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Abstract
A keyboard is a simple input device. Its function is to send keystroke informa-
tion to the computer (or other device) to which it is attached. Normally this
information is employed solely to produce text, but it can also be utilized as
part of an authentication system. Typist verification exploits a typist’s pat-
terns to check whether they are who they say they are, even after standard
authentication schemes have confirmed their identity. This thesis investigates
whether typists behave in a sufficiently unique yet consistent manner to enable
an effective level of verification based on their typing patterns.
Typist verification depends on more than the typist’s behaviour. The qual-
ity of the patterns and the algorithms used to compare them also determine
how accurately verification is performed. This thesis sheds light on all tech-
nical aspects of the problem, including data collection, feature identification
and extraction, and sample classification.
A dataset has been collected that is comparable in size, timing accuracy
and content to others in the field, with one important exception: it is derived
from real emails, rather than samples collected in an artificial setting. This
dataset is used to gain insight into what features distinguish typists from one
another. The features and dataset are used to train learning algorithms that
make judgements on the origin of previously unseen typing samples. These
algorithms use “one-class classification”; they make predictions for a particular
user having been trained on only that user’s patterns.
This thesis examines many one-class classification algorithms, including
ones designed specifically for typist verification. New algorithms and features
are proposed to increase speed and accuracy. The best method proposed per-
forms at the state of the art in terms of classification accuracy, while de-
creasing the time taken for a prediction from minutes to seconds, and—more
importantly—without requiring any negative data from other users. Also, it
is general: it applies not only to typist verification, but to any other one-class
classification problem.
Overall, this thesis concludes that typist verification can be considered a
useful biometric technique.
i
Acknowledgments
This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance of a number
of people, too many to mention them all individually. I am grateful to anyone
who has helped me, supported me, and given me the strength necessary to
complete such a substantial piece of work as this thesis. However, there are
several groups who I would like to personally thank for their considerable input
into my work.
First, I would like to thank the Tertiary Education Commission and the
University of Waikato for the generous scholarships they have provided me
with. This thesis would not have been possible without their financial support.
Second, I would like to express my gratitude to the authors of “Learning to
Identify a Typist” and “Keystroke Analysis of Free Text” who kindly provided
me with their datasets. Your work catalyzed my interest in typist verification,
and the datasets provided me with great insights - which are reflected in this
thesis.
Third, I would like to thank my supervisors, Eibe and Ian, who have pro-
vided me with the guidance, encouragement and academic aid necessary to
complete this thesis. Ian, your confidence in my work and optimism was con-
stantly reassuring - I feel truly honoured to have you as a supervisor. Equally,
Eibe your advice was always welcome, and your assistance with technical as-
pects of this thesis was much appreciated. Without either of you I am certain
I would not have been able to complete this thesis.
Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the support provided by
my family, friends, lab co-inhabitants, Team xG, pets and partner. Mum, Dad
and Paul - you have always been there for me and words cannot express how
grateful I am of that. To all my friends and colleagues, thank you. To those
of you still working on your PhDs - hang in there! To Lily and Oscar, for
always brightening my day and showing that cat-hugs really are the best kind
of hugs. And to Mark - your patience, faith in me and care of me will forever
be cherished.
iii
Contents
Abstract i
Acknowledgments iii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Verification Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Thesis Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Background 13
2.1 Biometrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.1 Biometric System Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.2 Evaluating Biometric Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Typing as a Biometric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Password Hardening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Static Typist Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Continuous Typist Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Replicating the State of the Art 35
3.1 Statistical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Learning To Identify A Typist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.1 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.2 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Keystroke Analysis of Free Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.1 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.2 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4 Comparison of Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4.1 Comparison Using the ROC Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
v
3.4.2 Comparison Using Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4 Data Collection 51
4.1 Collecting Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1.1 Recording with SquirrelMail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.1.2 Technical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1.3 Ethical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Final Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3 Re-evaluation of Existing Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5 Preliminary Experiments with New Techniques 63
5.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.2 PPM-Based Classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2.1 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3 Spread Classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3.1 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.4 Context Classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.4.1 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.5 Individual Digraph Classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.5.1 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.6 Performance Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6 Typist Behaviour 79
6.1 The Digraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.2 From Digraphs to Finger Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.3 Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.4 Pausing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.5 Ordering of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.6 Speed and Error Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7 One-Class Classification 97
7.1 One-Class Classification versus Multi-Class Classification . . . . 99
vi
7.1.1 Comparing Classifiers Fairly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
7.1.2 Evaluation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
7.1.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7.1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.2 Methods of One-Class Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.3 Combining Density and Class Probability Estimation . . . . . . 109
7.3.1 Combining Classifiers Using Bayes’ Rule . . . . . . . . . 110
7.3.2 Combined Classifier Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.3.3 Generating Different Proportions of Artificial Data . . . 114
7.3.4 Using Real Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.3.5 Replacing Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8 Typist Verification as One-Class Classification 119
8.1 Typing and One-Class Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.1.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.1.2 Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
8.1.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
8.2 Adding Mouse Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
8.2.1 Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
8.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
8.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
9 Conclusions 131
9.1 Collecting Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
9.2 Identifying Channels of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
9.3 Requirements for System Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
9.4 Revisiting the Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
9.5 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
References 137
A Experiment Details 145
A.1 Purpose of Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.1.1 Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.1.2 Email Recording . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.2 Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
A.3 Network Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
vii
A.4 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
A.5 Data Archiving/Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
A.6 Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
A.7 Example Email Recording . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
A.8 How to read an email recording . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B Instructions For Participants 159
B.1 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
B.2 Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
B.3 CS Webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
B.4 Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
B.5 Recording Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
B.6 Final Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
C Questionnaire 167
D List of Top 54 Predictive Digraphs 171
viii
List of Figures
2.1 Alphabetic layout (from [65]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 The original QWERTY keyboard layout (from [64]). . . . . . . . 14
2.3 The enrollment process for biometrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 The prediction process for biometrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1 The main workbench window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Partial ROC curves for KAOFT and LTIAT . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.1 Distribution of times for Backspace Backspace . . . . . . . . . 81
6.2 Times for Backspace Backspace for Participants A and J (one
sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.3 Times for Backspace Backspace for Participants A and J (all
samples) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.4 Times th for Participants A and J (one sample) . . . . . . . . . 83
6.5 Times th for Participants A and G (one sample) . . . . . . . . . 84
6.6 Slur rate versus typist speed (WPM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.1 Cross-validation for biased two-class classification (with rela-
belling) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.2 Cross-validation for one-class classification (with relabelling) . . 101
7.3 Cross-validation for unbiased two-class classification (with rela-
belling) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.4 Classes removed versus weighted AUC for the audiology dataset. 107
A.1 Login screen—standard CS webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
A.2 Inbox screen—standard CS webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
A.3 Compose screen—standard CS webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
A.4 Login screen—RT CS webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
A.5 Inbox screen—RT CS webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
A.6 Compose screen—RT CS webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
A.7 Registration screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
A.8 Main screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
A.9 Reconstructed email screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
A.10 Reconstructed email screen showing raw recording—Mail Analysis152
ix
A.11 Summary screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
A.12 Options screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
A.13 Login screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
B.1 Login screen—RT CS webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
B.2 Inbox screen—RT CS webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.3 Compose screen—RT CS webmail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.4 Registration screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
B.5 Main screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
B.6 Reconstructed email screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
B.7 Reconstructed email screen showing recording—Mail Analysis . 164
B.8 Summary screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
B.9 Options screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
B.10 Login screen—Mail Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
x
List of Tables
2.1 Password hardening techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Static typist verification techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Continuous typist verification techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 Experimental results for the LTIAT algorithm . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 FRR/IPR results for the LTIAT algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Experimental results for distance measures R and A . . . . . . . 45
3.4 Experimental results for combined R and A measures . . . . . . 45
3.5 Summary of comparison experiment results . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1 Emails recorded per participant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Re-evaluation results using new datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1 Effect of PPM model order on prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.2 Final results for PPM using order = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3 Final results for the Spread Classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.4 Effect of different context lengths on the Context Classifier . . . 73
5.5 Final results for the Context Classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.6 Final results for the Individual Digraph Classifier . . . . . . . . 75
5.7 Average build and classification times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.1 AUC values for popular digraphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.2 AUC values for movement types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.3 AUC values for pausing between words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.4 AUC values for key ordering measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.5 AUC values for WPM and backspace rate . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.1 Weighted AUC results for multi-class, two-class and one-class
classifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.2 Weighted AUC results for reduced numbers of non-target classes 106
7.3 Weighted AUC for two-class and one-class classifiers . . . . . . . 113
7.4 Effect of P (A) on the weighted AUC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.5 Results of using real negative data in one-class classifiers . . . . 116
8.1 Final results for the Combined OCC typist classifier . . . . . . . 124
xi
8.2 Results using different sample lengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
8.3 AUC values for the Mouse Use feature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8.4 AUC values for the Mouse Backspace feature . . . . . . . . . . . 128
8.5 Results for Mouse Use and the Combined OCC Typist Classifier 128
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
For over one hundred years, keyboards have been an essential tool for the
production of any printed text. As technology has developed, the keyboard
has evolved from the humble typewriter to become the standard input device
for modern computers. Yet despite the proliferation of keyboards—especially
over the last 30 years as the popularity of personal computers has exploded—
little thought has been given to using a keyboard for anything other than
entering text. This is not surprising: the keyboard was originally intended as
an input device and to this day its primary purpose remains unchallenged.
Just like any other tool, we would expect that people regularly using a
keyboard will become proficient at typing. “Typing” is simply “writing with
a typewriter or computer” [74], but an extended definition states that it is
the “process of inputting text into a device, such as a typewriter, computer,
or a calculator, by pressing keys on a keyboard” [75]. Both these definitions
cover every entry technique from hunt-and-peck input to skilled touch typing.
Considering keyboards as mere entry devices overlooks a very important notion
suggested by the last sentence; if different people have different techniques for
entering text, perhaps the keyboard could also be used as an authentication
or identification device.
It is this notion that forms the basis of this thesis. Is it possible to verify
the identity of a keyboard user based on how they type? This is a different
task to authorship verification, which focuses on what is written, rather than
how. It is also different from identification or recognition: identification and
recognition ask “who am I?” whereas verification and authentication ask “am
I who I claim I am?” [39]. In summary, typist verification makes a judgment
of whether that person is indeed who they say they are by examining the way
they type.
1
1.1 Verification Systems
Just as doors only protect rooms from people who cannot turn a handle, au-
thenticated computer sessions are only secure against people who cannot use a
computer. If security is important, access must be controlled—by locking the
door or computer so that only those with the key can gain entry. The “key”
used depends on what is being controlled. It may be a physical object—in the
case of a door, a metal key cut with grooves—or a piece of information that
must be committed to memory, such as a PIN or password. The security of
the system relies on the key being held by only the authorised user; security
is forfeited if the key is lost, duplicated or passed on to anyone else.
Furthermore, access control systems typically verify a user only once—when
they first present themselves to the system. Depending on what the system
controls access to, the user may also be required to notify the system when
they are finished. For example, at the border of a country you are required to
present identification whenever you enter or leave. In a computer system, a
login consisting of a username/password pair is often used to gain access to the
system, and a simple “log off” command is used to indicate that the computing
session has ended. The main difference between these two scenarios is that in
the latter it is possible for another individual to use the system without needing
to identify themselves first. If the user does not notify the computer system
that they are finished, it will continue to operate under the assumption that
the authorised user is still in control.
To combat this, the computer could be automatically locked after a certain
period of inactivity. Additional hardware or software could be employed to
detect when the user is no longer operating the computer; the software ap-
plication BlueProximity locks a computer when a physical token is no longer
sufficiently close that it is detected [27]. However, neither of these solutions
are complete: an unauthorised individual can access the system if it is still
active, or when they have the key.
Biometrics can provide a solution that ensures continuous security, with-
out requiring the user to remember information or possess a particular token.
Biometrics literally translates to “life measurement” [78], and it relies on mea-
surements of the user themselves to perform authentication. If the recorded
measurements do not match the user’s profile, the person is refused access to
the system. By placing biometric sensors directly in front of the user they can
be continuously verified without interrupting their normal tasks.
Typist verification is an example of a biometric authentication system
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where the keyboard serves as the biometric sensor. The system monitors a
user’s typing patterns in order to perform authentication. If the current pat-
tern is sufficiently different from the reference one, the user is refused access
to the system. However, unlike traditional access control systems, monitoring
can occur continuously. This means that typist verification can act as both
the access control key and as a policeman that constantly checks that the
authorised user is the only one in control of the system.
These two modes of access control are often separated; systems that check
a user’s identity when they first present themselves are known as “static” or
“fixed text” typist verification, and those that operate continuously are known
as “continuous”, “dynamic”, or “free text” typist verification. In a continuous
system users are free to enter whatever they please and the keystroke data is
collected until the session is terminated. In contrast, static typist verification
requires the user to type some known text and only records events that occur
whilst this text is being entered. Continuous verification is more difficult be-
cause there is no restriction on what is typed; it is possible for a new sample
to contain radically different sequences of key events to what has been entered
previously.
1.2 Thesis Statement
This thesis argues that
there is enough information in a user’s typing input for continuous
typist verification to be a useful form of biometric authentication.
Continuous typist verification is the scenario introduced in the previous section:
verifying users’ identities by examining the way they type, without placing
any restrictions on what they type. The input is a stream of key events (key
presses and releases) and the time that each occurs. This thesis considers
only verification, not identification: success for the task of verification implies
that identification is also possible. Also, verification is more appropriate in a
computer system controlled with a login process because the expected identity
of the user is known.
The question of whether the level of verification that is achieved is useful
or not depends on several parameters:
1. The set of possible users.
2. Constraints on how quickly an impostor should be identified.
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3. The different kinds of typing information that can be monitored.
4. How much information is available to the monitoring program.
5. Technical and ethical issues.
6. The amount of user variability between reference samples and test sam-
ples.
7. The desired level of accuracy.
The set of users should not affect the performance of a verification system
because, in principle, there is no need to know about how other people type to
confirm a given identity. However, this depends on the design of the system.
For example, Gunetti and Picardi [33] compare the test sample to reference
samples from every other user in their database, causing the system to perform
well when there are many registered users and to fail completely when there
is only one. An ideal system would not have this requirement, and this thesis
investigates whether negative information (that is, data from other users) is
necessary for successful verification.
Constraints on how quickly a behaviour-based verification system responds
can greatly affect how well it performs. If it is required to respond quickly to
an illegitimate user, the size of the sample being verified must be short enough
that an impostor need only type a small amount before being refused access.
Although passwords are often only 6 to 10 characters in length, the text is
always identical and because it is well known by the user, the pattern of entry
for the password is well defined. This means that a static verification algorithm
can correctly verify a user with little input. With continuous verification,
however, there may not be enough elements in common between the test sample
and the reference profile to make a confident classification. Conversely, when
samples are large enough to make a confident classification they may contain so
much text that they are no longer useful for security purposes. Larger samples
also take longer to classify than shorter ones. If the system is required to
provide a response in a timely manner after the sample has been collected, it
may be unable to do so if large samples of input are provided. Later chapters
investigate the trade-off between system classification accuracy and sample
length.
As well as size, the content of a typing sample also affects how well typist
verification performs. If the recorded sample contains both key press and
release events and their associated times, the following types of information
can be obtained:
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• Overall typing speed and accuracy.
• Genre of the task (e.g., email, instant messaging).
• Correction habits (e.g., whether backspace or delete is used for a given
correction).
• Modifier key patterns (e.g., whether the left or right shift key is pressed
to get a capital letter).
• Fine details of keystroke timings, including key press durations and key-
to-key latencies.
• Key press and release ordering patterns (e.g., whether a given key is
released before the next one is pressed).
One aim of this thesis is to quantify the amount of identity information carried
by each of these channels, in typical situations. As shown in the next chapter,
the most common typing patterns currently used for typist verification involve
using key press durations and key-to-key latencies.
The amount and quality of the information available to the identification
program recording the samples affects the difficulty of the task. For example,
if a software timer is used, recorded times are less accurate than when using
a hardware timer because the latter is unaffected by system load. However, a
software timer is more appealing for typist verification because no extra equip-
ment is required. When recording spans several tasks, the software application
being used may affect the way the user types. Due to operating system security,
it may not be possible for installed software to automatically determine the
identity of the current application. This can be solved by implementing typist
verification within each application, but this may be impractical. Ideally, a
continuous verification system is agnostic regarding the source of keystrokes.
In this thesis, only typing from within an email is collected, using a software
timer. Chapter 4 discusses this process in detail.
The amount of information that can be recorded may also be affected by
technical or ethical issues. Recording typing continuously may result in con-
fidential data being captured, such as bank account details, passwords, or
personal correspondence. If samples are stored, there is a risk that an attacker
may be able to access any private data they contain. If the computer system
monitoring key events is not strictly controlled, technical issues may arise from
insufficient, incorrect or missing data. In these cases the system may choose
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to ignore the samples; using them could damage the integrity or accuracy of
the verification system.
The most difficult parameter to control when performing typist verification
relates to user variability, that is, the degree to which a user’s typing patterns
naturally fluctuate. A typist’s behaviour can change with illness, mood, stress
and fatigue throughout the course of a day. If text is entered with one hand in-
stead of two, perhaps because the typist is holding something or is injured, the
pattern of entry will be different. Over longer periods of time—weeks, months
and even years—a typist may become more (or less) proficient at typing. Be-
cause it is unlikely that any of these effects can be controlled, any potentially
useful typing system must be capable of dealing with such variations.
Finally, the accuracy obtained by the system also determines how useful it
will be. There is a trade-off between correctly identifying users and impostors:
when constraints are relaxed so it is easier for a user to be identified as them-
selves, it is inevitably easier for an impostor to pass as that user too. If the
system is designed to refuse access to all impostors, it may also reject legiti-
mate users on a regular basis. There are no guidelines available to suggest what
would be an appropriate level of accuracy, especially since the desired trade-off
depends greatly on the cost of each type of error in a particular scenario.
It is considered rather unlikely that the hypothesis stated at the begin-
ning of this section will be upheld except in rather restricted circumstances.
Password-based static verification, better known as “password hardening,” is
one such circumstance, but does not fall within the hypothesis because it is
not performed on a continuous basis. A somewhat less restricted circumstance
is free typing within a particular program where users can type whatever they
like. Previous research (discussed further in Chapter 2) suggests that success-
ful identity verification can perhaps be accomplished in this rather unrealistic
scenario, at least under certain conditions. The other end of the spectrum is
when the user works naturally throughout a normal working day. This thesis
focuses on verifying a user where each sample in the system is an email. This
is similar to other continuous techniques described in Chapter 2, but extends
them because it uses real emails rather than artificial ones.
1.3 Motivation
The extent to which typing patterns can be used on a continuous basis for ver-
ifying an individual’s identity is currently unknown. It is known that in some
restricted circumstances authentication can be performed using typing from
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passwords and usernames, but there has been little investigation of continuous
verification. Because of this, there are many unexplored avenues that could
contain valuable information about a user’s typing habits.
This information is not just valuable for typist verification. It can also
be employed for accessibility, interface development and for testing the opti-
misation of keyboard layouts. For example, if a user “stutters” their typing,
pressing a given key more than necessary, the bounce delay can be automati-
cally increased to filter out the extra key presses. Fitts’ Law [25] can be applied
to an interface design to evaluate its effectiveness, but instead of using an esti-
mate that considers each key press as an equal quantity, individual—and more
accurate—key event times could be used. These same key event times could
be used to determine whether one keyboard layout is better than another. In
fact, the above scenarios have already been investigated in practice [73, 26, 35],
but the full data was never released; only the results of the experiments were
made available.
Studies of typing habits have traditionally focused on increasing a typist’s
speed. This is an admirable goal, and a large amount of work is devoted to
it. Some of this research can be used to give insights into a typist’s behaviour,
and this is discussed in Chapter 6. Unfortunately no datasets have been found
to be available because much of the relevant research happened over 50 years
ago and is based on typewriters, not computers.
Continuous typist verification is arguably more desirable than any other
scenario posed here: it allows the integrity of unattended computers to be
protected without great expense. The problem differs from static verification
or password hardening, but is applicable in a wider range of scenarios because
there is no need to place any restrictions on what the user types. Continuous
typist verification is designed to detect when a user does not appear to be
themselves, usually when an impostor starts using the system. However, it may
also be the case that the user themselves demonstrates abnormal behaviour.
This may be just as important to detect. In situations where a high degree of
risk accompanies abnormal user behaviour, such as operating heavy machinery,
refusing access to the system may prevent injuries, or worse.
In order to discover how useful continuous typist verification really is, two
concerns need to be addressed. The first is to gather a dataset of recorded
typing from a range of individuals. The second is to use this dataset for an in-
depth investigation into typist behaviour. This thesis addresses these concerns
by studying current techniques, collecting a dataset, exploring the behaviour of
the monitored typists, and presenting new algorithms that can perform typist
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verification on a continuous basis.
1.4 Contributions
The discussion in Section 1.2 and the motivation from the previous section is
summarised in the following objectives:
1. To discover whether negative information is necessary for successful ver-
ification.
2. To investigate the trade-off between sample size and classification accu-
racy.
3. To clarify the ethical and technical issues associated with typist recogni-
tion and find methods to address them.
4. To identify channels of information in typing input and the amount of
identity information in each.
5. To investigate whether mouse button press and release information can
be used to increase the accuracy of typist verification using keyboard
patterns.
By addressing the above objectives, this thesis makes a number of contribu-
tions, including:
1. A new approach for performing one-class classification.
2. The definition of a domain where one-class classification is effective.
3. New algorithms for dealing with typist data.
4. A demonstration that continuous typing input can be described accu-
rately by aggregate features rather than a raw stream.
5. Tools for logging key events, mouse events and their timings across a
range of different platforms.
6. A dataset of anonymous users and their typing input in a real-world
situation.
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An important contribution is the new approach for performing one-class
classification. The implications of this method extend beyond typist verifica-
tion; it is completely general and can be applied to any one-class problem.
Typist verification is one example of a one-class problem; detecting cancer is
another. Another important contribution is an investigation showing when
one-class classification should be used for two-class problems, even when neg-
ative data is available. The remaining contributions all relate to typist verifi-
cation, and will be discussed in detail in later chapters.
1.5 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 gives an overview of biometrics, and introduces the concepts that
will be used to describe typist verification in subsequent chapters. It also
surveys related work, covering existing techniques for password hardening,
static typist verification and continuous typist verification. This survey is
helpful in determining what might be an appropriate level of accuracy, in
general, for typist verification. It provides benchmarks for both prediction
time and accuracy, which are later used to evaluate new techniques introduced
in this thesis.
Chapter 3 examines two of the techniques from Chapter 2 in detail. Each
has been re-implemented using the Java programming language, and evaluated
using the datasets from the original studies. The two techniques are then
compared to each other using accuracy measures and by utilising the other’s
datasets. This chapter gives insight into the trade-offs between sample size
and classification accuracy, and whether negative information is necessary to
be able to verify a typist. Chapter 3 highlights the need for a better dataset of
typing data: the selected algorithms perform poorly when presented with the
other’s datasets. This is due to a variety of reasons—including the datasets
themselves—that are also discussed in this chapter.
The next chapter, Chapter 4, addresses the inadequacies of existing
datasets for evaluating many different typist verification techniques. It be-
gins by describing how email-based typing data was collected from 19 users
over a period of 3 months. In total, almost 3000 emails were collected from
the participants. However, several issues had to be addressed before these
emails could be used for evaluating typist verification systems. Sections 4.1.2
and 4.1.3 discuss the technical and ethical issues that occurred during data col-
lection. Finally, this chapter revisits the work from Chapter 3 and evaluates
the re-implemented techniques with the new dataset.
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Chapter 5 introduces four new approaches to typist verification, drawing
on related work in Chapters 2 and 3. First, a similar approach to the first
technique in Chapter 3 is proposed, substituting Prediction by Partial Match-
ing (PPM) for the LZ78-based classifier. Second, a Gaussian-based approach
is investigated, using digraph times to create a na¨ıve Bayes style classifier.
Third, a context-based classifier is proposed, combining ideas from the first
two classifiers. The fourth uses a multi-class classifier to perform verification
on individual digraphs. The four techniques are evaluated using the dataset
from Chapter 4, and compared with each other and with the techniques from
Chapter 3.
Chapter 6 uses one dataset introduced in Chapter 4 to explore how typists
behave as they type an email. It begins by examining digraphs, that is, the
time between two consecutive key press events. It then moves on to finger
movements, drawing similarities between digraphs typed in a similar pattern
of fingering. Section 6.4 studies when typists pause, and suggests reasons why
they may hesitate—even fleetingly—as they type. Section 6.3 covers the usage
of each key, particularly the invisible, modifier and non-alphabetic keys. The
exploration in this chapter gives great insight into how typists behave, which
of course can be exploited for verification. More importantly, the chapter
identifies what channels of information are available in a typing sample.
Chapter 7 broadens the scope by investigating an important machine learn-
ing paradigm that can used for typist verification, and other problems. This
paradigm is known as one-class classification. One-class classification is the
use of machine learning algorithms for prediction, when it has been trained
using only positive examples. It is analogous with novelty or outlier detection
because it detects abnormal behaviour, except that it does not attempt to
detect outliers in the training data. This chapter investigates when it is ap-
propriate to use one-class classification, even when negative data is available.
It also surveys existing one-class classifiers. Lastly, a new general technique for
one-class classification is introduced, which is one of the main contributions of
the thesis.
Chapter 8 relates the work in Chapter 7 to the problem of continuous
typist verification. Features are identified using the channels of information
suggested in Chapters 6 and 5, and these are used to train a general one-class
classifier. The dataset from Chapter 4 is used for evaluation. This chapter
addresses the argument of this thesis directly. It also covers the use of mouse
patterns to improve classification accuracy.
Finally, Chapter 9 reflects on the work in earlier chapters, and summarises
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them. The thesis ends with an outline of possible future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
Around 140 years ago, in the late 1800s, two quite different events occurred that
together underpin the field of typist verification: Christopher Sholes invented
the modern typewriter [64] and Alphonse Bertillon formalised an early form of
biometrics known as “anthropometrics”[78]. Typewriters had existed since the
early 1700s [17], but until 1878 their keyboards were a single line of keys, often
in a piano-like format and arranged alphabetically, as shown in Figure 2.1 [65].
Sholes tiered the keyboard into four rows of keys, in a format that we now call
QWERTY (shown in Figure 2.2). The reason for this layout change was to
prevent neighbouring typewriting bars from jamming by putting common letter
pairs onto separate hands. At the time, touch typing was unheard of; typists
used “hunt-and-peck”—first finding the appropriate keys, and then using the
index fingers of either hand to strike them [17].
Although not the original intention, QWERTY had the by-product of slow-
ing hunt-and-peck typists because the keyboard was no longer in an intuitive
alphabetic format [10]. Touch typing was to be the solution to this problem.
Typists learnt to memorise the keys, and type using four fingers of each hand
(using the thumb for the space bar). Regimented lessons were eventually in-
troduced to teach the skill of touch typing. The first book published as a study
of typing behaviour describes how, despite these lessons, each typist had their
own style that reflects their personality [23]. The book outlines how on one
occasion a neatly dressed gentleman “turned in typed sheets which were de-
cidedly not neat”[23]. On closer inspection it was revealed that the student
was anything but neat in real life, and his appearance was due to the trim
naval uniform he was required to wear. This is the first documented example
of keyboards (and typewriters) being used to learn something about a typist.
In other words, it is the first documented example of typing being used as a
biometric.
However, biometrics were used for verification long before typing was in-
vented. One of the first examples can be traced to Ancient Egypt: in the Nile
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Figure 2.1: Alphabetic layout (from [65]).
Figure 2.2: The original QWERTY keyboard layout (from [64]).
Valley traders were formally identified using physical attributes such as eye
colour [17].
Despite a long history, the field of biometrics was not formally described
until after the modern typewriter was invented. Alphonse Bertillon intro-
duced “anthropometrics” (literally, “human measurements”) in 1882, formally
describing a biometric identification technique for the first time [78]. He took
measurements of a person and noted any unusual features such as tattoos or
scars, with the intention of using this to identify them [78]. In later years the
same idea came to be known as biometrics (“life measurements”). Nowadays,
biometrics are used to verify identity through physical characteristics such as
fingerprints and behavioural ones such as typing [39].
This chapter provides background information relating to the use of
keystroke timings for biometric authentication. The next section describes
how biometrics can be used for authentication, how techniques are evaluated
and the processes used at various stages. Section 2.2 explains how typing can
be used as a biometric, and defines some terms that will be used later in this
thesis. The next three sections discuss existing typist verification techniques,
from password hardening and static verification in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 through
to continuous verification in Section 2.5. The thesis focuses on continuous typ-
ist verification, but this chapter explores a wider area to give the necessary
background.
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2.1 Biometrics
Traditional authentication or identification systems use something you have,
such as access cards, or something you know, such as a PIN or password,
to check a user’s identity [78]. In contrast, biometrics measure something
about you [78]. The measurements of a user can be either physiological or
behavioural [39]. Fingerprints are an example of a physiological biometric,
and typing a behavioural one. There are many others, including voice, infrared
facial and hand vein thermograms, face, iris, ear, gait, signature, DNA, odor,
hand and finger geometry, and retinal scans [39]. Only four of these have a
behavioural component: voice, gait, signature and typing.
Behavioural biometrics are generally considered weaker than physiological
ones since they are more susceptible to fluctuations over time. For example, a
user who feels tired may type more slowly than normal. Physical biometrics
do no have this variability: a tired person may be more sloppy at placing their
finger on a fingerprint scanner, but so long as it is aligned correctly their state
of mind will have no affect on the measurement. Behavioural biometrics also
change over time as the user becomes more practiced at the activity being
monitored.
Jain et al. [39] state several ideal features of a biometric measure:
• Universality Everyone should have it.
• Uniqueness No two people should be the same.
• Permanence The measure should be invariant with time.
• Collectability It should be quantitatively measurable.
• Performance The overall system should be accurate.
• Acceptability People should be willing to accept the measure.
• Circumvention The system should not be easily fooled.
Fingerprinting scores well. Most people have fingerprints (medium univer-
sality), they do not change with time (high permanence), the chance of two
fingerprints being the same is low (high uniqueness), fingerprints remain the
same throughout time (high permanence), current systems are good (high per-
formance), most people do not mind their fingerprints being taken (medium
acceptability), and they are easily collected (medium collectability) [39]. The
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major downfall is circumvention: advanced fingerprint locks have been defeated
with nothing more than a photocopy of a valid print [62].
All these features are subjective: the values from Jain et al. [39] were de-
termined from the opinions of three independent experts. According to them,
typing has low permanence and performance, and medium collectability, ac-
ceptability and circumvention; no suggestions are made about the qualities of
universality and uniqueness. In this thesis, Chapter 6 will tackle universal-
ity and uniqueness, Chapter 4 deals with collectability and acceptability, and
Chapters 3, 5 and 8 cover permanence and performance. This thesis does not
consider circumvention directly because no typist was given the opportunity
to observe another’s habits before attacking the system.
Although physiological biometrics rate better than behavioural ones on
many of the above features, they usually require users to present themselves
to the sensor, interrupting any task currently underway. On the other hand,
behavioural biometrics can be used continuously without causing interruptions.
This is where the power of a behaviour-based system lies: it can constantly
perform authentication. This extra layer of security is desirable in situations
where opportunities exist for an impostor to access an active system. This
is especially true for computers because it is easy to leave an authenticated
machine unattended.
2.1.1 Biometric System Processes
There are two stages to all biometric systems: enrollment and prediction. Both
physiological and behavioural biometrics use the same processes, although the
individual components differ depending on the type of biometric that is em-
ployed. Figure 2.3 shows the process for enrolling. Data is collected until it
is considered acceptable, and then stashed in a data store. Each sample is
annotated with the user’s ID in the system, ensuring that its source is known.
The process may be repeated several times depending on how many samples
are required for the system to perform at a satisfactory level.
Once they are enrolled in the system, a user’s new input can be checked
using the process in Figure 2.4. Samples are collected in the same way as
before. Some systems reject users if the samples are inadequate; others simply
request them to try again, or to provide more data. An acceptable sample,
the user ID and the stored samples known to belong to that user are provided
to a matching process, which outputs an estimated probability that the new
sample matches the stored samples for that user. If the probability reaches
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Figure 2.3: The enrollment process for biometrics.
the system threshold the sample is classified positively; otherwise it is rejected
as belonging to an impostor.
Between the enrollment and prediction stages, most systems process the
stored samples into some kind of model. In this case, the matching process
need only compare the sample to the pre-built model—making predictions
faster than if the process also had to build the model at this step. The threshold
can be varied to change the trade-off between incorrectly rejecting users and
allowing impostors through.
2.1.2 Evaluating Biometric Measures
Two types of error determine the effectiveness of a biometric system: Type I
and Type II errors; false positives and false negatives respectively. False posi-
tives occur when impostors are wrongly classified as the user. False negatives
occur when a user is wrongly refused access. In a perfect system, neither would
be present. In reality, these errors happen regularly and exhibit a trade-off:
increasing the number of false negatives makes it harder for an impostor to
pass, so the number of false positives is reduced. The reverse is also true: if it
is easier for an attacker to pass, legitimate users are less likely to be rejected.
Where security is a concern, systems will attempt to minimise the number
of false positives; it is more acceptable to annoy real users than to allow an
attacker access.
In typist verification systems, these two types of errors are referred to as
the Impostor Pass Rate (Type I error) and the False Rejection Rate (Type II
error). The Impostor Pass Rate (IPR) measures the number of impostors that
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Figure 2.4: The prediction process for biometrics.
are allowed access. The False Rejection Rate (FRR) measures the number
of times the system falsely rejects a legitimate user. In many other biometric
systems, alternative names are used: the IPR is also known as the False Accept
Rate (FAR) or False Match Rate (FMR); the FRR can also be known as the
False Alarm Rate (FAR) or the False Non-Match Rate (FNMR). To prevent
confusion, this thesis uses the terms IPR and FRR throughout.
The Equal Error Rate (EER) can also be used as a performance measure
to compare biometric systems. This is where the FRR and IPR are equal.
The Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve is a plot of the true
positive rate versus the false positive rate [77] and the EER, FRR and IPR
can be read off it. The advantage of reporting the EER over the FRR and
IPR is that it provides a single measure of performance. However, in many
situations—especially security—it is more desirable to have an IPR that is as
low as possible, so reporting both figures is more useful in determining how
useful the system will be. For example, Cho et al. [13, 79, 80] report the FRR
when the IPR = 0. In the field of password hardening (discussed in Section
2.3) Monrose et al. set the FRR to be as low as possible because the typing
patterns only have to strengthen the password, not replace it [47]. Existing
biometric techniques typically report both the FRR and IPR, tuned to the
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security requirements of their real world application.
Some systems report the accuracy or the error rate as measures of per-
formance. These are the percentage of predictions the system got right and
wrong respectively. Unfortunately, using these measures conceals the trade-off
between false positives and false negatives, so it is difficult to tell whether a
system will fit a given situation.
This chapter presents the FRR and IPR of all assessed systems, and else-
where in the thesis the area under the ROC curve (AUC) is also reported.
The AUC gives the probability that a randomly-chosen positive instance will
rank higher than a randomly-chosen negative one, meaning that systems with
an AUC value close to one are more likely to make correct classifications than
systems with a lower AUC value. The AUC is independent of any thresholds,
making it possible to assess two systems without needing to consider whether
the threshold they utilize is the best one. Another advantage of using AUC is
that by generating the ROC curve it is possible to read off the values for the
FRR given IPR, or the IPR given FRR.
2.2 Typing as a Biometric
In the Second World War, Morse code operators could be identified by the
length of their dots and dashes and their pauses between words and sen-
tences [66]. A remote operator’s patterns were often recorded by their home
stations; in the event that the operator was captured, false messages sent from
the enemy could be easily identified. A Morse key is the simplest possible
keyboard: it has a single key that is either on or off. The operator presses
and releases the key to generate the code, typing either a dot or a dash de-
pending on how long the key is held down. The rhythm of the operator can
be considered a behavioural biometric measure because measuring the lengths
of dots, dashes and pauses is sufficient information to verify identity. There is
no evidence to suggest that the individual styles of Morse operators proven to
exist in the 1930’s have not translated to the typewriter/computer keyboard.
After all, the standard US computer keyboard is just 104 small Morse keys.
Using a computer keyboard for biometric authentication is achieved in a
similar manner to a Morse key. In both cases, a keystroke is composed of two
distinct events—a key press (key down) event, and a key release (key up) event.
These events are recorded, and stamped with the current time. But because
a computer keyboard has many keys whereas a Morse key has only one, the
identity of the affected key must be recorded when any event occurs. The
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result of recording is a continuous stream of key events and times. Capturing
this stream, or “key logging,” is infamous on the Internet for its use by hackers
to obtain a victim’s private data. It can be implemented on a computer using
hardware or software, but the latter is more attractive for typist verification
systems because no extra equipment is required.
In the 1930’s the identity of Morse operators was verified manually. How-
ever, the process can be automated on a computer, although this is not always
necessary, as shown later in Section 2.4. The computer records the event/time
stream and divides it up into samples for processing. Each sample usually cor-
responds to an entire session of typing, although large samples may be broken
up into smaller ones for easier processing.
The samples are either immediately provided to a machine learning algo-
rithm for direct integration into a predictive model or are pre-processed into
a set of features first. Both cases result in a model that can be used to make
predictions on previously unseen samples of typing, with no manual input.
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages, and these will be discussed
in later chapters. The main idea of both techniques is the same: when given
a new sample of recorded typing, they can predict whether or not it belongs
to a given user. The system of recording, processing into samples, extracting
features, learning, and prediction of new samples is typist verification.
2.2.1 Terminology
The input to a typist verification system is a stream of key events and the time
that each one occurs. Each event is either a press or a release. The stream
does not always alternate perfectly between presses and releases. For example,
one key may be held down whilst the next is pressed, causing two presses to
appear consecutively, followed by the releases. Most verification techniques
make use of the time between pairs of events, typically the digraph time or
keystroke duration. The following list explains terms used in typing research:
Key Event A key event is a single action with a key. It is a key press if the
key is pressed down, or a key release if the key is being let go. Key-
down and key-up events are alternative terms for presses and releases,
respectively.
Key Logging The act of recording key events.
Keystroke A keystroke is the press and release of a single key.
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Digraph Any sequence of two consecutive key press events, also referred to as
a digram or bigram. Sequences with three characters are trigraphs, with
four are four-graphs, and so on. Digraphs can additionally be classified
into groups indicating which finger was responsible for each key, the type
of movement being employed, what row the keys were typed on, or even
which hand typed each key. For example, 1F, 2F, 1H and 2H digraphs
refer to whether the digraph was typed with one finger (1F), two different
fingers (2F), one hand (1H), or two (2H). [31]
Digraph Time The digraph time is the time between two consecutive key
press events. It is sometimes called the key-to-key latency, keystroke
latency, interstroke time or interkeystroke interval. [31]
Keystroke Duration The keystroke duration is the time between the press
event and the related key release event for a single key. This is sometimes
known as the key-down time, dwell time or hold time. [31]
Inter-key Time The inter-key time or the key delay is the time between the
release of one key and the press of the next. This time may be negative
if the key release for the earlier key occurs after the key press event for
the later key.
Words-per-minute (WPM) Rate The WPM Rate is the number of words
that a typist can type in a minute, on average. A “word” is standardised
to 5 characters or keystrokes, including spaces. This thesis considers
keystrokes: the final number of characters for a sample is not known
because a mouse was available for editing in the considered datasets.
The estimates of a typist’s speed using keystrokes is higher than using
characters because inevitably there will be corrected mistakes in a final
text that account for extra keystrokes. Traditional calculations of speed
on a typewriter utilize uncorrected text; mistakes are scored separately
because they are notoriously difficult to correct.
Error Rate The error rate is how often a typist makes a mistake. Errors
are difficult to automatically detect in a computer system; historically
they were marked against a hard copy of copy-typed text. To recognise
whether a particular keystroke is intended or not, the reader must have
some understanding of the text. Computers do not yet adequately under-
stand text, although they can spell-check for simple mistakes. Instead,
the correction rate—how often the text is corrected—can be accurately
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Algorithm FRR (%) IPR (%) Sample Content Classifier
Joyce and Gupta [40] 16.36 0.25 Username, password and names Statistical
D’Souza [21] 24.00 0.00 Username, password and names Statistical
Bleha et al. [9] 8.10 2.80 Name and fixed phrase Bayes
Monrose and Rubin [49] ≈7.86% ≈7.86% Username, password and names Bayes
Ong and Lai [52] ≈15.00 ≈15.00 Password Clustering
Monrose et al. [47] 2.00 60.00 Password Distance
Revett et al. [58] 5.60 5.60 Password Distance
Hocquet et al. [38] 3.27 3.75 Username and password Ensemble
Chang [12] 5.33 1.08 Password Wavelets
Yu and Cho [79] 0.30 0.00 Password One-class SVM
Yu and Cho [80] 3.69 0.00 Password GA-SVM
Rodrigues et al. [60] 3.60 3.60 Numeric password HMM
Table 2.1: Password hardening techniques
observed from a stream of keystrokes, but only if the mouse was not used
for editing.
2.3 Password Hardening
Biometric authentication systems typically replace existing authentication sys-
tems. They can also extend them, requiring the user to perform authentication
normally, and provide some biometric information about themselves as well.
Password hardening is an unusual biometric system because it augments an
existing authentication system: passwords. It is so named because it “hard-
ens” the strength of a password by ensuring that it is not only typed correctly,
but typed in the right way [53]. This is an easier task than static or continuous
typist verification because the password content is known and it is expected
that the patterns are well-defined because users should be familiar with their
own passwords.
Unfortunately, it is well known that many users pick bad passwords that
can be easily guessed, often choosing actual words or variations of them (e.g.
scholar becomes sch0lar) [41]. It is not surprising that this occurs, because
in many cases passwords are required to be changed regularly and must meet
a minimum length, forcing users to choose something memorable and causing
them to be more likely to disclose their password [2]. For example, the New
Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau recommends that pass-
words should be “changed every 90 days”, “checked for poor choices”, “consist
of at least seven characters” and “contain characters from at least three of
the following sets: lowercase letters, uppercase letters, digits, punctuation and
special characters”[32]. With such strict requirements on passwords, harden-
ing becomes an attractive biometric system because it provides an added layer
of security, even when users select bad passwords. Table 2.1 summarises the
techniques discussed in this section.
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Joyce and Gupta [40] were the first to use password hardening in a modified
login environment. They obtained a set of reference samples by requiring each
of 33 users to type his/her username, password, first and last names, eight
times each. They suggest that those four well-known strings would have an
identifiable pattern since the typing “does not involve difficulties like reading
text from paper”[40]. In experiments, 975 classifications were attempted (of
which 165 came from legitimate users) and the system achieved a FRR of
16.36% and an IPR of 0.25%. Their system used digraph times, where outliers
greater than three standard deviations from the mean were discarded before the
system began classifying new samples. The classifier was based on a statistical
approach. For a sample to belong to the user each digraph was required to
fall with 1.5 standard deviations of its reference mean, for all digraphs in the
password.
D’Souza [21] used the same approach as Joyce and Gupta, with two small
changes. Instead of throwing away digraph samples that were considered out-
liers, all digraphs were kept. Also, instead of requiring all digraphs to pass,
only 80% were required to pass for a sample to be classified positively. The
dataset consisted of 11 users with 51-60 login attempts each. The FRR was
24%, higher than that of [40]. The IPR was reported at 0%, but this should be
taken with a grain of salt because it was determined from only two impostors
attacking four users, and on two occasions the impostors did successfully gain
access.
Another similar approach to Joyce and Gupta [40] was proposed by Bleha
et al. [9]. Their system utilized names and fixed phrases, such as “University
of Missouri Columbia”. Digraph times were used to train a Bayes classifier,
where a threshold was set on the overall probability that a sample belonged
to the user. Their system was evaluated using 14 users and 25 impostors,
resulting in a FRR of 8.1% and an IPR of 2.8% from 539 legitimate logins and
768 attacks.
Joyce and Gupta’s work [40] was extended by Monrose and Rubin [49] in
1999. The same type of content was used for a sample: username, password,
and first and last names for a single participant. 63 people provided samples
over a period of 11 months, although it is unclear how many samples were
provided by each person. In this work several different classification algorithms
were investigated. In all cases the digraph times and keystroke durations were
calculated for all possible digraphs, and factor analysis was applied to select a
subset of features. The users were then partitioned into groups using k-means
clustering. Three different classifiers were applied to the same task, all three
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using a nearest neighbour approach after calculating a distance or probability
for a test sample. The first classifier used a Euclidean distance between pattern
vectors. The second used a non-weighted probability; it assumed each feature
was distributed normally and independently—that is, a na¨ıve Bayes approach.
The third used a weighted probability; it was essentially the same as the second
approach, except that features were weighted based on their discriminative
power. Of the three methods, the weighted probability performed the best,
obtaining an accuracy of 87.18%.
The same authors went on to test a “Bayesian-like classifier” that charac-
terises the performance as a function of the number of classes being discrim-
inated. Each feature vector was assumed to be “distributed according to a
Gaussian distribution and an unknown vector is associated with the person
who maximises the probability of the measurement vector”[49]. The accuracy
of this technique was higher than the other three techniques, achieving 92.14%
on the same dataset. Monrose and Rubin’s approach is unique compared to
other approaches surveyed in this section because they use identification for
authentication. As mentioned in Chapter 1, identification systems find the
user from a particular group of known users. The problem in this case is that
the difficulty of verification depends on the set of users the system was trained
on. Some continuous typist verification techniques also use this approach, as
we will see later in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 and also in Chapter 3.
In 2000, Ong and Lai [52] asked 20 people to type three passwords 20 times,
resulting in 60 samples. They repeated this on two other occasions, each on
separate days and with the same users, over a period of two months. Their
classifier used the digraph times and a modified k-means clustering algorithm.
If a given password formed a cluster on its own, it was rejected as belonging to
an impostor. Compared to other techniques, their system performed poorly.
Their best results have a FRR and IPR of approximately 15% each.1 However,
they make an interesting observation: when impostors were allowed to watch
users enter their passwords they had a higher chance of a successful attack.
Monrose et al. [47] performed password hardening using a system where all
users had the same password. 481 successful logins were collected, for 20 users.
Features were selected from digraph times and keystroke durations, forming
a vector of distinguishing features for each user. The Hamming distance was
used to determine how close a reference vector was to a test one. Their system
had an unusually high IPR of 60%, and a FRR of 2%. This is explained
1These values were read off a graph and may not be exact, no tables or actual values
were reported in the work.
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by their focus on hardening logins, instead of replacing them. Rather than
ensuring that it is as difficult as possible for an attacker to pass, they consider
it more important that the FRR is low because the password patterns are not
being used on their own.
More recently, Revett et al. [58] used 14 character passphrases from eight
users for password hardening. They use the average, median, standard devi-
ation, and coefficient of variation to form a feature vector for each digraph.
The reference feature vector for each digraph was compared to the values of an
unknown sample, using a custom distance measure that incorporated all four
features. The distances for each digraph were summed, to obtain an overall
distance between the reference profile and the user. If the overall distance
reached the threshold for each user, the unknown sample was classified posi-
tively. Each password was entered 12 times to train the system, and attacked
16 times by each of 43 attackers. In this work, the authors evaluate the system
using the EER, instead of separating the IPR and FRR. Their system obtained
an EER of 5.6%, but using smaller (different) passphrases that were only eight
characters long they managed to achieve an EER of 4.1%.
Another approach that used a four-feature vector for each pair of keys was
introduced by Hocquet et al. [38]. In this case the feature vector consisted
of four timing values for a single digraph: digraph time, keystroke duration,
inter-key time and time between releases (i.e. both fingers up). These feature
vectors were used to train a one-class classifier in combination with a handful
of other features, such as the mean time and associated standard deviation
of the entire sequence. In total, a set of 31 features was available. The clas-
sification algorithm was a fusion of three classifiers: a statistical classifier, a
time discretizer and a ranked time method. The dataset used for evaluation
contained 20–110 logins and 20–100 attacks for each of 38 users, and each sam-
ple was a username and password pair between eight and 30 characters long.
When user-specific parameters were employed their system obtained a FRR of
3.27% and an IPR of 3.75%, the lowest of all the techniques discussed so far
in this section.
Keystroke timing vectors are a popular feature set for password hardening.
Chang [12] also used timing vectors. First, a vector of digraph and duration
times for a password was stored in a keystroke timing vector. Second, discrete
wavelet transformation was applied to the timing vector, producing a keystroke
wavelet co-efficient vector in the relevant frequency domain. Finally, both
the original timing vector and the wavelet vector were scored for consistency.
For prediction, a sample belongs to a user if the score reaches the threshold.
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Only 20 keystroke patterns were used to train the system; an additional 75
legitimate and 75 attacker samples were used to evaluate each password. In
total, 21 different passwords were evaluated, achieving a FRR of 5.33% and
an IPR of 1.08%.
The dataset used to evaluate Chang’s work [12] was originally collected for
work by Yu and Cho [79]. They hold the current record for password hardening,
attaining a FRR of 0.3% and an IPR of 0% for the best linear support vector
machine (SVM) classifier, where impostors are not allowed any practice. The
FRR jumps to 0.8% when the impostors are allowed to practice the passwords
first. In the full dataset, 21 users typed their password between 150 and 400
times and 15 imposters typed each password five times unpracticed, and also
an additional five times after being allowed to observe how the user typed the
password. Only the last 75 patterns typed by each user were used for testing;
the rest were used to train the classifier. Each password was stored in a timing
vector that contained the digraph and duration times for the entire password;
however, if any of the vector elements were in the upper or lower 10% of times,
the entire vector was discarded. Depending on the user’s consistency, between
20% and 50% of their data may have been discarded. It is unclear whether
consistency checking was performed only on the training data. Finally, a SVM
set up for one-class classification was used to determine whether a given sample
came from a user or an impostor. Two and four layer auto-associative neural
networks were also tested, but ultimately the SVM produced the best results.
The same authors produced a similar method the following year [80]. They
wrapped a genetic algorithm (GA) around a SVM. The GA is used to “cleanse”
the data, selecting relevant features for the final SVM to use. They used the
same dataset from their previous work, achieving a FRR of 3.69%—much
higher than their previous technique. However, no timing vectors were thrown
away, and only 50 (randomly selected) samples were used to train each GA-
SVM model.
Although all the password hardening techniques discussed thus far operate
on alphanumeric sequences, there are some situations where a password may be
limited to a particular set of keys. All the techniques would continue to work
in this scenario, but Rodrigues et al. [60] address this problem directly. They
consider passwords that only contain numeric characters, such as PIN codes
for an ATM. Each password was eight numeric characters long, and was typed
40 times by a user and 30 times by an attacker. Twenty users participated,
using one password each. Each user’s samples were collected at a rate of ten
per session, in four separate sessions. Using a hidden Markov model (HMM),
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their classifier accomplished an EER of 3.6%, similar to techniques that utilize
full alphanumeric password content.
Regardless of which keys are pressed, the patterns associated with typ-
ing are not limited to timings between key events. Lau et al. [44] suggest
that relative key orderings for events and shift key patterns could be used
for authentication. For the former, they hypothesize that users press and
release keys in a unique way. Considering the two keys A and B, three differ-
ent ordering patterns can generate the phrase AB: {Adown, Aup, Bdown, Bup},
{Adown, Bdown, Aup, Bup} and {Adown, Bdown, Bup, Aup}. A shift key pattern is
the case of which shift key is pressed for each letter. Lau et al. propose that
there are four classes of users: strict left shift users, strict right shift users,
users who use both the left and right and are consistent for a given letter, and
users who use both but are inconsistent on some letters. Four categories are
hardly enough to form a security measure on their own; it is possible for a
lucky impostor to fall into the same class as the user. The idea of shift key
patterns and relative key orderings could nevertheless be used to strengthen
existing time-based approaches.
Another method of strengthening existing approaches was proposed by Cho
and Hwang [14]. They focused on improving the quality of the timing vector
patterns because, traditionally, inconsistent timings are either discarded or re-
moved via feature selection. They used musical rhythms from popular tunes
to attempt to create more unique entry patterns for passwords. They also at-
tempted to increase entry consistency by providing audio and/or visual cues.
They found that “the proposed artificial rhythms were found to be significantly
more unique than those [...] obtained with a natural rhythm,” and the samples
typed with cues “were found to have decreased inconsistency in all cases”[14].
Unfortunately, this study was only a preliminary one with a single user, and
the authors admit that further trials are needed. There is another concern:
password hardening makes it more difficult for an impostor to successfully ac-
cess a system even when the password is known, but increasing the consistency
and providing a rhythm for entry could actually make it easier for an impostor
to attack the system. For example, if the attacker knows the password and the
rhythm, and the cue is provided as part of the entry process, they may find
it easier to mimic the user’s patterns than the case where no rhythm or cues
were ever used.
Password hardening has arguably had great success. Including the tech-
niques discussed here, commercial systems like BioPassword [8] are available.
Not all use just the password; some use additional information such as the
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Algorithm FRR (%) IPR (%) Sample Content Classifier
Gaines et al. [28] 0.00 0.00 6000 characters of prose Manual
Umphress and Williams [76] 12.00 6.00 1400+300 characters of prose Statistical
Bergandano et al. [7] 0.00 0.14 683 characters of prose Nearest Neighbour
Table 2.2: Static typist verification techniques
user id, the user’s name, or fixed phrases. However, they are all examples of
password hardening because they attempt to strengthen an existing password-
based authentication mechanism.
2.4 Static Typist Verification
Password hardening is a special case of static or “fixed text” typist verifica-
tion. In both cases, the text entered by the typist is known in advance. The
difference between the two is that password hardening strengthens an existing
authentication system, but static typist verification can completely replace it.
In this case, the text is presented to the typist to copy-type, and this is what is
used for authentication. Although the content may be known in advance, the
typist is not necessarily proficient at typing it. This is counteracted by using
samples that are typically much longer than those used for password harden-
ing, often an entire sentence in length, or longer. Table 2.2 summarise a few
techniques that are intended to replace an existing authentication scheme.
Gaines et al. [28] was the first to formally introduce the idea of identifying
a user by their typing patterns, and did so using static typist verification. In
Gaines’s experiments, six professional secretaries provided two samples each
with a gap of four months between their collection. One sample contained
three passages, varying in length but each with around 2000 characters. The
digraph time was calculated for all keystrokes in the input. It was found there
were 87 digraphs that appeared ten or more times in all samples for all typists,
and after calculating significance statistics it was discovered that five of these
digraphs together discriminated perfectly between the six secretaries. The five
selected digraphs were in, io, no, on, ul. The last digraph, ul, could be
substituted with il or ly, since the four core digraphs plus one of ul, il or
ly gave perfect authentication. Even though the recordings were performed
on a computer, no automated classification algorithm was used to distinguish
between the typists—the typists could be perfectly classified by hand.
Gaines’s success in static verification was later reinforced by several other
papers in the area. Umphress and Williams [76] collected two typing samples
from each of 17 users. Both samples were collected by asking the user to
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copy-type some text as quickly as possible, presented in the form of a typing
test. The reference sample used for training contained approximately 1400
characters of prose, while the test sample only contained around 300 characters.
The keystrokes were grouped into words, and the first six digraph times for
each word were calculated and stored in a matrix. The classifier was similar to
Joyce and Gupta’s [40]: each digraph must fall within 0.5 standard deviations
of its mean to be considered valid. A threshold was placed on the proportion of
valid digraphs, and samples that met or exceeded it were classified as belonging
to the user. Their system obtained a FRR of 12% and an IPR of 6%.
The current state of the art in static typist verification was achieved by
Bergandano et al. [7]. Instead of digraph times, they used trigraph times for
features. Each trigraph was placed in an ordered list based on its average
time (and then alphabetically if two or more trigraphs had the same average
time). The idea is that a legitimate user’s sample will be in approximately
the same order as their reference sample, because anything that may affect a
typist’s pattern will do so by changing all average trigraph times in a roughly
uniform way. For every user the lists of trigraphs from the test sample and all
reference samples were compared. For a sample to be classified as belonging
to a given user, the test sample must be closer to that user than any other
person in the database. Evaluation was performed using 44 users and 110
attackers, the users typing five samples each but the attackers typing only
one. The samples were 683 characters long. Their system accomplishes a FRR
of 0% and an IPR of 0.14%, but has a FRR of 7.28% when the IPR is set to
zero. This FRR is poorer than the best password hardening technique, [79],
which achieves a FRR of less than 1%. However, this technique can be used
to replace an existing password authentication system, so a different trade-off
may be appropriate.
Much of the research on static typist verification is better classified as pass-
word hardening because it is designed to strengthen an existing system. There
is at least one known example of a commercial use of static typist verification
too, Psylock [56]. Psylock replaces a password with a sentence of text to be
copy-typed. Its exact performance is not reported; however, the provider’s
website suggests that it may have an IPR of <1% and a FRR of <5% [57].
2.5 Continuous Typist Verification
Continuous typist verification using ‘dynamic’ or ‘free text’ is much closer to
a real world situation than using static text. It is unrealistic to expect the
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Algorithm FRR (%) IPR (%) Sample Content Classifier
Song et al. [67] - - - Markov Model
Monrose and Rubin [48] 80.00 80.00 Unknown Weighted Probability
Dowland et al. [20] - - Global logging Statistical
Dowland and Furnell [19] 0.00 4.90 Global logging Statistical
Nisenson et al. [50] 5.25 1.13 Task responses LZ78
Gunetti and Picardi [33] 3.17 0.03 Artificial emails Nearest Neighbour
Table 2.3: Continuous typist verification techniques
users to type the same document twice in a world where copy and paste are
universal computer functions. Continuous typist verification allows the input
to be completely different for each sample. It is also more desirable than
password hardening or static typist verification because it continues to check
that a legitimate user is operating the system even after a standard log-in
procedure has occurred. Unfortunately, it is also more difficult: the user can
enter whatever they please, so samples must be sufficiently large that they
have enough common elements—otherwise a confident classification cannot be
guaranteed. This section describes all known continuous typist verification
techniques. They are summarised in Table 2.3.
Song et al. [67] investigated using all possible digraph combinations in a
profile for a user. They calculated the digraph, duration and interkey times for
pairs of keys, as well as the latencies for trigraphs and entire words. Their sys-
tem can make predictions continuously by employing a Markov model. Given
the current state of the system, the model can calculate the probability of a
given event using normal distributions for each recorded time. No empirical
results were presented in the paper.
Before attempting password hardening as reviewed in Section 2.3, Monrose
and Rubin [48] attempted to use their three distance-based classifiers on free
text. For evaluation purposes they recorded a combination of fixed and free
text samples from 42 users over a period of seven weeks, but reduced their
final dataset to 31 users due to timing issues on some machines. For fixed text
samples, an accuracy of 90.7% was achieved using their weighted probabil-
ity classifier. Accuracy diminished significantly when fixed text samples were
compared to free text ones, and when free text samples were compared to each
other—48.9% and 21.5% respectively. Despite their poor free text results, they
claim that with future work “free text will perform comparably to that which
can be obtained with structured text”[48].
A preliminary investigation by Dowland et al. [20] profiled ten users using
digraph times collected using a custom-made high accuracy timer. Any times
less than 40ms or greater than 750ms were immediately discarded. If the
standard deviation for a given digraph was larger than its mean, the upper
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and lower 10% of the values were removed and recalculated, as in Yu and
Cho [79] discussed earlier. If there were less than 50 examples of a given
digraph, then it was removed completely from the dataset. In order to classify
a sample, a similar approach to that of Joyce and Gupta [40] was applied: a
digraph was only valid if it came within x standard deviations of its mean.
The value x was a parameter of the classification algorithm, and Dowland et
al. tested the values 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2. Although no final empirical results were
reported, they found that for at least four users the digraph acceptance rate
was the highest when a sample did belong to the given user. They concluded
that keystroke analysis “had potential” [20].
A longer trial by Dowland and Furnell [19] collected around 3.5 million
keystrokes from 35 participants over a period of three months. Keystrokes were
logged globally across all applications on the user’s computer. Global logging is
unique to this work; in all other systems users were recorded when performing
a set task. This meant that samples are likely to have a higher variation in
typing. For example, a user typing in an instant messaging program is likely to
provide short, sharp responses, whereas the same person typing in a text editor
may have slower typing patterns because they are concentrating on composing
their work. Global logging includes all the typist’s behaviours, but does not
allow the classification system to take advantage of task-specific typing habits.
Dowland and Furnell [19] used an identical method to Dowland et al. [20],
except that the low pass filter was reduced from 40ms to 10ms to prevent po-
tentially useful digraphs from being removed. The FRR was set to 0%, and
using digraphs for classification they achieved an IPR of 4.9%. However, they
noted that some users had inconsistent typing patterns, which dramatically af-
fected the average IPR. By removing the five worst users their system achieved
an IPR of 1.7%. They argue that a user’s typing should be monitored only
if “the method was shown to be a discriminating authentication technique for
that user” [19].
Nisenson et al. [50] attempt to use a compression technique, LZ78, modified
for prediction, to verify a typist. They collected free text samples from five
users and 30 attackers. Each sample was either an open answer to a question,
some copy-typing, or a block of free typing. All samples for each participant
were collected in a single session. The samples were kept as a continuous stream
of events and time differentials, each becoming a symbol for the classifier.
The time differentials were quantized using clustering, preventing the possible
number of symbols provided to their classifier from becoming too large. The
LZ78-based classifier was trained on the stream of symbols. Given a new
31
symbol and the context in which it appears, the classifier predicts the likelihood
of that symbol occurring—regardless of whether it is a key event or a time
differential. Although their system is capable of providing predictions on a
single event or time, they sum the log likelihood across all symbols and make
predictions on an entire sample. With a user-specific threshold set on the
probability, their system attains a FRR of 5.25% and an IPR of 1.13%.
Gunetti and Picardi [33] propose the most accurate continuous approach so
far. Their technique is based on static typist verification work by Bergandano
et al. [7], discussed in the previous section. However, their work differs in
two ways. First, instead of considering only trigraphs, they do not limit the
size of the n-graphs they rank—only making the restriction that the ranking
must occur on lists made up of the same sized n-graphs. They term their
relative rank-based measure the “R measure”, with R2 using digraphs, R3
using trigraphs, and so on. Second, they add an absolute measure, the “A
measure”. This is used to ensure that attackers who type at a different overall
speed to the user will not be classified as the user, even if relatively they appear
the same. The two measures can be used separately, or combined. No matter
which measures are used, the same nearest neighbour approach is taken as
in [7], so that the performance is dependent on the set of users the system was
trained on.
Evaluation was performed using a set of 40 users, each providing 15 samples
of freely typed Italian text approximately 800 characters long. 165 attackers
additionally provided one sample each. All samples were typed as if the partic-
ipant was typing an email. Using the set of combined measures R2,3,4A2, and
the aforementioned dataset, their system accomplishes a FRR of 3.17% and
an IPR of 0.03%. Again, predictions are made periodically on entire samples
rather than individual events. They argue that small samples can simply be
merged together to form larger ones, so the need for large samples of text is
not an issue. The main concern with this approach is that although it achieves
an accuracy comparable to password hardening techniques, it requires a good
database of users in order to do so.
In principle, the requirement of data from other users seems counter-
intuitive. It should be possible to confirm identity without making comparisons
with a large group of people. However, Gunetti and Picardi’s [33] technique
achieves a commendable accuracy, and does so utilizing an innovative relative
approach. Nisenson’s approach is also interesting: treating the event/time
stream as a sequence allows the context of a digraph to be taken into account.
This context is not considered by any other technique where empirical results
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are available, even though there are many references in the literature that
allude to it being a factor in typing.
The last two techniques discussed, Nisenson et al. [50] and Gunetti and
Picardi [33], are reviewed in greater detail in the next chapter, where they
are also re-implemented and compared to each other. Although numerous
candidate techniques for replication have been discussed in this chapter, these
two methods take unique approaches to typist verification. They also produce
low FRR and IPR values, making them good choices for further investigation
because they are already effective continuous typist verification techniques.
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Chapter 3
Replicating the State of the Art
This thesis argues that there is enough information in a user’s typing pat-
terns to use them for biometric authentication, and as we have seen in the
last chapter, many research projects have attempted to substantiate this same
hypothesis. However, the broad overview in Chapter 2 does not describe the
intricacies of typist verification—in many cases the system has been set up in
such a way that the reported accuracy can only be achieved in restricted situ-
ations. To demonstrate this, this chapter evaluates two techniques introduced
in Chapter 2: Learning to Identify a Typist [50] and Keystroke Analysis of Free
Text [33]. These two techniques report by far the best results for continuous
typist verification—around 96.8% (optimized parameters) and 98.4% (opti-
mized parameters and using the best distance measure) accuracy respectively.
None of the others report accuracy levels consistently above 95%.
The two selected techniques employ different approaches to the problem.
The first sets a probability threshold for a single user, while the second finds the
nearest neighbour between a given sample and all other users in the system.
In each case, the authors were emailed to clarify small points of detail and
obtain the original datasets. The techniques were then re-implemented (in the
Java programming language) and evaluated using the original dataset from
the published study. The process of reconstruction, the comparison of the
two systems and the results of the experiments all provide fresh insight into
difficulties associated with the problem of continuous typist verification.
The next section summarizes the statistical methodology and the test har-
ness used for evaluation. The details of the experiments and the results ob-
tained are described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Finally, the merits of the two
methods are compared in Section 3.4, and Section 3.5 draws some conclusions.
3.1 Statistical Methodology
To facilitate testing under identical conditions, an interactive workbench for
the algorithms and data was built. The workbench allows users to load pre-
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Figure 3.1: The main workbench window
recorded typist data, partition it into groups, and perform self-identification
and user-vs-attacker tests based on a particular algorithm and partition. These
algorithms are adaptive: they work by building a model for each user from
that user’s data and all other users’ data. The purpose of the model is to
distinguish between that user’s data and the rest, and classify new data samples
as belonging to that user or not.
In order to make the most of the available data, a “leave-one-out” test
methodology is adopted. For a self-identification test, one sample belonging
to a user is held out when the model is built. The held-out sample is then
tested against the model and the success of the test is recorded. A full self-
identification run for a particular user involves repeating this procedure for
each of the user’s typing samples, and the average result gives the overall self-
identification accuracy for that user. Averaged over all users, self-identification
determines the false rejection rate (FRR) of the system: the chance that a
legitimate user will be erroneously identified as illegitimate.
For a user-vs-attacker test, a model is built for a given user from their
entire set of samples minus one held-out sample. All the attacker samples are
classified using the hold-one-out model. This is repeated for every possible
hold-one-out model for the user. Since the technique in Section 3.2 requires
no negative data for building a user’s model, data from other users can be
used for attacking the system without having to hold them out when building
the model. The second technique (see Section 3.3) uses a nearest neighbour
36
approach among all users, so before utilizing a user’s samples for attacking,
their data must first be temporarily removed from the model. The overall
accuracy of the user-vs-attacker test is the cumulative accuracy for all hold-
one-out models tested with the attacker data. The user-vs-attacker test gives
the impostor pass rate (IPR) of the system.
Ten-times ten-fold stratified cross-validation is also performed using each
dataset. In this case, the data is randomly and equally distributed into ten
groups, or “folds”, and a model trained using nine of the ten folds. The
outstanding fold is used for evaluation. This is repeated for every possible
held-out fold, and the overall process repeated ten times to ensure that any
results are not caused by a particular fold sampling.
The results from cross-validation can be used to obtain the area under
the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, usually known at the
AUC [77]. As discussed in Chapter 2, the AUC is a measure of classifier
performance on a dataset that is independent of any arbitrary thresholds set
by the classification algorithm: it is an estimate of the probability that a
user’s sample will rank higher than an attacker’s one. The AUC results were
not presented in the original studies, but are included here to allow a direct
comparison between techniques. In all experiments the weighted AUC is used,
to ensure that users with different numbers of training samples do not adversely
affect the results. The weighted AUC is calculated by determining the AUC
for each user, and weighting this value by the proportion of samples in the
system belonging to that user.
3.2 Learning To Identify A Typist
The LTIAT (Learning To Identify A Typist) technique was proposed in Nisen-
son et al’s paper [50] Towards Biometric Security Systems: Learning To Iden-
tify A Typist. It uses both key-press and key-release events to build a profile of
a user. LTIAT is based on the well known Lempel-Ziv (LZ78) lossless compres-
sion algorithm [82], modified to make more effective use of a limited amount of
training data [50]. The method was originally tested using a dataset contain-
ing a single sample from each of 5 users and 30 attackers, which was kindly
provided by Nisenson et al. for use in these experiments.
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3.2.1 Algorithm
The original input is a continuous stream of keyboard events, both key-press
and key-release, along with each event’s time of occurrence in milliseconds (the
actual timing accuracy is discussed below). The first step is to transform this
stream into a sentence of events and quantized time differentials. Specifically,
the input becomes:
e1,∆1, e2,∆2, . . . , en−1,∆n−1, en,
where e1 and e2 refer to the first and second keystroke events recorded, each
either a press or a release, and ∆1 is the time between the two. Next, the
input stream is divided into “sentences,” each of which is deemed to end when
a maximum time differential ∆max is encountered. This provides a convenient
way of partitioning the input stream into independent samples, and of discard-
ing long time delays because keystrokes that are minutes apart are unlikely to
be related. Then the differentials ∆ are modified by clustering the values using
scalar quantization into a predetermined number Q of clusters and replacing
each one by its cluster centroid. The actual quantization method used is un-
clear in [50]; however, k-means is used here after the author confirmed that
this would be appropriate.1 The purpose of this step is to reduce the size of
the alphabet from which the items in the input sequence are drawn in a way
that also smooths some of the outliers in the timing data. The value of Q was
optimized as described below.
To build a model for a user u, the set of training sentences Du belonging to
u are used to build an LZms Tree. LZms is a variant of the LZ78 scheme [82]
that is used for text compression. The general idea is to build a tree using
the text as input. Each time a new symbol is seen in the current context,
it is added as a branch to the tree and the algorithm returns to the root.
If the symbol has been seen before at the given node, the algorithm follows
the branch and awaits the next symbol. In order to use the LZ78 tree for
prediction, each node keeps count of the number of distinct symbols it has
seen [43]. Sentences are included into the prediction tree in the manner above,
where each key-press, key-release and quantization interval is a symbol.
In order to build a larger tree with many contexts from a small amount of
input, LZms makes two modifications to the standard LZ78 method. Such a
tree will give an unseen sentence a greater chance of tracing to a leaf node. The
first modification is known as “input shifting”. The idea is simple: the sentence
1Nisenson, personal correspondence, 8 April 2006.
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is learnt in its entirety, then the first symbol is removed and the sentence is
learnt again. This is repeated s times, where the value of s is optimized as
described below.
The second modification is called “backshift parsing” and is designed to
provide some prior context when a new sentence is added. When the algorithm
returns to the root after seeing a new symbol, m prior symbols are traced down
the tree; then normal parsing resumes from the last trace node. The value m
determines how many prior symbols are held in context when the algorithm
returns to the root, and is optimized as described below in Section 3.2.2.
The probability that an unseen sentence x belongs to a particular user u’s
model is determined by tracing x through the fully-built tree and calculating
the log-likelihood along the way. In order to translate this into a decision, a
cutoff threshold is chosen below which x is deemed to belong to an impostor.
A suitable threshold is determined when the model is built by repeatedly
holding out a sentence from the user’s data Du and classifying the held-out
sentence using the model built from the remaining sentences. At run time
any sentence whose log-likelihood falls below the threshold is deemed to come
from an attacker, while sentences whose log-likelihood exceed the threshold
are classified as belonging to u.
3.2.2 Experimental Setup
The LTIAT algorithm was implemented as described by Nisenson et al. [50] and
reviewed above, and incorporated into the workbench. In order to determine
the best values for the parameters—the number of clusters Q, input shifts s
and back shiftsm—leave-one-out optimization was used. The particular values
tested for each parameter were identical to those used in Nisenson’s work: Q
= 80, 90, 100, 110, 120; m = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; and s = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. A
single leave-one-out optimization tests all 180 possible combinations of Q, s
and m in order to find the settings that minimise the FRR. If more than one
combination has the best settings then the combination with the smallest value
of Q is used, with the smallest value of s then m being employed to break any
ties. Results from this classifier will be optimistic since parameter tuning is
performed on a per-user basis.
The accuracy of the times in this dataset appears to be 1–2 ms. The data
obtained was already segmented into the sentences used in the original ex-
periment and this same segmentation was used in the experiments here. The
original paper reported that “the sentences, both before learning and before
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testing, were split into segments of 100 keystrokes (arbitrarily set)”, suggest-
ing that the split sentences contained at most 200 keyboard events (key press
and release for each keystroke). However, after attempting to reproduce this,
the splitting required to get the same number of self-identification attacks was
actually 50 events per sentence. This means that the sentences were split into
segments with 100 symbols (including both events and their times as sym-
bols), rather than 100 keystrokes.2 The authors confirmed that no overlapping
segments were used. Because the original sentences were not merged together
before splitting took place, several blocks contained fewer than 50 symbols—
since these smaller sentences were not removed in the original experiments,
they were also included here. For the user-vs-attacker tests, the data was not
split at all. Although the data for each user was originally obtained in a sin-
gle typing session, each sentence was treated as an independent sample when
calculating the system’s FRR and IPR.
Notwithstanding the description in [50], correspondence with the authors
confirmed that the original sentences were not segmented by using some ∆max
value. Instead, the data was obtained by asking subjects to type the fixed
sentence To be or not to be, that is the question, and answer certain ques-
tions (e.g., What is your favourite programming language and why? ), and each
sentence was defined as a response to one of these tasks. All responses were
typed in English and encoded using the keyboard driver codes. There are 164
sentences in total in the dataset; each of 30 attackers provided 4 sentences and
the users provided between 5 and 19 sentences each.
Unfortunately the original data is dubious: six attacker sentences contain
between four and eight events, corresponding to between two and four charac-
ters of text. On closer inspection all six sentences are the 4th sentence provided
by each attacker, and correspond to the (assumed) question “Do you have any-
thing else to add?”3 In five of the six cases the response is “no” and the other
is “ok”. Extra characters are invisible keystrokes—shift and backspace. Since
the smaller sentences are never used for training and are attacker sentences,
including these small sentences will artificially inflate the IPR of the system.
Ideally a minimum size should be imposed on all experiments to ensure that
the size of the sentences does not affect the reported accuracy. This is also
2In personal correspondence, the authors conceded that 100 symbols may be correct.
3The authors did not clarify what all the questions were; however, after reconstructing
the dataset from keyboard driver codes into readable text some of the questions are obvious.
In the case of sentence four, one response, including a missing apostrophe, was “I dont
anything else to add” and all responses made sense for the question “Do you have anything
else to add”.
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Classification Errors Total Classifications
No. of passed impostors 63 6716
No. of false alarms 10 276
Table 3.1: Experimental results for the LTIAT algorithm
Evaluation Method IPR (%) FRR (%) Weighted AUC
Original [50] 1.13 5.25 N/A
Re-implementation 0.94 3.62 N/A
CV 12.92 3.16 0.962
CV with cleansed dataset 8.38 3.79 0.965
Table 3.2: FRR/IPR results for the LTIAT algorithm
true of the self-identification tests—split sentences that have less than 100 sym-
bols should not be included in the experiments. However, it does not appear
that the data was preprocessed in the original experiments, so the replicated
experiments below do not include any pre-processing either.
Results for ten-times ten-fold stratified cross-validation are also presented
for the LTIAT algorithm. The AUC was computed by ranking based on the log
likelihood. It has not been calculated for the self-identification and user-vs-
attacker experiments—only the cross-validation experiments—because there
are different models used for those two experiments (due to the sentence split-
ting). Results for performing cross-validation on a “cleansed” dataset are also
reported in the next section. In this case, all sentences were split into blocks of
50 events and only full sentences that did not contain any less than 50 events
were included in the dataset. All experiments were performed on a 2.4GHz
machine with 1GB of RAM.
3.2.3 Results
The results from the experiments (shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2) are approx-
imately the same as those in the original paper, confirming the accuracy of
the re-implementation. The non-significant variation can potentially be ex-
plained by the choice of k-means as a quantization algorithm; in the original
work a different method may have been used. The cross-validation results
have a substantially different IPR to the original experiments, although the
FRR is similar to previous results. The difference in IPR is justified: for
user-vs-attacker tests an entire impostor sample is used for attacking, in the
cross-validation tests an impostor’s sample is at most 50 events long—much
smaller than the original sample lengths used to calculate the IPR and the
same length as a user’s samples in the self-attack experiments. The LTIAT
algorithm appears to have difficulty correctly classifying smaller samples as
belonging to an impostor, and so a substantial difference is observed between
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the normal and cleansed datasets: the only difference is that the latter re-
quired that all samples contain exactly 50 events and the former used samples
between 1 and 50 events long.
Each classification takes approximately 10 milliseconds, not including the
offline time to build each user’s model. The samples in this dataset have not
been collected over a sufficiently long period of time to support any conclusions
about whether this technique is appropriate for continuous use over periods of
several hours, days or weeks. However, these results have verified that it does
perform well when presented with accurately timed data collected in a single
session.
3.3 Keystroke Analysis of Free Text
The KAOFT (Keystroke Analysis Of Free Text) technique was proposed in
Gunetti and Picardi’s paper [33] Keystroke Analysis Of Free Text. Several
samples are collected from a user, and each is transformed into a list of n-
graphs, sorted by their average times. To classify a new sample it is compared
with each existing sample in terms of both relative and absolute timing. Only
digraphs that appear in both the reference and unknown samples are used for
classification.
3.3.1 Algorithm
KAOFT uses two measures to characterize the distance between typing sam-
ples. The first, introduced by Bergandano et al. [7], is known as the “R-
Measure” and involves relative times. The second measure is known as the
“A-Measure” and was created by the KAOFT authors, Gunetti and Picardi.
The R-Measure is based on the durations of n-graphs, that is, the time between
the first and last of n subsequent key-presses. First, these are extracted from
each sample. Then the n-graphs that are common between two samples are
determined, and the list for each sample is ordered by its average time (using
alphabetical ordering as a tie-breaker). The degree of disorder of each list is
found by taking the sum of the distances between the position of each n-graph
in sample 1 and its position in sample 2.
We denote by R2(x, y) the degree of disorder of sample x with respect to
sample y over n-graphs of size n = 2. Different R-Measures can be combined:
R2,3(x, y) is defined as the sum ofR2(x, y) and R3(x, y) weighted by the number
of graphs used to compute each measure. Formally, R measures are combined
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like this [7]:
Rn,m(x, y) = Rn(x, y) +Rm(x, y)M/N
where N and M are the number of n-graphs and m-graphs that the samples
x and y have in common. It is required that N > M . This formula can be
extended to arbitrary numbers of n-graphs by including further terms in the
sum. This formula is not asymmetric: although in the above equation R3,2 is a
different calculation to R2,3, the constraint N > M is violated by R3,2 because
there will be more shared digraphs than trigraphs. There is only one possible
way of combining the measures R2 and R3, and that is R2,3.
The R-Measure copes with effects such as fatigue by assuming that all
n-graphs are affected in a similar manner. If the user slows down, their n-
graph durations increase but probably retain the same relative ordering. How-
ever, users who have different timings but the same relative orderings will be
confused with each other. To combat this, an additional “A-Measure” com-
pares the absolute times of n-graphs to ensure that the typing speed is similar
enough between the two samples to have come from the same user. Two n-
graph durations a and b for the same graph are defined to be similar if 1 <
max(a,b)/min(a,b) ≤ t. We use t = 1.25 because this value was found to give
the best results in [33]. The A-measure is defined as
Atn(x, y) = 1− (α/β),
where α is the number of similar n-graphs between x and y, and β is the
total number of n-graphs shared by these two samples. A-Measures can be
combined in the same way as R-Measures, and the two can be summed. For
example, R2(x, y)+A2(x, y) is the combined distance value for n-graphs of size
2.
To identify whether sample x comes from user A, we first settle on a given
distance measure d. Then the mean distance between A’s set of reference
samples is determined, obtaining m(A). Next we calculate the mean distance
between the unknown sample x and all other registered users, B, defined as
md(B, x) for each user B. Sample x is deemed to belong to user A if the
following conditions apply [33]:
1. md(A, x) < md(B, x) for all registered users B different from A;
2. md(A, x) is smaller than and closer to m(A) than it is to any other
md(B, x) value. That is, the following two conditions hold:
(2a). md(A, x) < m(A)
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(2b). md(A, x) < 0.5(md(B, x) +m(A))
The idea is that to classify x as belonging to A it must resemble A more closely
than it does any other registered user, and moreover must be close enough to
A as well.
3.3.2 Experimental Setup
The KAOFT algorithm was implemented as described by Gunetti and Pi-
cardi [33] and reviewed above, and incorporated into the workbench, using
the value for t = 1.25, as mentioned previously. The dataset originally used
for evaluation, provided by Professor Gunetti, was gathered over a 6-month
period and contains 15 samples from each of 40 different users. Users were
asked to provide no more than one sample of 700–900 characters per day, but
could provide it at any time of day. They were allowed to type whatever they
liked, except that they should not type the same text for more than one sam-
ple. The sample was collected using a web-based form that recorded ASCII
characters and associated key-press times. Attacker data was collected in the
same way, except that 165 additional people provided a single typing sample
each. Not all users gave permission for their samples to be released to a third
party, so the dataset provided contained data for only 21 users, along with the
165 attackers.
Although the dataset used here is only half the size of the original, it
still provides useful information for comparison purposes. Because the timer
was implemented in user space4 the resolution is approximately 10 ms. The
samples were not broken up in any way for self-identification tests: each sample
contains all the data recorded by a user in one session. The samples given to
the system are on average 5 times longer than those for the previous technique.
The KAOFT data and algorithm was also tested using ten-times ten-fold
stratified cross-validation in order to determine a weighted AUC value that can
be compared to the previous technique. Unlike the LTIAT technique, KAOFT
cannot produce a probability and is not easily modified to do so. Therefore,
the results of the KAOFT experiments correspond to a single point on the
ROC curve. The AUC can be estimated by plotting the point, then drawing
the curve as two straight lines—from (0,0) to the point, and from the point
to (100,100) (assuming a percentage point plot). The AUC is then the area
under this “curve”.
4In current versions of Linux, user space has a resolution of approximately 10 milliseconds,
compared to kernel/system space which has a resolution of 1–2 milliseconds.
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Table 3.3: Experimental results for distance measures R and A
Adopted Distance Measure R2 R2,3 R3,4 R2,3,4 A2 A2,3 A3,4 A2,3,4
No. of passed impostors 406 572 779 1220 996 1367 1750 1634
No. of false alarms 24 42 47 83 65 101 146 155
IPR (%) 0.28 0.39 0.53 0.83 0.68 0.93 1.19 1.12
FRR (%) 7.62 13.33 14.92 26.35 20.64 32.06 46.35 50.79
Weighted AUC 0.962 0.931 0.918 0.866 0.896 0.837 0.762 0.742
Table 3.4: Experimental results for combined R and A measures
Adopted Distance Measure R2 + A2 R2,3 + A2,3 R2,3,4 + A2 R2,3,4 + A2,3,4
No. of passed impostors 576 784 689 1104
No. of false alarms 20 33 35 83
IPR (%) 0.39 0.54 0.5 0.75
FRR (%) 6.35 10.48 11.1 26.35
Weighted AUC 0.967 0.949 0.942 0.857
3.3.3 Results
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the results obtained by repeating the experiments of
[33] with the new re-implementation and the data provided. For brevity, only
those measures reported in Tables III and IV of [33] are given. There are 315
self-identifications and 146,475 attacks.
The results are significantly worse than those in the original paper. This is
most likely because this technique relies on a large set of registered users—a
small user database will inevitably make less accurate classifications than a
large one—and only half the users were available for these experiments (21
out of 40). One advantage of the technique is that it is robust to fluctuations
over time. However, it is affected by events such as distractions—a large pause
will affect both the relative and absolute ordering of the n-graph it appears
in. The first technique can cope with pauses because a long time differential
would simply be quantized into a cluster with a similar value.
The time this method takes to make a classification increases linearly with
the number of registered users. The system in [33] takes 140 seconds to make
a classification on a 2.5 GHz Pentium IV, with 40 registered users. Like the
original system, this re-implementation is far from optimized; it takes around
400 milliseconds on a similar machine to perform a single prediction with 21
users, and 20 seconds to build the model used for prediction.
3.4 Comparison of Techniques
The previous two sections have individually covered the LTIAT and KAOFT
typist verification techniques. These two algorithms employ different strategies
to obtain a commendable accuracy on their own datasets. However, it is
difficult to determine which of the two is the most accurate based on a single
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FRR/IPR pair because there is a trade-off between the FRR and IPR. For
example, if the FRR is increased by selecting a threshold that makes it harder
for a user to pass, the IPR of the system should lower because it also becomes
more difficult for an attacker to gain access. Instead, the area under the ROC
curve (AUC) can be used for comparison with the caveat that it is based on a
single FRR/IPR pair in the case of KAOFT.
Using the AUC values reported so far is still an unfair way to compare the
two techniques: each technique has so far only been tested using its own data,
so the AUC values have been calculated using different test conditions. Ideally
they should be tested using the same dataset, but the datasets collected for
each technique do not have appropriate information to be directly used for
comparison. Instead, each dataset must be processed in some way in order
to be used for testing. Performing tests in this way gives insight into the
performance of each technique under restricted conditions. The rest of this
section discusses these comparisons.
3.4.1 Comparison Using the ROC Curve
Using the best results for each algorithm, the weighted AUCs are 0.962 for
LTIAT and 0.967 using the measure R2A2 for KAOFT. This suggests that
the two techniques have comparable accuracy, despite differing FRR and IPR
scores for each. A finer comparison can be achieved by graphing the ROC
curves for one user from each technique’s dataset. Figure 3.2 shows partial
ROC curves for LTIAT (user 5) and KAOFT (user 21). KAOFT’s curve can be
achieved in practice by mixing a random predictor in appropriate proportions.
Both curves are only partial because in reality the curves continue along the
top axis with a true positive rate of 1. Only one user is graphed for each
technique because LTIAT produces probabilities that are specific to each user.
Figure 3.2 shows that LTIAT performs the best up until the IPR is 0.2%,
having the highest true positive rate up until this point. Increasing the IPR
further, it becomes easier for a user to successfully authenticate, and KAOFT
becomes the most effective technique.
3.4.2 Comparison Using Datasets
In order to see the merits of LTIAT and KAOFT in greater depth, each was
tested using the other’s data. The datasets originally used for each method
are too diverse to allow direct comparison between the two techniques. That
for LTIAT contains both key-press and key-release events and has an accurate
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Figure 3.2: Partial ROC curves for KAOFT and LTIAT
Method/Experiment FRR % IPR % Best Measure
LTIAT - Published 5.2 1.1
LTIAT - Reproduced 3.6 0.9
KAOFT - Published (40 users) 3.2 0.1 R2,3,4A2
KAOFT - Reproduced (21 users) 6.4 0.4 R2A2
LTIAT - Single Divided Sample (KAOFT data) 16.2 19.3
LTIAT - Random Continuous Sentence (KAOFT data) 10.8 36.0
LTIAT - 10ms Timing Resolution (LTIAT data) 2.9 13.5
LTIAT - Key Presses Only (LTIAT data) 7.4 19.3
KAOFT - Single Divided Sample (KAOFT Data) 35.9 0.5 R2A2
KAOFT - Random Continuous Sentence (KAOFT Data) 64.9 0.2 R2A2
KAOFT - Using LTIAT data 38.6 12.5 R2A2
Table 3.5: Summary of comparison experiment results
timing resolution, but only includes a single session of data for each user. That
for KAOFT has 15 samples for each user but has a coarse timing resolution and
only contains key-press events. Hence, processed versions of the datasets are
considered. The results of the experiments are summarised in Table 3.5. The
first block of the table repeats the published and reproduced results discussed
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. The remaining results are described further below.
Firstly, LTIAT was tested using KAOFT’s data. Since it took excessively
long to complete one self-identification classification using an optimized model
(more than 24 hours of CPU time5), the data was broken down to resemble
that of the LTIAT dataset. A single sample from each user was selected at
5For each single self-identification classification all 180 combinations of parameters were
tested using hold-one-out models on the training data before classification takes place. The
KAOFT data provides a much larger amount of training data and therefore the optimization
step takes substantially longer.
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random, and divided into sentences of 100 key-press events.6 The procedure
was repeated 5 times and the results averaged, yielding an FRR of 16% and
an IPR of 19% (Single Divided Sample in Table 3.5). In a second experiment,
one continuous sentence of size 100 was selected at random from each of the
user’s samples. Again, the procedure was repeated 5 times, yielding an FRR
of 11% and an IPR of 36% (Random Continuous Sentence in Table 3.5). Here
each sentence is from a different session, whereas all sentences in the first
experiment were selected from the same session.
The LTIAT method clearly cannot cope with the KAOFT data. To ascer-
tain whether the inaccuracy was caused by the low resolution timings or the
lack of key-release events, it was re-tested twice using its own data. First, all
key-release events and their associated times were removed from the data and
the times relating to existing key-press events were altered to reflect the re-
moval of the key-release events. Second, both key-press and key-release events
were retained, but a 10ms resolution was simulated by adding a random num-
ber between 0 and 9 to each recorded time.
When the key-release events were removed, the IPR was identical to that
found by dividing up a single sample of KAOFT data (19.3%). This is not
surprising considering that both datasets are from a single continuous typing
session and contain only key-press events. The FRR remained below 10% for
both the removal of key-release events and the introduction of a 10ms resolu-
tion. However it is the IPR that is most interesting with regards to security
and this was found to exceed 10% in both experiments. It is important to
note that when the key-release events are removed, adding their time differ-
entials to the appropriate key-press times introduces a slightly coarser timing
resolution than had the data been recorded without the key-release events in
the first place. The new resolution is estimated to be 2–4ms, because on aver-
age two times, each with a 1–2ms resolution, are used to replace a single one.
The experiments show that LTIAT only performs well when provided with all
keyboard events and with timing data that has an accuracy of 1–2ms.
The two experiments above were repeated using the KAOFT method. For
the measure R2A2, the FRR was 36% and 65% and the IPR 0.5% and 0.2%
for the first and second experiment respectively. The same pattern was seen
through other measures—in the first experiment the FRR was half the size
of the second experiment, and the reverse is true of the IPR. The KAOFT
method was then tested using the LTIAT data, resulting in an FRR of 38%
6The average sentence in Nisenson’s data for both users and attackers contains about
100 key press events.
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and IPR of 12% (for R2A2), a similar FRR to that of the first experiment on
the broken-down KAOFT data.
The results on the LTIAT data in particular indicate that the KAOFT
method cannot cope with small sample sizes: the amount of information is in-
sufficient to make correct classifications for valid users. Larger samples share
more n-graphs, so the computed distance between them is more meaningful.
Gunetti and Picardi suggest that short samples can simply be concatenated
together to make larger ones [33]. In an attempt to test this, sentences from
the LTIAT data were concatenated until the number of key-press events ex-
ceeded 300. However, this resulted in only 2 users and 2 attackers having more
than 2 samples each, so the number of tests that could be performed was not
informative.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has revisited two continuous typing recognition systems intro-
duced in Chapter 2. They were re-implemented and tested with data that was
used for evaluation in the original papers. The first, LTIAT, produced similar
FRR and IPR rates to those in the original paper. The second, KAOFT, ex-
hibited worse results, most likely due to a reduction in the number of registered
users.
Neither can be viewed as the complete answer to continuous typist recogni-
tion, and both are restricted to limited situations—such as accurately recorded
single sessions for the first method, and long recordings from users and impos-
tors for the second. In both cases, the original data for each method performs
poorly when applied to the other algorithm. For the LTIAT technique the
poor performance on the KAOFT data can be attributed to the lack of key
releases in the data. This means that some important patterns, relating to
interleaving of press and release events, are lost. When considering KAOFT,
it relies heavily on the availability of sufficiently large quantities of data from
other users—a requirement that is not always easily satisfied in a real-world
situation.
However, the two techniques do demonstrate that under ideal conditions
it is possible to recognise a typist by how they type in a restricted situation
where input has been collected for only one task. The results highlight the
need for a better dataset—one that contains several paragraph sized samples
per user, and has key-release events included. The next chapter covers the
collection of such data.
49
Chapter 4
Data Collection
Collecting typing data for continuous typist verification sounds like an easy
task, given that no extra hardware is required and keyboards are a standard
input device for most computer systems. Recording simply requires some
software to monitor the keyboard and log keystroke information. The user
does not need to interact with this software in any special way; they can simply
continue using the computer as they normally would. However, accurately
collecting typing patterns is not an easy task: there are a range of technical
and ethical issues that can affect the integrity of recording keystrokes.
The technical issues surrounding the recording of keystroke data are rela-
tively minor compared to the ethical issues, but they can nonetheless play a
crucial role in determining the accuracy of any typist verification system. The
most obvious technical concern is what exactly is recorded. In Chapter 2 we
saw that Gunetti and Picardi’s [33] system requires only the key press events
and their associated times—so this was all that was recorded in their dataset.
However, when attempting to reuse this dataset in other experiments, includ-
ing those in the previous chapter, the lack of key release events means that
some algorithms are less accurate, and others cannot be used at all.
In evaluation of most typist verification problems, data is collected in an
artificial situation. In the case of static verification, users might be required
to copy-type some fixed text. For dynamic verification, users might be asked
to respond to questions [50], type a paragraph as if it were an email [33]
or perform set tasks on a given system [48]. In all of these cases many of
the ethical issues present in a real-world scenario can be overcome. However,
because users are required to use an artificial system, they are taking time
away from their regular tasks to participate. This may restrict the amount
of data that can be collected because users may have little incentive to use
this system at length. This is evident in Nisenson et al.’s dataset [50], which
was reconstructed from keycodes in the previous chapter: many of the users
commented how bored they were with the task, and provided little input other
than what was required to complete their session.
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Data quality may also be an issue for artificial situations. Ideally the
participants should be typing data that is meaningful to them in order to get
representative samples of how they type. This is demonstrated by the success
of password hardening, discussed in Chapter 2: users tend to know their user
ids and passwords well and thus type them with a distinct rhythm. If the user
is forced to type unfamiliar text there is a risk that their normal rhythms will
be disturbed by the task of reading or comprehension. Of course, data quality
cannot always be guaranteed in a real-world scenario either, although there is
at least a greater chance that the user will be performing a familiar task.
It is obvious that both datasets used in the previous chapter are inadequate
for further investigation into typist verification. One has only a small amount
of data per user that has been recorded in a single session, the other does
not contain key release events. Therefore, before experimentation on new
algorithms could begin, it was necessary to collect some new typing data that
extended over several sessions and contained key release and key press events,
as well as their associated times.
This chapter covers the process of collecting new data and how the technical
and ethical issues were addressed. Section 4.2 presents the properties of the
final datasets, and Section 4.3 discusses the performance of the algorithms
from Chapter 3 on these datasets. The collection of a reasonably-sized real-
world dataset, which yields results on par with those obtained from restricted
datasets that have been collected for use with a specific algorithm, is one of
the main contributions of this thesis.
4.1 Collecting Data
In an ideal situation, data for typist verification would come from real-world
recording where users were surreptitiously recorded as they perform their usual
duties. Unfortunately the process of keylogging also records deleted keystrokes
and keystrokes that are encrypted on screen (i.e. passwords). It is difficult
to convince a user to allow their keystrokes to be monitored during usual
computer use because there is a high probability that confidential information
will be captured.
The advantage of being able to record real behaviour is that the user is
unlikely to be affected by the constraints of an artificial task. As previously
mentioned, users may be unwilling to use an artificial system, as is evident in
Nisenson et al.’s dataset [50]. Furthermore, if they are required to enter un-
familiar data or use an unfamiliar workstation there may be subtle differences
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between their usual patterns and the recorded ones. However, this may not
be a problem for system evaluation because it would be unlikely that there
would be a mix of keystrokes recorded in artificial and real-world situations.
But it does raise the concern that a system evaluated on an artificial dataset
may perform poorer than reported if used in practice.
Gunetti and Picardi [33] attempted to create a dataset that contained data
similar to that of a real-world situation by asking their volunteers to “enter
samples in the most natural way, more or less as if they were writing an email to
someone.” These samples were entered into a web-based form consisting of one
textbox and a ‘submit’ button, with the amount of text roughly a paragraph
in length for each sample. No restrictions were made on the operating system,
Internet browser or keyboard used to access and enter information into the
form. In total, 15 samples from each of 40 users and a further 165 attacker
samples were obtained over a period of 6 months. The main limitation of this
dataset is that it contains no key release events.
Instead of setting up an artificial situation, this thesis uses data collected
from a real email system. This makes it easy to collect a large number of
samples, but it is difficult to ensure that they meet requirements for length,
content, or even authorship. However, the limitations of Gunetti and Picardi’s
dataset [33] can be overcome by ensuring that both key press and release
events are recorded. After technical and ethical issues have been addressed,
discussed here in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 respectively, the resulting dataset is
comparable in nature to Gunetti and Picardi’s dataset [33] except that it is
recorded from real emails, not simulated ones. The next section discusses the
process of recording the emails.
4.1.1 Recording with SquirrelMail
In early 2007, 19 participants from the University of Waikato’s Department
of Computer Science gave permission for their typing patterns to be recorded
whilst they used their Computer Science email accounts. Their patterns were
recorded over a period of just over three months, from mid-April 2007 through
until the end of July 2007. The Computer Science Department accesses email
through SquirrelMail [71], a web-based system that employs forms similar to
the one used in Gunetti and Picardi’s experiments. In order to use this email
system to record typing patterns, an augmented version of SquirrelMail was
set up, known as the recorded typing (RT) version. RT SquirrelMail is almost
identical to the standard one, with the exception that it has the ability to
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record typing patterns for email. The user interacts with the RT version in
the same way as they would normally (it provides access to the participant’s
standard computer science email account).
RT SquirrelMail records the typing for each of the text entry boxes on the
compose screen: To, CC, BCC, Subject and Body. Mouse press events (clicks)
within the compose frame are also recorded. When the user saves or sends
the email, the recorded patterns are saved. Full details of RT SquirrelMail,
including the recording format, can be found in Appendices A and B, which
respectively contain the details required for ethical consent and the instructions
given to participants.
Because a real email system is used, the entry of confidential information
cannot be prevented. However, controls were available to the participants to
enable them to remove any private emails. The emails were only saved when
the check box “If checked, all of your typing will be recorded for this email”
was selected. If the participant forgot to uncheck the box, the email could still
be removed from the dataset later. For the duration of the experiments, the
participants were able to access a website, known here as mailAnalysis, that
provided statistics on their own emails. MailAnalysis had two purposes: to
encourage participants to use RT SquirrelMail over the standard SquirrelMail
by providing interesting statistics, and to allow them to remove their own con-
fidential emails from the dataset before evaluation began. Further information
about mailAnalysis can be found in Appendix B.
Additionally, each participant filled in a questionnaire that included general
questions relating to physiological attributes such as height, weight and hand-
edness, and also information about their computing habits. This questionnaire
provided information that was intended to be used to find out whether it is
possible to identify key attributes of a typist—not just their identity—from
their typing behaviour. However, there was an insufficient number of partici-
pants to be able to form any generalisations from this data and the responses
are not used in any analysis in this thesis. For completeness, an example
questionnaire is included in Appendix C.
Overall, 2897 emails were recorded from the 19 participants over the three
month period. Although the most prolific participant recorded 1951 emails
in the RT system, the majority of participants recorded less than 100 emails
each. Of the 19 participants, 11 participated for the entire duration and eight
were involved for the last two weeks. All participants, despite assurances, were
understandably hesitant to participate. To ensure that the dataset contained
a large number of users, some users (specifically, the last eight) were asked
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to use the system for a limited time, and to use it only to type emails to
the researcher. These eight participants therefore typed a smaller number of
emails than the other 11 users and their email content was similar to the emails
in Gunetti and Picardi’s dataset [33]. Table 4.2 shows the number of emails
recorded by each user and includes the number of emails that were finally used
after technical and ethical issues were addressed. The next two sections detail
these issues.
4.1.2 Technical Issues
Technical issues are rarely present in an artificial scenario: careful program-
ming and supervision ensures that major issues are avoided. When collect-
ing real emails however, supervision is impractical and even the most careful
programming cannot compensate for users failing to follow instructions. For
example, users were instructed to use the Opera browser if they were accessing
their emails on a machine running Linux, and although Opera was installed
on all relevant computers, many users forgot to use it and accessed RT Squir-
relMail using Mozilla Firefox instead.
The occasional use of Mozilla Firefox on Linux-based machines presented
the most difficult technical challenge, because the version of Firefox available
for use during the data collection period contained a bug that caused certain
key down events to fail to register [59]. Specifically, if a key was pressed and
held down then any subsequent key presses would not be recorded until the
held key was released. It is important to note that the missing key press events
are actually lost, not delayed. Key releases are recorded as normal, so the end
result is that there is the possibility of key release events recorded that have no
associated key press event. This poses a huge problem for a typist verification
system: characters appear on the screen as the key is pressed, so it is impossible
to accurately calculate such features as the digraph time, or the duration of
time a particular key is held down. Even attempting to reconstruct the input
causes issues, as can be seen in the two example emails below. The first email
shows the actual recording, and the second the actual input. Overall, 1217
of the 2897 emails were affected by this issue and were discarded from the
dataset.
Dear all,
Jus watd to le yo kno ha the tying syste is nw upand running and
yo can rcord yor tying by usin the special SquirrlMal.
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Chees,
Dear all,
Just wanted to let you know that the typing system is now up
and running and you can record your typing by using the special
SquirrelMail.
Cheers,
Unfortunately the Firefox bug was not the only browser-related issue. It
was discovered that Internet browsers are not uniform in the way they treat
modifier keys. Modifier keys are the keyboard keys that modify the normal
action of a key in some way: firing off a macro, capitalising a letter, providing
access to alternate characters and so on. Some browsers treat modifier keys
as independent key presses, recording the press and release events with their
own key code. Others repeat the press event for a modifier until the key
is released—alphanumeric keys will repeat in a similar fashion if held down
long enough, but typically have matching releases for each key press. At the
very least, all tested browsers (Internet Explorer, Firefox, Safari, Opera and
Konqueror) record the current state of all modifier keys in the same structure
that stores the keycode for each key event.
Ideally the emails should have a uniform format for ease of processing,
but the modifier key event information differs between each browser. This
information could be used later to reveal typing patterns. Given that the most
common browser used during the recording process, Opera, only recorded the
current state of the modifiers and all browsers had at least this behaviour,
this was all that was recorded in RT SquirrelMail. Although some channels
of information are lost by not recording modifier keys as individual events, no
recorded samples have any more (or less) information recorded as a result of
the browser that was used to access the system. In summary, the recordings
are browser independent.
Finally, the use of a real email system over an artificial one presents a
unique technical challenge: the length of any sample is not guaranteed to
meet a minimum threshold. For example, if a user simply forwards an email,
they only need to type the recipient’s address. If the user replies to an email,
they do not need to type anything—obviously it would be more helpful to the
recipient if they did, but no new content needs to be provided in order to send
the email. Compounding the problem further, shortcut keys, toolbar buttons
and the mouse can be used to copy text from outside the browser window.
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Therefore, legitimate emails can range in length from a few input events, to
thousands.
It is unfair to impose a minimum limit on the emails before they are sent,
especially since a lack of typing is often justified. Instead, after the recording
phase ended, emails that did not contain at least 500 events were removed
from the dataset. The minimum length was an arbitrarily chosen amount,
corresponding to approximately two sentences of typed text (500 events equals
250 characters, or approximately 50 words). This size restriction guaranteed
that the samples from RT SquirrelMail were larger than the smallest of the
samples from the datasets in [33, 50], even after potentially sensitive data was
removed. Of the remaining 1680 emails, 690 were removed as a result of this
size restriction.
4.1.3 Ethical Issues
After technical issues had been addressed, only 990 emails remained in the
dataset. These 990 emails were sourced from only 17 of the 19 participants—
two participants had all of their samples removed from the dataset due to the
technical issues described in the previous section. However, ethical issues must
also be addressed before the dataset is used; the dataset cannot be distributed
to anyone attempting to reproduce the results if it contains sensitive informa-
tion. The ethical issues discussed here are typically not present in artificial
scenarios.
The most obvious ethical issue is that people inevitably use email for per-
sonal correspondence, not just work-related discussions. RT SquirrelMail and
mailAnalysis provided controls so that participants could remove confidential
emails from the dataset. However, even with these measures in place there
were a number of emails containing private information, and one even con-
tained a password. To prevent such emails being present in the final dataset,
a filter was run to remove any emails that might contain sensitive information.
“Love” is an informal salutation and is unlikely to be used on a business-related
email, so all emails that contained this word were removed. “Password” is an
example of another filter word used to remove emails. After looking at some
emails by hand, some other key words and names were discovered that were
then used to remove emails from the dataset.
After some emails were manually checked, another issue became apparent:
many of the participants were not native English speakers and often conducted
email conversations in other languages. Whilst the presence of non-English
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emails is not necessarily a bad thing, the dataset was collected by someone who
only knew English and it was unclear whether any of the non-English emails
contained sensitive information. Fortunately, only a small number of emails
were not typed in English—instead typed in German, Swedish or Maori—
and so these were simply removed from the dataset. Although these emails
could have simply been referred back to the authors for double-checking, the
relevant participants were keen users of the system and provided a sufficiently
large number of English emails that this extra step was deemed unnecessary.
Emails typed by the last eight participants were not subjected to the language
filter; these last eight participants were typing to the researcher and despite
emails being recorded in both Swedish and Maori—as well as English—they
were guaranteed to be non-confidential so it was unnecessary to remove them.
At first blush the remaining emails may now appear to be anonymous.
However, people tend to sign off their emails with their name and start by
addressing the person they are sending to, so these names had to be manually
removed from the data. The names could not be automatically removed by
simply removing a number of characters from the start and end of the emails—
some users were found to address a person or sign their name midway through
authoring the email. To fully anonymise an email, the salutations and signa-
tures were selected by hand and all events and times relating to the names
were removed. The removed section is replaced with a single time differential
that is the sum of all the time differentials in the removed section. Adding
large time differentials should not prove to be an issue because the system
should be robust to distractions. In Nisenson’s system [50], time differentials
greater than two seconds long were removed before learning. In Gunetti and
Picardi’s system [33], large time differentials were included into the average for
each digraph. This last anonymisation step was only performed on a specific
set of emails, as discussed in the next section.
4.2 Final Dataset
After ethical and technical issues were addressed, 607 emails remained. These
emails had several assured qualities: they contained at least 500 events, were
typed with a non-buggy browser, and contained no personal content. This
dataset is comparable in size to Gunetti and Picardi’s [33], which in the orig-
inal paper contained 765 samples (their dataset used in the previous chapter
contained only 480 samples). Gunetti and Picardi’s [33] dataset contained
data from a larger group of people, but at most 15 emails from any given
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Total Issues Causing Removal Final Final
Participant Emails Browser Length Ethical Emails (sm-all) Emails (sm-150)
A 224 96 2 126 15
B 1951 1192 308 284 167 15
C 55 26 1 28 15
D 133 33 2 98 15
E 30 13 1 16 15
F 60 24 4 32 15
G 164 84 20 60 15
H 143 56 69 18 15
I 49 1 24 24 15
J 33 13 20 15
K 9 9 0
L 9 7 2
M 2 2
N 4 4
O 21 15 3 3
P 4 4
Q 1 1
R 3 1 2
S 2 2 0
Total 2897 1217 690 383 607 150
Table 4.1: Emails recorded per participant
participant. In contrast, this dataset contains between one and 167 samples
per user, with ten users typing 16 or more samples each. Table 4.2 shows the
number of emails recorded, removed for technical and ethical reasons, and the
final number of emails per user.
These 607 emails were separated into two datasets, the sm-all dataset that
contains all 607 unaltered emails, and the sm-150 dataset that contains 150
fully anonymised emails. The sm-150 dataset contains the body text of 15
samples from each of ten users (Participants A–J), with salutations and sig-
natures manually removed as described in Section 4.1.3. The sm-150 dataset
was created for two reasons: to ensure that no user had any more samples for
training than any other, and so there was a fully anonymised dataset available
for other researchers to use.1 The sm-all dataset contains all possible infor-
mation recorded for each email, but the email content may reveal the identify
of the author or intended recipient.
The sm-all dataset is essentially a set of samples collected in a real sys-
tem. As mentioned in Appendix A, each textbox on the email compose form
was separately recorded, and mouse events occurring on this page were also
recorded. At this stage only key events are of concern, so the mouse events
are not included in the sm-all dataset. The separate textbox recordings are
interleaved together using the absolute times, forming one sample of typing per
email. Thus, a single sample includes all the typing for an email, in exactly
the order the participant typed it.
1This dataset is available by request.
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4.3 Re-evaluation of Existing Algorithms
In the previous chapter the two re-implemented techniques were compared by
utilising the other technique’s dataset. In both comparisons, the tests were
biased. Even when the same dataset was used the algorithms were trained
on data that was not suitable for them. Now there are two datasets, sm-all
and sm-150, that address the shortcomings of the other datasets and can be
used to fairly compare the two re-implemented techniques from Chapter 3. In
this section the re-implemented methods are re-evaluated using the two new
datasets.
Each of the two algorithms—namely LTIAT and KAOFT—was tested us-
ing fully optimised models and ten-times stratified ten-fold cross-validation. In
the last chapter the best choice of Q, m and s for LTIAT was selected for each
user. This results in a large number of models built per user. Since both new
datasets contain significantly more data than was originally used, the LTIAT
technique was tested using default parameters for this evaluation (Q = 100, m
= 0, s = 0, i.e. the LZ78 algorithm with at most 100 time symbols). The m
and s extensions should be unnecessary since they are designed to make the
most of a small amount of data—and there is now a large amount of data.
However, the main reason for testing in this way is that performing ten-times
ten-fold cross-validation on optimised models would take an excessive amount
of processing time for this algorithm (more than a month of processing time
on a 2.4GHz machine). KAOFT was tested using the measure R2A2 because
this was found to give the best results in the previous chapter.
Table 4.3 shows the results of evaluating the methods from the previous
chapter with the two new datasets. These results reinforce the findings of the
previous chapter: KAOFT is the most effective typist verification technique
investigated so far. Note that sm-all has four times the volume of data and
Table 4.3 shows there is an improvement when more data is added for either
method. For the sm-all dataset, the LTIAT algorithm with default parameters
outperforms the optimised algorithm on its own dataset (which reported an
AUC of 0.962). For both datasets, KAOFT performs better than with its
own data from the previous chapter, obtaining higher AUC values and lower
FRR/IPR values as well. These datasets reinforce the findings of the previous
chapter, but also indicate they themselves are of equivalent—if not better—
quality to the original datasets.
It is important to remember that KAOFT requires data from other users
to make a prediction about a target user, whereas LTIAT does not. Also, it is
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Original datasets FRR (%) IPR (%) Weighted AUC
LTIAT - optimised parameters 3.16 12.92 0.962
KAOFT - R2A2 6.35 0.39 0.967
sm-150
LTIAT - m = 0, s = 0, Q = 100 3.53 29.33 0.950
KAOFT - R2A2 6.06 0.00 0.970
sm-all
LTIAT - m = 0, s = 0, Q = 100 0.75 16.65 0.976
KAOFT - R2A2 3.60 0.00 0.982
Table 4.2: Re-evaluation results using new datasets
unclear just how much data is necessary for successful verification and whether
other possible channels of information may be more informative than those
used for the state of the art. The next few chapters attempt to answer these
questions, using insights gleaned from the replication in the previous chapter,
studies of related work, and thorough investigation of the new datasets.
61
Chapter 5
Preliminary Experiments with
New Techniques
In Chapter 3, where the two leading continuous typist verification techniques
and their results were replicated, a limiting factor for evaluation was the lack
of a dataset that had sufficient information for it to be utilised for both tech-
niques. The collection of new datasets, discussed in the previous chapter,
resolved this issue and enabled the two techniques to be fairly tested. Using
these same datasets from Chapter 4, some initial experiments were performed
to investigate new ways to verify a typist.
This chapter presents this investigation by discussing new ways to verify
typists using probability-based algorithms. Three of the algorithms can make
judgements after being trained only on data from the target user. The other
requires data from other users, but achieves good accuracy on individual di-
graphs. The FRR and IPR of all four algorithms can be varied at prediction
time by changing the threshold that determines the yes/no verdict.
This trade-off allows the security of the system to be quickly adjusted
to best suit the task at hand. Systems that simply predict yes or no usually
require complete retraining in order to alter the trade-off between the FRR and
IPR. Also, because an arbitrary threshold set automatically by an algorithm
is not necessarily the best one, being able to rank numerical predictions allows
a true assessment on the effectiveness of a typist verification system using the
AUC.
The next section describes the experimental methodology that was used
to evaluate each method. Each of the four methods is then discussed in turn,
including explanations of the algorithms and the results obtained using the
datasets from the previous chapter. The first method is similar to LTIAT
from Chapter 3 except that it uses Prediction by Partial Matching (PPM)
instead of LZms for the underlying model. The second constructs a probability
density for each digraph, and makes predictions using the combined densities
for all digraphs in a sample. The third combines ideas from the first two
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methods in this chapter, integrating context with per-digraph models. The
fourth classifies individual digraphs using C4.5 decision trees using absolute
and relative timings as attributes. In Section 5.6 the methods are compared
to each other and the algorithms from Chapter 3.
5.1 Methodology
Each algorithm was implemented in the Java programming language and in-
tegrated into the workbench described in Chapter 3. Although the workbench
is capable of performing many different kinds of evaluation, all the results pre-
sented here use ten-times ten-fold stratified cross-validation. The same seed
was used to initialise the pseudo-random number generator each time, ensur-
ing that the algorithms were tested with exactly the same set of folds. This
same seed was used for the evaluation at the end of Chapter 4.
Each fold contains 10% of the data that belongs to each user and at-
tacker. Three of the algorithms in this chapter ignore any negative data that
is present during training, ensuring that attackers are always new to the sys-
tem. However, the last algorithm, the Individual Digraph Classifier, requires
negative data in order to make a judgement. Sourcing negative data from the
sm datasets means that the attackers are not novel, so in this case all negative
data was deleted from the training folds before training began. This forced
the algorithm to use negative data from elsewhere. In reality, this data could
be automatically generated, or the real negative data could be used. In this
thesis, the negative data was sourced from the LTIAT dataset, and each user
or attacker was relabelled as if it belonged to a single impostor. This means
that all algorithms in this chapter were evaluated after being trained on a sin-
gle user’s data from either the sm-150 or sm-all datasets and attackers were
always novel.
All algorithms utilise a threshold to separate a given user from any im-
postors. This threshold can be based on a probability, however, not all the
methods in this chapter are able to produce these. This is not a problem
for typist verification because the numerical predictions produced by the algo-
rithms in this chapter are able to be sensibly ranked.
To determine the threshold for each model, each of the user’s training
samples is held out in turn during training, and a model built that includes all
samples except the held out sample. The held out sample is tested against the
model and the prediction recorded. After testing all possible held out samples,
the threshold is set at the value that maximises the chance that the hardest
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held out sample will pass as the user. That is, the threshold is the smallest
predicted value calculated from the leave-one-out training. The final model
for any fold is built using all of the data, and utilises the threshold calculated
during the leave-one-out training. This is exactly the same method as LTIAT
from Chapter 3 uses to determine a threshold. It is used for all but the last
model presented in this chapter.
Because the thresholds set by the system—and therefore the FRR and
IPR—are not necessarily ideal for a particular scenario, in all empirical results
the weighted average AUC of the system is reported. As discussed in earlier
chapters, the AUC gives the probability that a user’s sample will rank higher
than an attacker’s one, and is independent of the arbitrary thresholds. The
weighted average AUC is used so that users with varying amounts of data,
such as those found in the sm-all dataset, do not adversely affect the results.
The FRR and IPR are also reported for all algorithms.
5.2 PPM-Based Classifier
Prediction by Partial Matching (PPM) is a popular compression technique, but
it can also function as a universal sequence prediction algorithm [6]. It is the
latter application that is the most helpful for typist verification. PPM comes
from the same class of prediction/compression algorithms as LZ78, the under-
lying prediction technique (with modifications) used for LTIAT in Chapter 3.
In both cases the algorithms predict the likelihood of the next symbol, which
is either a key event or time differential, depending on the current state of the
system. The main difference between the two algorithms when they are used
for prediction is that PPM uses a finite context model, basing its decisions on
at most o previous events for some fixed number o, called the context length.
In contrast, LZ78/LZms uses as many previous events as possible, until an
event fails to match in the current context and the algorithm resets to the root
of its tree.
The standard version of PPM deals with escape probabilities by using the
probability of a novel character occurring [6]. Escape probabilities are the
values used when the next character has not been seen before in the current
context. For PPM, the method used to calculate escape probabilities was
“Method C”, which is generally regarded to be the best method for this clas-
sifier. Using Method C, the probability of an unseen character is based on the
number of novel characters seen before in the current context. More precisely,
the probability of an unseen character is q/(C + q) and the probability of a
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seen character is ci/C, where q equals the number of distinct characters seen
before, ci the number of times a character i has been seen before, and C the
total number of characters seen [6]. LZ78/LZms predicts 1/(C +1) for unseen
symbols, and ci/(C + 1) for all others.
5.2.1 Algorithm
PPM can be used for typist verification by utilising the LTIAT technique and
simply substituting LZms with PPM. This new algorithm has two parameters:
the number of quantization clusters q, and the order o of the PPM model.
The process is otherwise the same as that of LTIAT. Given a number of train-
ing samples, the time differentials are first clustered using k-means and then
the order-o PPM model is built using the key events and quantized times.
A threshold is obtained by repeatedly building leave-one-out models during
training, for all possible held out training samples, and using the probability
that maximises the chance that the hardest held out training sentence will be
classified correctly. Finally, the probability of a sample belonging to the user
is calculated by predicting each symbol in a sample, and accumulating the log
likelihood. This is translated into a decision by utilising the threshold obtained
during training.
The PPM-based version of LTIAT was implemented in the Java program-
ming language and incorporated into the workbench from Chapter 3. However,
because the PPM algorithm was not modified in any way, an existing open-
source implementation of PPM was utilised rather than a re-implementation.
The PPM implementation used here was originally coded by Ron Begleiter for
general evaluation of variable order Markov models [5]. The original LTIAT
technique used a modified version of LZ78, and the entire LZms algorithm was
implemented from scratch.
In general, LZ78 models are much faster to build and evaluate than PPM
ones, but are less accurate. In the implementation here, PPM can build its
model faster than LZms, because the two extensions—input shifting and back-
shift parsing—increase the number of times each symbol is seen, and so build a
much larger model than LZ78 would. On average, PPM (o = 1) takes one-fifth
the time to build a model compared to LZms (m = 5, s = 5), and one-tenth the
time to make a classification. Table 5.7 in Section 5.6 shows the average build
and classification times for LZ78, LZms and PPM, along with other methods
discussed in this chapter.
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Order o FRR IPR Weighted AUC
0 3.00 42.56 0.862
1 4.33 25.22 0.966
2 4.00 25.83 0.961
3 4.00 25.76 0.960
4 4.20 25.76 0.961
5 4.07 25.93 0.961
6 4.07 25.93 0.961
7 4.20 25.96 0.961
8 4.07 25.65 0.961
Table 5.1: Effect of PPM model order on prediction
Algorithm/Dataset FRR IPR Weighted AUC
PPM / LTIAT 1.85 14.55 0.967
PPM / sm-150 4.33 25.22 0.966
PPM / sm-all 0.90 18.99 0.971
LZms / LTIAT 3.16 12.92 0.962
LZ78 / sm-150 3.53 29.33 0.950
LZ78 / sm-all 0.75 16.65 0.976
Table 5.2: Final results for PPM using order = 1
5.2.2 Results
The PPM-based classifier was evaluated using both the sm-150 and sm-all
datasets, using the methodology described in Section 5.1. In order to perform a
fair comparison to LTIAT’s evaluation in Chapter 4, the parameter q was set to
100. This parameter was optimised on a per-user basis in the original LTIAT
implementation, but the LZms model took a substantial length of time to
produce an optimised model for the sm datasets. Because of this, optimization
was abandoned in favour of fixed parameters.
Optimisation on the order parameter, o, was attempted globally, with dif-
ferent values of o being tested for the sm-150 dataset. The results of this
evaluation is presented in Table 5.1. There was no substantial difference be-
tween the models after reaching o = 1, therefore this value was used globally
for all users when using the sm-all dataset for evaluation. When the con-
text length is one, the PPM algorithm uses at most one symbol for the prior
context—the context for a time is a key event and vice versa. It is unusual
that performance should peak with such a context length, and would usually
indicate that something is wrong with the implementation. However, this ef-
fect might be caused by the interleaved symbol types; the stream alternates
between key events and quantized times and it is possible that this forms a
sequence where events that affect each other are out of order. For example, a
time symbol may be affected by three preceding key events, but not the other
time symbols that occur in between.
Table 5.2 presents the results for evaluating PPM and LZms/LZ78 with the
LTIAT, sm-150 and sm-all datasets. Each dataset was divided up using the
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same cross-validation folds for each algorithm. Surprisingly, PPM performs
no better than LZ78 for the sm-all dataset, despite PPM being generally
regarded as a better classifier and more efficient encoder [6]. However, on the
smaller sm-150 and LTIAT datasets, PPM slightly outperforms LZ78.
5.3 Spread Classifier
Instead of considering the prior context for a particular digraph, the digraphs
can be considered independent and each one evaluated separately. A na¨ıve
implementation would average the time for each digraph, and use this for
prediction. Each feature is one digraph, and contains either the average time,
or a value that denotes that this digraph is “missing” in the sample. One
problem with this kind of approach is that it is impossible to control what
is typed in a continuous scenario, so there is potentially a large number of
missing digraphs for any given sample. In such a situation, the classifier may
begin to make predictions based on what is missing, rather than any features
that are present in a given sample.
The KAOFT technique discussed in Chapter 3 overcomes this issue by
comparing two samples on only their common digraphs. Typical classifiers
using subsets of features require retraining with each subset each time a pre-
diction is required. However, retraining can be avoided by building a model
for each digraph seen in the training data, but only using each model when
the sample requiring verification contains that digraph. In the algorithm eval-
uated in this section, the spread of times for each digraph is used to form a
per-digraph model. The predictions of each model are combined to make an
overall prediction whether or not a given sample belongs to the user.
5.3.1 Algorithm
This algorithm, called the “Spread Classifier”, utilises the spread of time values
for each digraph in order to verify an identity. A model is built for each
digraph seen during training, but only if it occurs at least x times, where x
is a parameter. The algorithm has four other parameters: whether to remove
time outliers, the value o above which times are considered outliers, the type
of model to build, and the bandwidth b of spread. In this implementation,
three different types of models were available:
• Fixed Bandwidth In this model digraph times are binned into discrete
ranges during training. For prediction, the probability a time t belongs
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to that user’s digraph is the total number of training digraphs in the
same bin, divided by the total number of digraphs D plus one. If no
digraphs are in the same bin, the predicted probability is 1/(D + 1). In
this model, b is the size of the bin.
• Gaussian The Gaussian model fits a single Gaussian distribution to each
digraph, based on the mean and standard deviation of the training times.
A prediction for a time t is the value of the continuous probability density
function for t. For this model, b is ignored and instead the standard
deviation is used.
• Mixture of Gaussians This model is similar to the Gaussian model, but
instead fits a mixture of Gaussians using the Expectation-Maximisation
algorithm during training. The predicted value is the combined densities
of the fitted Gaussian models. Again, b is ignored and the standard
deviation is used to determine the spread.
In the case of the first model, Fixed Bandwidth, the value for b could be
set automatically to the standard deviation of that particular digraph. Fixed
values of b were applied globally to all digraphs, but the standard deviations
were set per-digraph. In practice, fixed values of b performed worse than
the per-digraph standard deviation, so in all results in the next section the
standard deviation is used for the bandwidth.
The four parameters affected all digraphs; the parameters were not op-
timized on a per-digraph basis unless the bandwidth parameter utilised the
standard deviation instead of a fixed value. Furthermore, no per-user op-
timization was employed—the parameters were identical for every user the
system evaluated. Although per-user parametrization has been shown to im-
prove results for other typist verification techniques [38], the results are not
substantially different from those using global parameters, and so the lack of
per-user optimization is not considered an impediment here. Also, all methods
in this thesis, with the exception of LTIAT in Chapter 3, perform no per-user
optimization.
A prediction on a sample to be verified is performed by considering only
the models that both the trained system and the given sample have in com-
mon. Each digraph time is provided to the relevant model, and the probabil-
ity/density is obtained. The densities are then accumulated together (using
their log likelihood) and divided by the total number of digraphs evaluated.
Thus, the length of a sample and/or the number of digraphs it has in common
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Model Minimum Digraphs x FRR IPR Weighted AUC
sm-150
Fixed Bandwidth 1 7.67 93.64 0.235
Gaussian 3 5.13 75.17 0.704
Mixture of Gaussians 3 0.855
sm-all
Fixed Bandwidth 1 0.500
Gaussian 3 0.757
Mixture of Gaussians 3 0.923
Table 5.3: Final results for the Spread Classifier
with the training data should not affect the overall prediction. A threshold is
obtained during training using the leave-one-out methodology adopted by the
other techniques in this chapter. During prediction, any values falling below
the threshold fail verification, those above the threshold pass.
5.3.2 Results
Table 5.3 presents the results for each of the sm datasets, and each type of
model. In all cases the standard deviation was used as the bandwidth pa-
rameter b, and digraph times above 2000ms (2 seconds) were removed. When
presented with the sm-all dataset the implementation was overwhelmed and
took an excessive amount of time1 to complete evaluation, so threshold op-
timization was abandoned and only the weighted AUC is presented for this
dataset. This is also the case for the Mixture of Gaussians model for both
datasets—the computation involved in optimizing the threshold took more
than a week of computing time. For both sm datasets and the Mixture of
Gaussians model, only the weighted AUC is presented.
It is possible to read off FRR and IPR values from the ROC curve for each
user, but this would mean that the thresholds were obtained in a different
manner—so it is difficult to make a fair comparison of the various models.
However, the weighted AUC is available for all of the models and is independent
of any thresholds, so this value forms the basis of all comparisons.
Not surprisingly, the most complicated per-digraph model—a mixture of
Gaussians—performs the best on all datasets. Unfortunately this particular
model takes a long time to process the sm datasets, making it unhelpful for
typist verification because decisions cannot be made quickly enough to refuse
an attacker access to the system in real time. The faster Fixed Bandwidth and
Gaussian models perform poorly compared to other techniques such as LTIAT
and KAOFT, and build and classification time increases to an unmanageable
level when using larger datasets such as the sm-all one. Also, all AUC values
1More than one week of processing on a single 2.4GHz machine.
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are worse than those previously observed for other techniques. Simply put,
the per-digraph model representations of a typist are often large to store and
time consuming to process, and do not challenge the current state of the art
in any way.
5.4 Context Classifier
In Section 5.2.2 it was found that PPM worked best when the context was
limited to a context length of one. The last section, 5.3, used more compli-
cated metrics than PPM in order to verify identities, opting for a density-
based approach. These two techniques can be combined, to form a single
context-sensitive density-based classifier. This classifier, called the “Context
Classifier”, requires that a context matches before making a prediction using
a digraph’s one-class model. As a result of this requirement, a single digraph
may have many different models—one for each context where the digraph ap-
pears. This is different to using trigraphs or larger n-graphs where the overall
time of the entire n-graph is considered; only the digraph time is ever used.
5.4.1 Algorithm
The Context Classifier was implemented into the workbench from Chapter 3.
Like the Spread Classifier in the last section, it removes outlier times above a
given level, o. It has two other parameters, namely the prior context length
and post context length for a character. If the post context length is set to
one, the model is built on digraphs and is identical to the Spread Classifier
when it uses a Gaussian model, except that no limitations are made on the
number of observations before the system will attempt to use a model.
The prior context length determines how many characters are considered
before the character in question and the post context determines the number
of characters afterwards. A value of zero for the post-context length param-
eter means the second character in the digraph is anonymous. For example,
considering the two sequences the and thy with a prior context length of one
and a post context length of zero, the times for the digraphs he and hy would
be incorporated into the model for th (where t is the prior context). When
the post context length is increased to one, the times for he and hy are put
into separate models the and thy. When the second character is anonymous
the time value is still a digraph time—not a duration—because the only key
press events are considered.
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One Gaussian distribution is fitted to each {prior context, character,
post context} triple, using the digraph times for the triple to build the Gaus-
sian distribution. A sample is verified by considering triples that appear in
both the training data and the given sample, and using their relevant distri-
butions to produce densities that are combined in the same manner as in the
Spread Classifier discussed previously.
This implementation of the Context Classifier uses only key press events,
but it is possible to create a similar classifier using releases as well. Such
a classifier would be similar to PPM in Section 5.2, but utilise a Gaussian
distribution to make predictions instead. After considering the relevant per-
formances of the classifiers in this section, evaluation of such a classifier was
not conducted in favour of investigating other methods of typist verification.
5.4.2 Results
The results of ten-times ten-fold stratified cross-validation for different context
lengths, up to a maximum of four characters, is presented in Table 5.4 using
the sm-150 dataset. In Table 5.4, c is used to represent context characters
surrounding the main character C. When the context is at least two characters
long, regardless of whether the characters are in the prior or post context, the
system scores an AUC below 0.5. This suggests that a given key is affected
by only one other key because context lengths smaller than two perform sub-
stantially better than others when used for verification. Gentner [30] asserted
that “the inter-stroke interval for typing a given character is influenced by the
neighbouring two characters to the left and one character to the right.” Gen-
tner’s work was an investigation of keystroke timing in transcription typing,
of which character context is one aspect. The analysis here does not support
this assertion, however, key releases may influence timings but were not used
when considering context in this classifier.
The results from Table 5.4 indicate that a post context of one and a prior
context of zero—that is, digraphs (as used in the Spread Classifier)—is the
most effective for verification, when using the AUC for comparison. This con-
text was also tested using the sm-all dataset, which produced worse results.
Unfortunately none of the results are good regardless of the dataset used. The
AUC needs to be much greater in order to perform verification that would be
practically useful. The Context Classifier and the related Spread Classifier are
not good challengers to the current state of the art in typist verification.
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Prior Context Post Context Context FRR IPR Weighted AUC
0 0 C 7.47 89.54 0.619
0 1 Cc 8.07 97.40 0.644
1 0 cC 7.93 94.81 0.623
1 1 cCc 2.46 95.44 0.468
2 0 ccC 3.66 96.31 0.498
0 2 Ccc 4.33 95.04 0.489
2 1 ccCc 0.67 98.82 0.448
1 2 cCcc 0.80 96.79 0.429
2 2 ccCcc 0.20 99.76 0.413
0 3 Cccc 0.60 97.89 0.452
3 0 cccC 0.00 99.93 0.448
3 1 cccCc 0.07 99.93 0.423
1 3 cCccc 0.27 99.81 0.441
Table 5.4: Effect of different context lengths on the Context Classifier
Dataset Prior Context Post Context FRR IPR Weighted AUC
sm-150 0 1 8.07 97.40 0.644
sm-all 0 1 1.14 99.07 0.622
Table 5.5: Final results for the Context Classifier
5.5 Individual Digraph Classifier
All classifiers introduced so far in this section are one-class classifiers: they
require no data for training other than that belonging to the user being ver-
ified. In general, requiring negative data is a drawback because the system
performance becomes dependent on it; poor quality data or low quantities of
negative data will damage performance. On the other hand, the performance
of one-class classifiers depends on only the target user’s data, and their thresh-
old can be adjusted to obtain a different trade-off between the FRR and IPR.
Up until this point, only one-class classifiers have been proposed in this chap-
ter. However, there is negative data available—both from other users in the
sm datasets, and other datasets from Chapter 3—so it is possible to consider
systems that make use of this data.
The “Individual Digraph Classifier” is one method of using the negative
data, but retains the ability to change the trade-off between the FRR and IPR
at prediction time. This is achieved by recording a set of features for every di-
graph that appears in the training samples and training a standard multi-class
classifier with this data. The multi-class classifier can predict either “user” or
“attacker” for previously unseen digraphs. A sample is verified by forming a
threshold on the proportion of digraphs in it that are classified as “user” by
the multi-class classifier. This threshold can be adjusted at prediction time
without retraining any part of the system.
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5.5.1 Algorithm
The Individual Digraph Classifier utilises C4.5 decision trees as the multi-
class classifier, trained with a set of ten features. The implementation of the
C4.5 decision trees used here was provided by the WEKA Machine Learning
Workbench [77]. Each instance is derived from a single digraph in a sample
with the features that were used to train the classifier being:
• First Character The first character in the digraph.
• Second Character The second character in the digraph.
• Absolute Digraph Time The digraph time, measured in milliseconds.
• Absolute First Duration The duration of time, measured in millisec-
onds, that the first key was held down.
• Absolute Second Duration The duration of time, measured in mil-
liseconds, that the second key was held down.
• Absolute Inter-Keystroke Time The time in milliseconds between
the release of the first key and the press of the second. This may be
negative if the first key was still depressed when the second one was
pressed.
• Relative Digraph Time The absolute digraph time divided by the
WPM speed of the entire sample.
• Relative First Duration The absolute first duration divided by the
WPM speed of the entire sample.
• Relative Second Duration The absolute second duration divided by
the WPM speed of the entire sample.
• Relative Inter-Keystroke Time The absolute inter-keystroke time
divided by the WPM speed of the entire sample.
Both absolute and relative times were used because either on their own had
little discriminatory power; the learner was unable to perform better than
predicting the majority class when trained with only one type of timing.
Just like LTIAT and the PPM Classifier, the C4.5 decision tree makes
predictions on individual digraphs rather than samples. To translate this into
a judgement for a sample, a threshold is set on the proportion of digraphs
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Dataset Threshold FRR IPR Weighted AUC
sm-150 0.5 4.33 35.41 0.917
sm-all 0.5 0.70 46.48 0.927
Table 5.6: Final results for the Individual Digraph Classifier
that pass verification according to the decision tree. A digraph passes if it
has a greater probability of belonging to the target user than an attacker.
The attacker data is sourced from the LTIAT dataset in the evaluation below,
ensuring that attackers are always novel to the system.
It is possible to set the threshold in the manner described in Section 5.1,
however, finding the threshold in this manner takes an excessively long time for
this classifier.2 The classifier is trained on tens—often hundreds—of thousands
of digraphs and takes a long time to build a model with so much data. Fortu-
nately it is easy to set a sensible threshold on the proportion that achieves a
similar FRR to other classifiers. If more than half of the digraphs pass verifi-
cation, the entire sample passes too. The threshold is set by default at 0.5 for
this classifier.
5.5.2 Results
The Individual Digraph Classifier was evaluated using ten-times ten-fold strat-
ified cross-validation, in exactly the same manner as all other algorithms in
this chapter. In both cases, the threshold was set to 0.5—no leave-one-out
threshold optimization was performed. Table 5.6 presents the results of the
evaluation.
This classifier did surprisingly well, considering that the Spread Classifier—
which also evaluates individual digraphs—performs poorly. The Individual
Digraph Classifier did not score a higher AUC than the state of the art, but
came closer than both the Spread and Context Classifiers. The accuracy of
the predictions could be improved by using bagging or boosting on the deci-
sion trees [55], but doing so would increase the time taken to build a model.
Attempts at training bagged trees and boosted trees were abandoned because
they did not complete in a reasonable amount of time.3
2More than a week of computing power on a single 2.4GHz machine to perform a full
cross-validation evaluation on the sm-150 dataset
3It took more than 24 hours of processing time for evaluation of the sm-150 dataset.
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5.6 Performance Comparison
This chapter has presented four different methods of performing continuous
typist verification, and evaluated their performance using the sm datasets. In
terms of accuracy, the PPM classifier performed the best; it scored an AUC
of 0.971 for the sm-all dataset. The PPM technique was based on LTIAT,
changing only the machine learning component, and rivals the accuracy of
LZ78—especially on small datasets. However, PPM is slower than LZ78 and
the performance difference is not significant, so LTIAT using LZ78/LZms still
trumps this technique.
In all analysis, accuracy has been a major factor in determining the ef-
fectiveness of the algorithms. Yet speed is also important. Ideally a system
should be able to perform classifications in real time to ensure that attackers
are quickly identified. Training time also needs to be considered because it
would be advantageous to retrain the system over time, keeping the profiles
up to date. Systems that take a long time to train may have problems when
many users need to be verified—the training of profiles may overwhelm the
machine being used.
Table 5.7 presents approximate timings for training and prediction for each
of the systems from this chapter and Chapter 3, using the sm-150 dataset. No
threshold optimization was performed, the timings represent how long each
algorithm takes to build a single model, and classify a single instance. The
timings are rounded to the nearest five milliseconds and were calculated using
ten-times ten-fold stratified cross-validation. Each technique is evaluated using
its implementation in the Typist Workbench introduced in Chapter 3. Whilst
none of the code was completely optimised each classifier was implemented in
a similar code style and provides satisfactory performance, with the exception
of PPM where a third-party implementation was used.
Of all the techniques, LTIAT using LZ78 is a clear winner on speed, but this
should be taken with a grain of salt because the times were clustered before the
system was trained. This means that the training time is artificially low, and
in reality the Context Classifier is the fastest overall technique. Unfortunately,
this classifier achieves an accuracy inferior to all other techniques, so the speed
advantage is outweighed by its poor performance for verification.
All algorithms slow down—noticeably during training—when the larger
sm-all dataset is used. The KAOFT technique and Individual Digraph Classi-
fier both utilise negative data, and their training time is additionally influenced
by the amount of negative data available. The results in Table 5.7 suggest that
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Training Time Prediction Time
Method Average Std Dev Average Std Dev
LTIAT - LZ78 50ms 40ms 10ms 10ms
LTIAT - LZms m = 5, s = 5 1000ms 500ms 150ms 20ms
PPM - o = 1 200ms 30ms 15ms 15ms
Spread - Fixed Bandwidth 50ms 10ms 100ms 50ms
Spread - Gaussian 50ms 10ms 100ms 50ms
Spread - Mixture of Gaussians 30000ms 200ms 10ms 10ms
Context - Prior/Post = 2 150ms 10ms 5ms 10ms
Individual Digraph 3000ms 200ms 25ms 20ms
KAOFT - R2A2 1300ms 100ms 100ms 40ms
Table 5.7: Average build and classification times
these two classifiers would be a poor choice for this dataset. Despite KAOFT
scoring the highest accuracy it is also one of the slowest techniques.
5.7 Summary
This chapter has presented four different continuous typist verification tech-
niques, the PPM Classifier, Spread Classifier, Context Classifier and Individ-
ual Digraph Classifier. Each classifier considers a different aspect of typing
behaviour, from sequences to individual digraphs. None of these classifiers
challenge the accuracy of LTIAT or KAOFT on the sm datasets, except for
the PPM classifier, which slightly outperforms LTIAT on two of the datasets
used. The classifiers have a varying speed performance on the sm datasets,
but considering both accuracy and speed LTIAT is the best choice for typist
verification seen thus far.
In order to challenge KAOFT’s accuracy and LTIAT’s speed and accuracy,
a new approach is needed. To reduce the training and prediction times, smaller
representations of typists are required. To achieve good accuracy, any approach
must consider various aspects of a typist’s behaviour—not just raw speed. The
next chapter discusses typist behaviour, exploring what aspects of typing can
be used to distinguish typists from one another. Chapter 7 introduces one-class
classification and presents a general classifier that can outperform multi-class
classifiers when attacking data is novel to the system. Chapter 8 draws on
the insights from Chapters 6 and 7 to present a continuous typist verification
technique that rivals all those explored thus far—considering both speed and
accuracy.
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Chapter 6
Typist Behaviour
There are many elements to consider in typing input, but ordinary typist
verification techniques utilise only one: the time between key events. This is
not necessarily a problem because methods that use time-based metrics, such
as those in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, have been shown to achieve high accuracy.
However, the performance comparison in the previous chapter showed that
many of these techniques are slow; they utilize large numbers of features and
because of this perform many comparisons before producing a judgement. In
order to reduce the time taken, the dimensionality of typical typist verification
systems needs to be addressed.
This chapter explores typist behaviour and considers what habits a typist
has that might differ from another typist with a similar level of skill. The
intention is to shed light on what features might be useful for verification, so
a system can be created that utilises only these. Not all behaviours can be
used to distinguish typists from one another—often typists perform a task in
a similar manner. This isn’t unhelpful: identifying uniform behaviours allows
distinctive ones to be isolated, and it is these that are of interest for typist
verification.
The digraph is one of the smallest units of data in a typing sample and one
of the most commonly used structures for typist verification. Because of this
it is the starting point for this chapter. First, different sorts of digraphs are
considered in Section 6.1, including those that do not produce characters on
the screen. Next, Section 6.2 abstracts from digraphs to finger movements, to
examine whether there is any correlation between digraphs that are typed in
the same way.
These features are still based on time, although several individual digraphs
are combined when considering movements. Section 6.3 is the first analysis
in this thesis of a non-time based metric, studying how often certain unprint-
able characters are used. Section 6.4 analyses pausing behaviour. Section 6.5
investigates whether typists may have different habits for releasing keys. Sec-
tion 6.6 briefly discusses the potential of simple attributes such as typing speed
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and error rate. All these channels of information can be exploited for typist
verification.
6.1 The Digraph
In the English language, “the” is one of the most common words. Its compo-
nent digraphs, th and he, are the most commonly typed alphabetical digraphs
in the datasets collected in the previous chapter. However, neither are the
most common digraph: that honour goes to a pair of backspaces, which is
typed three times more often than any other digraph in the sm-all dataset. In
fact, th is only the 6th most frequent digraph. The top ten frequent digraphs,
in descending order, are: Backspace Backspace, Right-Arrow Right-Arrow,
e Space, Left-Arrow Left-Arrow, Space t, th, t Space, Space a, he, and
Space Space.
The top five digraphs are either pairs of unprintable characters, such as
Backspace, or digraphs that include the Space character. Pairs of unprint-
able characters are not always helpful because they are often typed quickly,
especially when the key is held down until it begins to repeat automatically.
They can also be typed extremely slowly, such as when the user pauses to
consider what they are editing. Figure 6.1 shows the spread of times for a
pair of backspaces, rounding times to the nearest 20ms and grouping times
that exceed 1000ms into the final bar. Although Figure 6.1 reveals a skewed
normal distribution nestled next to a spike at 40ms where the backspace key
is held down and the key repeat has engaged, and a long tail of values past
1000ms. One might na¨ıvely assume that it would be safe to filter out times
that are not within a given range—removing the spike and tail in the case of
Figure 6.1. However, this is not the case. Applying a filter can have a nega-
tive effect: valid digraph times that discriminate one user from others may be
discarded, and for some samples all occurrences of a digraph may be removed.
The negative effect can be demonstrated by considering a randomly selected
sample for the digraph th, typed by Participant A from Chapter 4. Using a
filter that removes times less than 40ms, three of the 40 values for Participant
A’s sample would be removed. All three values are perfectly legitimate: t and
h are separate keys, and the typist is simply quick at typing them.
In general, it is unwise to use a filter that removes low times—especially for
digraphs that are a pair of keys—because it is difficult to determine whether
the digraph has been typed legitimately or is the result of held-down keys when
considering a pair of keys. Filters that remove long times may be useful; it is
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of times for Backspace Backspace
unlikely that a digraph that takes minutes to type occurs naturally in the flow
of typing. The user is most likely distracted, typing with something in their
hand, or absent from the terminal between press events. However, care must
be taken to ensure that such a filter does not remove valid digraphs either.
For example, 750ms seems too low—5% of all digraph times for Backspace
Backspace would be removed using this value.
Ideally any filter should take into account the way that a digraph is typed,
since a global filter will remove a different proportion of times for each. Some
digraphs require the typist to move their hands across the keyboard, not just
their fingers, and inevitably such digraphs will take a longer time to type. A
more conservative filter could also be used, in the order of seconds rather than
milliseconds. On the other hand, any well-designed learning scheme should be
robust to outliers, so filtering out high digraph times should be unnecessary in
order to perform verification.
Regardless of filtering, digraphs formed with a pair of identical letters,
such as a pair of backspaces, are not always informative for discrimination
between users. Participant A, the fastest typist averaging 70 WPM, has a
strikingly similar spread for the digraph Backspace Backspace to Participant
J, the slowest of the typists who averages only 39 WPM. Figure 6.2 displays the
frequency of the digraph Backspace Backspace in a randomly selected sample
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Figure 6.2: Times for Backspace Backspace for Participants A and J (one
sample)
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Figure 6.3: Times for Backspace Backspace for Participants A and J (all
samples)
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Figure 6.4: Times th for Participants A and J (one sample)
from each of the two users. Despite Participant A having an overall average
speed almost twice as fast as Participant J, there is an average difference of
only 35ms between the two samples. On average, Participant A had a digraph
time of 200ms, Participant J had a time of 235ms. This is not just a result of
unrepresentative sample selection: the same two users have the same overlap
when considering the same digraph, Backspace Backspace, across all samples,
as shown in Figure 6.3.
The digraph th does not suffer from the same issue as Backspace
Backspace for these two users. Examining the same two users for th, the
difference in overall typing speed is clearer. Figure 6.4 shows the spread of
times, using the same two samples as before. Participant A typed th with an
average time of 76ms, and Participant J managed only 143ms—almost half
the speed of Participant A’s efforts. Surprisingly, the second fastest typist,
G, also types th at a distinctly different rate to Participant A, despite per-
forming on average only 2 WPM slower overall. This is shown in Figure 6.5,
which displays the same sample from Participant A against a random sample
from Participant G. In this case G is more similar to J, with an average time
of 141ms for th in the given sample. Yet G types nearly twice as fast as J
overall.
This behaviour is not uncommon: a similar overall speed between typists
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Figure 6.5: Times th for Participants A and G (one sample)
does not mean that their individual digraphs will be typed at the same rate.
Ideally, for the purpose of verification, a user should type a digraph consis-
tently, that is, with a low standard deviation, but uniquely—with a mean or
median that distinguishes them from the rest. If all users are inconsistent the
relevant digraph is unhelpful in discriminating between them. If some users
are consistent, this quality can serve to separate them from the rest. If all users
are consistent, the digraph must be typed uniquely in order for it to remain
useful. It is difficult to determine in advance whether or not certain digraphs
will have the required properties.
However, using the dataset from the previous chapter it can be shown that
Backspace Backspace does not have the same discriminatory power as th. A
number of techniques surveyed in Chapter 2 utilised the mean and standard
deviation for each given digraph time, classifying a digraph as belonging to
a user if it passed with x standard deviations of the mean (x > 0, x ∈ R).
Assuming a normal distribution, the probability density can be calculated for
any digraph time, from the mean and standard deviation for a given digraph
and user. This density is calculated using the continuous probability density
function for a Gaussian distribution:
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2σ2 (6.1)
To evaluate the discriminating power of a single digraph, the probability den-
sity is first calculated for each digraph time, d. Next, the densities are ranked,
noting whether each time belongs to the user, or an attacker. Finally, the
ranked densities are used to calculate the area under the ROC curve (AUC),
giving the probability that a user’s time will have a higher density than an
attacker’s.
The higher the AUC for a user’s digraph, the easier the user can be sepa-
rated from the attackers and the more useful the digraph is for typist verifica-
tion. Table 6.1 shows the AUC values for the top six most popular digraphs,
and in, using the sm-all dataset and the first 10 users (the other users did
not type enough to make their analysis useful). The last digraph, in, is in-
cluded because Gaines et al. [28] found it to be one of five digraphs (in, io,
no, on, ul) that together could be used to discriminate perfectly between six
professional secretaries (see Chapter 2). Clearly, this digraph is the best one
for verification of the selected digraphs in Table 6.1: it has a higher AUC
value than any other digraph in the table, for all users. In contrast, the other
digraphs perform poorly, rarely managing an AUC above 0.5—with the excep-
tion of th, which for some users rivals in. Three AUCs are missing from the
table: Right-Arrow Right-Arrow for Participants A and B, and Left-Arrow
Left-Arrow for Participant B. These digraphs were not ever typed by the
relevant users, so it is impossible to calculate an AUC value for them.
Calculating the AUC for each digraph shows that a digraph’s discrimina-
tory performance is not only dependent on the digraph itself, but on the user
as well. For example, Participant J scores an AUC of 0.784 for th, but Par-
ticipant A only scores 0.577, even though earlier in this section it was shown
that these two users were separable from each other using this digraph! Rank-
ing all digraphs by their average AUC, the highest that was typed by all ten
users is in, scoring 0.744, followed by as, yo, er and on. None of the digraphs
perfectly discriminate any one user from the rest. The closest to do so is tc,
which reports an AUC of 0.946 for Participant H.1
In general, digraphs that contain the space character and digraphs that
contain unprintable characters such as Right-Arrow perform worse than the
those formed from two alphabetical characters. However, there are exceptions
1Appendix D gives a ranked list of the top 54 digraphs typed by all ten users at least ten
times each.
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Participant \b \b →→ e Space ←← Space t th in
A 0.490 - 0.556 0.461 0.539 0.577 0.737
B 0.562 - 0.441 - 0.522 0.484 0.756
C 0.431 0.411 0.595 0.468 0.585 0.633 0.668
D 0.489 0.609 0.590 0.639 0.522 0.585 0.789
E 0.530 0.432 0.696 0.451 0.482 0.699 0.706
F 0.466 0.580 0.574 0.651 0.515 0.592 0.719
G 0.466 0.493 0.576 0.469 0.549 0.535 0.781
H 0.621 0.600 0.652 0.623 0.522 0.616 0.726
I 0.530 0.454 0.516 0.512 0.521 0.500 0.730
J 0.539 0.571 0.558 0.528 0.471 0.784 0.831
Average 0.512 0.519 0.575 0.533 0.523 0.600 0.744
Table 6.1: AUC values for popular digraphs
for particular user/digraph combinations. This does not mean these digraphs
cannot be used for verification; when treated as different behaviours from the
rest they can help to discriminate between users. Sections 6.4 and 6.3 discuss
ways to make use of them.
Notwithstanding the analysis in this section, it is impossible to determine
in advance whether a particular digraph will be useful for verification unless
the set of attackers is known. Most verification systems assume that this is
not the case, and systems covered in Chapter 2 that use digraphs in the same
manner as above do not select subsets of digraphs unless the technique utilises
identification for authentication.
6.2 From Digraphs to Finger Movements
One of the major problems in a continuous typist verification system is that
there are no guarantees that a user will type a particular digraph. If a single
digraph differentiated a user from the rest, it would be tempting to try and
force the user to type it. However, the advantage of a continuous system is that
it can perform authentication without interrupting the user, which would be
sacrificed by requiring the user to type something specific. One way of dealing
with this is to abstract from the exact keys involved to the movements used.
This reduces the number of possible features from thousands of digraphs to a
handful of movements.
Abstracting to movements can be done in a number of ways. Dvorak et
al. [23] describe six different classes of movements, as follows:
• tap Both letters in the digraph are the same, so the finger can simply
‘tap’ the same key (ee, tt).
• reach A digraph typed by the same finger on the same hand moving
over a distance of only one key (ft, ju, ed).
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Participant Tap Reach Hurdle Trill Rock Opposite
A 0.715 0.417 0.642 0.505 0.432 0.470
B 0.513 0.334 0.299 0.339 0.276 0.419
C 0.731 0.679 0.595 0.565 0.469 0.588
D 0.837 0.742 0.684 0.744 0.767 0.619
E 0.712 0.502 0.508 0.563 0.571 0.704
F 0.650 0.492 0.421 0.549 0.593 0.487
G 0.560 0.551 0.319 0.517 0.570 0.494
H 0.525 0.566 0.541 0.551 0.711 0.476
I 0.756 0.325 0.380 0.403 0.446 0.521
J 0.653 0.698 0.777 0.699 0.774 0.762
Average 0.665 0.531 0.517 0.544 0.561 0.554
% of Digraphs 7.59 2.56 1.16 14.94 25.20 48.55
Table 6.2: AUC values for movement types
• hurdle A digraph typed by the same finger on the same hand hurdling
over the home row (ce, un).
• trill A digraph typed by adjacent fingers on the same hand (fe, op, te).
• rock A digraph typed by remote fingers on the same hand, in which the
fingers often move in a rocking motion (af, jp, on).
• opposite A digraph typed by different hands (if, od, ma).
Of the top ten most discriminative digraphs typed by all ten users in Ap-
pendix D, all are trill or rock digraphs. This seems to indicate that the be-
haviours that can be used to verify users occur for digraphs typed with different
fingers of the same hand. Table 6.2 shows the results of calculating the AUC
for each movement type listed above, instead of for individual digraphs. A
similar pattern is seen in Table 6.1: the performance of a movement for verifi-
cation depends on both the movement and the user, and there is no movement
that is better than the rest for all ten users. Surprisingly, taps are better dis-
criminators on average than any others, despite only accounting for 7.59% of
all digraphs.
A simpler abstraction is to consider only the hand that typed the digraph,
giving three possible classes: left, right and both. A more complicated ab-
straction might use various combinations of hands, fingers and keyboard rows
to form features. There are many possible abstractions—too many to cover
here—but it is likely that the same pattern will occur for any abstraction.
Each feature will have a different discriminating power for a particular user,
but none will by itself be a panacea for typist verification, even though some
features clearly perform significantly better than others.
The empirical evidence presented here indicates that digraphs formed from
pairs of alphabetical letters are the most useful for typist verification. Never-
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theless, it would be a mistake to attempt to use these alone. An ideal con-
tinuous system will not force a user to type particular digraphs, and because
of this it cannot guarantee that a sample will contain any particular digraphs.
Ideally, these results could be used to weight features, but doing this requires
negative information. It is impossible to know in advance whether or not a
digraph or movement will be helpful for verification, without understanding
the way potential attackers type.
6.3 Key Usage
Although missing digraphs present a problem for verification, they can also
be useful—the system may perform verification by considering what a user
is typing. This is known as authorship verification. It is different to typist
verification, which considers how a user is typing. Authorship verification
systems typically work on a blocks of text, instead of the stream of events
used to create them. Such systems are able to supplement typist verification
because a stream of key events can easily be turned into a block of text.
Unfortunately, potentially helpful information will be lost when a typing
stream is turned into text. Some keys on a computer keyboard produce un-
printable characters that are important when creating text, but do not affect
reading or understanding. These include cursor keys, Backspace, Delete,
Insert, Home, End, Page Up, Page Down, Shift, Meta, Control and Alt. A
typical authorship verification system would never see these keys because they
do not produce characters directly, but are used for editing or modifying other
keys. However, their occurrences are readily available for typist verification.
The simplest way of using these keys for verification is to calculate how
often they occur in each sample and turn this into a probability. The absence
of a particular key cannot confirm an identity because it might not have been
typed simply by chance. On the other hand, the presence of a key might
indicate that an attack is underway, especially if the user has never pressed it
before. For example, Participant B never used the Left-Arrow or Down-Arrow
key in the sm-all dataset, yet all others did use these keys in at least one of
their samples. If this observation was used for verification, a sample containing
the Left-Arrow or Down-Arrow keys would be considered unlikely to belong to
Participant B. Such a sample should not be totally discounted, because there
is always a slim chance that the user did indeed type with this key, perhaps
by accident.
Navigational keys and keys used for editing are not the only ones whose
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usage (or lack thereof) should be considered. After analyzing the most common
digraphs from the previous sections, 88 stood out. It was the 15th most popular
digraph, whereas no other numerical digraphs appeared in the top 250. Of the
5378 times that 88 appeared, only seven occurrences were not from Participant
B. It was typed once by Participants A and G, and five times by Participant
D. On closer inspection it was discovered that the digraph was actually **,
that is, 88 modified by the Shift key. Participant B often used a line of
asterisks to separate text within their emails, pressing and holding the key
until a sufficiently long line was produced. This kind of behaviour would be
caught by any competent authorship verification system because the repeated
asterisks would be present in the printed text.
All of the digraphs in this chapter are evaluated in lowercase. Although
the datasets collected earlier indicate whether Shift was down when another
key was pressed, Capslock was not recorded, so it is difficult to determine
whether some characters actually appear on screen in uppercase. Furthermore,
all modifiers—Shift, Meta, Control and Alt—were recorded in the form of
a mask for each key. Because of this, it is impossible to perform a similar
analysis to Lau et al. [44] (reviewed in Chapter 2), checking to see which of
the left or right versions of these four keys were pressed.
Navigational keys and those used for editing should be used with caution
for typist verification. Their presence or absence cannot by itself confirm an
identity. Whether they are typed depends on a number of factors, including
whether a mouse was available to provide input. Just like the digraphs in the
previous two sections, the discriminatory power of a particular key’s usage is
dependent on the user, the key, and the potential set of attackers.
6.4 Pausing
Studies of reading have found that “various levels of structure contribute to
the process: letters, digraphs, syllables, words, phrases, sentences, and so
on”[51]. Many typist verification techniques apply this idea by considering
not just digraphs, but larger units such as words. One difficulty with any
timing collected from typing samples is that it may be influenced by pauses.
Inevitably typists pause as they prepare to type each structure, just as they
would during reading. They may also pause for other reasons, such as being
distracted, holding something that impairs their ability to type, tiredness, or
leaving the terminal. Section 6.1 found that digraphs containing the Space
key were poor discriminators compared to others. This is most likely due to
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Participant Before Space After Space
A 0.531 0.310
B 0.565 0.745
C 0.786 0.584
D 0.507 0.515
E 0.619 0.590
F 0.660 0.521
G 0.486 0.518
H 0.689 0.391
I 0.569 0.705
J 0.548 0.570
Average 0.596 0.545
Table 6.3: AUC values for pausing between words
typists pausing while they prepare to type the next word. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to confirm this because the typist would need to be observed, either
in person or using a camera, to understand what causes them to pause.
Verification systems can utilise pauses explicitly to differentiate between
typists, regardless of their cause. To do this, the system considers how long
the typist takes to complete certain structures. Digraphs that contain the
Space character can be useful here: it is likely some typists pause before
pressing the space key, whereas others pause after doing so. After testing this
with the sm-all dataset, it was found that most typists tended to pause after
pressing the space key instead of beforehand. Just as we saw with other types
of digraphs, these times were a useful discriminator for some of the users. The
results of this evaluation are presented in Table 6.3.
Similar patterns to those in Table 6.3 are observed using other simple struc-
tures such as syllables, and larger ones such as sentences. Interestingly, di-
graphs that cross syllable boundaries are usually typed faster than elsewhere
in the text. In this case, syllables were calculated using a hyphenation engine
from the iText PDF generation library [45], and each digraph was split into
one of two groups depending on whether or not it crossed a syllable boundary.
On average, those that did were faster that those that did not 75% of the time,
even when times greater than one second are removed from the analysis.2
Unfortunately, at higher levels of structure the effects of software timers
are amplified; software timers have a resolution no finer than 10ms—higher if
the system is under load. As consecutive events are accumulated into larger
structures the overall timing error increases. For example, four events produce
an overall error of between zero and 40ms. If this error is sufficiently large it
may negatively impact a verification system’s performance. This is a problem
when considering pauses because it is difficult to determine how much of a
2Syllables are likely to produce only short pauses because the typist is moving between
sections of text but ideally maintaining a flow, and so removing excessively large times
should not affect the evaluation.
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timing belongs to the user’s natural patterns, how much is the result of pausing,
and how much can be attributed to system error. In all the evaluation in this
section no attempt was made to divide any timing into its component parts.
Here, pausing is just the act of taking longer than usual to complete a task.
6.5 Ordering of Events
Typed language structure is made up of a number of key events. Characters
need only two events; digraphs four; words and sentences need much more.
Only half the events—the press events—cause text to appear on screen. Key
releases are important for modifier keys, such as Shift or Ctrl, which trans-
form a normal key in some way until they are released. Releases are also useful
when a key is pressed for a long period: computer operating systems usually
begin to automatically repeat characters after a key has been held down for
a certain period of time, and continue to repeat at regular intervals until the
key is released. Keystroke recognition systems that use audio recordings to
determine what was typed [81] additionally define a touch peak and hit peak,
referring to when the finger touches the key and when the key hits the key-
board backplate respectively. The keyboard itself can only provide information
as to the state of a key, i.e. whether it is up or down.
When typing, press events must occur in the same order as the intended
characters, but releases are not constrained. Studies have shown that touch
typists move towards 3 different keys at any given time on average [16]. With so
many movements going on at once, it would be unrealistic to expect events to
alternate perfectly between presses and releases. Even hunt-and-peck typists
can hold down overlapping keys if they use both index fingers to type.
The extent to which keys overlap can be quantified in a number of ways.
In this thesis, four different measures are used for event ordering. Whilst there
are many possible ways of evaluating this, these four metrics performed the
best out of all that were tested. The metrics used are:
• Slur Rate The slur rate is the proportion of times a release event does
not follow immediately after the press event for the same key, over the
total number of events in the sample. It indicates how often a given user
slurs events, instead of pressing and releasing keys cleanly. A typical
user from the sm datasets has a slur rate around 0.7.
• Slur Length The slur length measures how many key events occur be-
tween a press event for a given key and its related release event. For
91
an entire sample, the slur length is the average length of all slurs. This
measure quantifies how long a user slurs, without considering the overall
time involved. The average slur length across all users in the sm datasets
is 1.7.
• Press Before Release Following the same idea of slurring, this measure
considers the proportion of times a press event for a new key occurs before
the release event for the given key. It measures the number of times that
p1p2r1r2 occurs as a pattern, as a proportion of the number of sequences
with the pattern p1p2rxry where x and y may be any key. Most users in
the sm datasets had a press before release value above 0.9, however the
average value was 0.78.
• Paired Perfect Order The slur rate measures how often a given user
does not press a key and immediately follow it with the release of the
same key. This attribute is the inverse—it measures how often the user
presses events in a “perfect” order but also requires that there is two con-
secutive “perfect” sets of key events. That is, it uses the event sequence
p1r1p2r2. Like the Press Before Release, this is divided by the number
of sequences with the same pattern p1rxp2ry where x and y may be any
key. A typical user from the sm datasets has a paired perfect order value
between 0.8 and 1.
Table 6.4 shows the AUC for each of the four metrics, for each user. Overall,
all four perform well compared to others considered here, and all but the Slur
Length perform better than any other metric in this chapter. Even the Slur
Length is only beaten by the digraph in, which achieves an average AUC of
0.744 across all ten users. On a per-user basis all four metrics perform well,
with the exception of Participant D and the Slur Length and Press Before
Release metrics. Surprisingly, Participant J is almost perfectly authenticated
on Slur Rate alone! No other metric in this chapter comes so close to perfect
authentication for any user.
The four metrics, Slur Rate, Slur Length, Press Before Release and Paired
Perfect Order, are all good discriminators. They show that there is plenty
of information available for authentication that would be lost if the system
only considered press events. All four can be easily utilised as part of a typist
verification system, but to date no system has used these attributes.
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Participant Slur Rate Slur Length Press Before Release Paired Perfect Order
A 0.668 0.925 0.930 0.630
B 0.858 0.652 0.938 0.848
C 0.886 0.528 0.863 0.911
D 0.984 0.375 0.339 0.956
E 0.970 0.979 0.787 0.950
F 0.883 0.679 0.859 0.885
G 0.857 0.878 0.872 0.786
H 0.917 0.595 0.897 0.907
I 0.694 0.529 0.840 0.674
J 0.996 0.576 0.826 0.983
Average 0.871 0.671 0.815 0.853
Table 6.4: AUC values for key ordering measures
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Figure 6.6: Slur rate versus typist speed (WPM)
6.6 Speed and Error Rate
When users are trained to touch type there are two important factors that
are used to estimate their skill level: speed and error rate. All typing veri-
fication systems examined in Chapter 2 operate at a low level, using habits
gleaned from examining presses, releases, digraphs and other small structures
in typing. The findings in this chapter shows that although low level patterns
exist, aggregates such as Slur Rate can be more informative for verification
than individual digraphs.
The analysis in Section 6.5, implies that typing speed is useful for veri-
fication. The faster a user types, the closer together events occur and the
more likely the typist is to slur presses and releases. This is demonstrated
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Participant WPM Backspace
A 0.887 0.771
B 0.851 0.883
C 0.830 0.635
D 0.955 0.768
E 0.953 0.897
F 0.788 0.620
G 0.709 0.716
H 0.832 0.692
I 0.896 0.629
J 0.978 0.673
Average 0.868 0.728
Table 6.5: AUC values for WPM and backspace rate
in Figure 6.6, which shows the average WPM speed per sample against the
Slur Rate for the same sample. Considering that these two attributes are so
strongly correlated, it would be foolish to ignore typing speed in favour of
lower level attributes such as digraph times.
Evaluation using the sm-all dataset shows that typing speed and error rate
are just as useful for verification as the event ordering metrics in the previous
section. Table 6.5 shows the AUC values for typing speed (measured in words
per minute) and backspace rate (the proportion of backspaces in the sample).
In some cases, such as Participant A, speed and backspace rate are better
attributes than the Slur Rate, scoring higher AUC values. For others, the
metrics in the previous section perform better. However, these two aggregates
perform equally well as—usually better than—the best individual digraph,
in. These results indicate these two simple metrics are viable attributes for
verification.
6.7 Summary
On the face of it, typing appears simple: a user presses and releases keys to
create text on the screen. When examined further, it is exposed as a complex
task. Some keys are pressed before others are released. Some keys are used in
preference to others when editing text. The time between certain digraphs does
not always accurately reflect the typist’s overall speed. And typists arbitrarily
pause. Typist verification is a difficult task because none of these factors can
be used alone to verify identity, and many have performance that depends on
the user.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine in advance whether or not a
particular attribute will be useful for identifying a given user. To do this,
the set of possible attackers must be known. In some situations this may be
available, but in general for verification this is assumed to not be the case.
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Ideally, the performance of a typist verification system should not rest on
knowledge of other users, but only on knowledge about the target user.
The success of typist verification using the attributes discussed in this sec-
tion is currently unknown, even though the usefulness of each attribute is indi-
vidually quantified here in terms of their AUC value. Chapter 7 discusses the
sort of machine learning algorithms that can make predictions on the source of
a sample using the attributes discussed in this chapter. Chapter 8 shows how
to use these attributes and the algorithms from Chapter 7 to perform typist
verification.
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Chapter 7
One-Class Classification
All of the techniques for typist verification presented in earlier chapters, with
the exception of Gunetti and Picardi’s method [33] and the Individual Digraph
Classifier, have one important feature in common: they are one-class classifiers.
One-class classifiers are a type of machine learning algorithm that only requires
information about a single ‘target’ class in order to build a model that can be
used for prediction. They can make two possible judgements on an unknown
instance. They predict target if the instance appears to belong to the same class
the model was trained on, or unknown if the instance does not seem to come
from the same class as the training data. Gunetti and Picardi’s technique is
not one-class classification because it requires data from many different people
in order to build a predictive model for a given user.
One-class classification is often called outlier detection or novelty detection
because it attempts to differentiate between data that appears normal and
abnormal with respect to the training data. The literature can be confusing:
outlier/novelty detection sometimes refers to problems where all instances are
available at training time, and instead of building a model for prediction the
learning algorithm must distinguish what—if any—instances from the dataset
are outliers. However, the literature is consistent when referring to one-class
classification. In this case, a training dataset is provided with information
about a single class (which may or may not contain outliers) and a model is
built that can then be used to predict whether previously unseen instances
belong to the target class.
This approach to learning is typically used in situations where it is inappro-
priate to make use of non-target data. For example, consider the problem of
password hardening discussed in Chapter 2.3. This is a biometric system used
to strengthen logins, which it achieves by verifying that the provided pass-
word is typed with the correct rhythm. An important aspect of the system
is that it is strengthening the password—not replacing it. This means that
it is not possible to collect negative data for a given target password because
to do so the password would have to be supplied to the attacker typist. This
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constraint does not apply to typist verification because the patterns are mined
from free text and it is possible to collect negative data without compromising
the system.
It may seem sensible to suggest that two-class classification should be used
in preference to one-class classification to verify a user since all the datasets
presented here contain data from many different typists. Using two-class clas-
sification simplifies the learning problem—the algorithm need only to draw a
boundary between the target class and all others. There are two reasons why
one-class classification should be still considered. The first is practical: if typist
verification is to be used on personal computers then acquiring typing rhythms
for attacking users may be difficult. The second—and most important—reason
for considering a one-class setup is that we cannot guarantee that the data that
is available will cover the range of potential attackers. In some situations, in-
cluding typist verification, new classes may appear at prediction time that are
different from all classes available during training time.
Since there is only a limited number of attackers (20–30 in the datasets
here), intuition suggests that one-class classification should be used in prefer-
ence to two-class classification for typist verification because it seems unlikely
that the existing attackers will provide comprehensive coverage of the poten-
tial attacker space. But it is not clear that this is the case: the small amount
of negative data used with two-class classification may still form a better ver-
ification model for a user than one-class classification alone.
This chapter investigates when one-class classification should be applied
to a given verification problem. It deals with general verification problems,
rather than the specific problem of typist verification, so the techniques used
can benefit other research areas. The next chapter relates the work discussed
here to typist verification.
The next section describes how one-class and multi-class classifiers can be
tested to discover their prediction accuracy for a given problem; it also de-
scribes how to compare the setups fairly. The approaches to classification are
then compared and conclusions drawn about the use of one-class classification
for verification. This comparison uses a density function for one-class classi-
fication; later sections will introduce a better one-class classifier. Section 7.2
covers methods of one-class classification, especially those used for verification
problems. Finally, Section 7.3 explores how one-class and multi-class classifica-
tion techniques can be combined to form a single one-class classifier, using an
artificially generated second class alongside the target data for the multi-class
component. This artificial data can be replaced with real negative data—if
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such data is available—to improve on prediction accuracy.
7.1 One-Class Classification versus Multi-
Class Classification
For verification problems such as typist verification, there are at least three
possible ways to approach classification: multi-class classification, two-class
classification and one-class classification. When negative (i.e. non-target) data
is available, standard multi-class classification can be used. In this approach,
the system learns to differentiate between all the classes in the training data,
and the model is then used to predict the class of an unseen instance. If the
predicted class matches the target class the verification succeeds, otherwise it
fails. A potential disadvantage of this approach in the context of verification
is that we are primarily interested in identifying occurrences of completely
novel classes at prediction time and multi-class classifiers may not accurately
discriminate against these; they match to the closest known class.
It is also possible to approach classification by reformulating the problem
as a two-class classification problem. As a first step, all classes in the training
data except the target class are relabelled to a single unified class: outlier.
Then a multi-class classifier learns target versus outlier using the relabelled
data. The classifier can make two possible predictions on an instance, target or
outlier, corresponding to verification success and failure respectively. Two-class
classification can potentially suffer from the same problem as standard multi-
class classification when novel classes arise at prediction time: the classifier is
only as good as the coverage of the outlier class.
Finally, the non-target classes present in the training data can be com-
pletely ignored and a one-class classifier used for verification. As discussed
earlier, one-class classifiers do not use any negative data during their training
phase. This means that a one-class classifier’s accuracy is unaffected by the
coverage of the non-target classes in the training data. However, it can be
difficult to define an accurate boundary around a target class without know-
ing where non-target instances are likely to appear. The usual practice is to
provide a parameter to the one-class classifier that is used to define what per-
centage of the training data should be considered outliers. This parameter is
known as ν in the case of one-class support vector machines [63]. Using this
parameter, the classifier can create decision boundaries by identifying outliers
in the target class and effectively use these as a second class.
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When negative data is available at training time, all three methods can
be used for verification. However, choosing a classifier presents a problem: it
is not obvious how to perform a fair comparison of multi-class and one-class
classifiers in this context because each setup uses a slightly different set of test
and training data. Therefore, before proposing that one method should be
used over another for a given verification problem, the issue of comparing the
classifiers must first be tackled.
7.1.1 Comparing Classifiers Fairly
A standard method for evaluating one-class classifiers is to split a multi-class
dataset into a set of smaller one-class datasets, with one dataset per class
containing all the instances for the corresponding class. The one-class classifier
can then be trained on each dataset in turn, with a small amount of data held
out from the training set and all the other datasets used for testing. Depending
on the number of instances available for each class, this generally means that
there is a large amount of negative (or ‘attacker’) data for testing, and a
relatively small amount of positive data for both testing and training.
Multi-class classifiers are often evaluated using stratified 10-fold cross-
validation, where the data is split into 10 equal-sized subsets, each with the
same distribution of classes. The classifier is trained 10 times, using a different
fold for testing and the other 9 folds combined for training. These two different
evaluation methods are not comparable: in each one the classifier is trained
on a different proportion of data for a given class, and is tested on different
quantities of data.
In fact, it is not immediately obvious how to perform a fair comparison
of one-class classifiers and multi-class ones: the former are designed to deal
with classes that are unseen at training time, but the latter typically handle
only classes that they have been trained on. There are two types of multi-class
classification—biased, where the classifier has seen data from the attacker class
during training, and unbiased, where attackers are always novel. Fortunately,
there is a way to compare all three types of classification—multi-class biased,
multi-class unbiased and one-class—to each other.1 Let us consider the biased
multi-class case first. A target and held-out ‘attacker’ class are identified.
Then, a normal stratified cross-validation fold is performed, which maintains
the class distributions. However, before relabelling the non-target classes,
1This technique is covered in further detail in “Discriminating Against New Classes:
One-Class versus Multi-Class Classification” by Hempstalk and Frank [36].
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Figure 7.1: Cross-validation for biased two-class classification (with rela-
belling)
Figure 7.2: Cross-validation for one-class classification (with relabelling)
Figure 7.3: Cross-validation for unbiased two-class classification (with rela-
belling)
instances from the test set that do not belong to either the target or held-out
class are deleted. Finally all non-target classes are relabelled to O, and the
evaluation is performed. Figure 7.1 shows the resulting datasets used for two-
class classification. Let us now consider the evaluation of a one-class classifier:
it simply ignores all outlier training data, as shown in Figure 7.2. Lastly,
let us consider unbiased two-class classification. In this case, before the final
relabelling is performed, the heldout class is removed from the training set, as
demonstrated in Figure 7.3.
The advantage of this approach is that the test set and the target data in
the training set are identical for all three classification techniques, and it is
now possible to compare results. Furthermore, as an additional benefit, it is
also possible to compare true multi-class classification based on more than two
classes with two-class and one-class classifiers by omitting the relabelling step
where the non-target classes become class O.
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Evaluation of a single target class using different classification techniques
(multi-class, two-class and one-class) can be performed by accumulating all
predictions for each possible combination of target and held-out classes. The
area under the ROC curve (AUC) is then calculated for each target class. The
AUC is used here for comparisons because it is independent of any threshold
used by the learning algorithm. To compare classifier performance on an entire
multi-class dataset, the weighted average AUC is used, where each target class
ci is weighted according to its prevalence p(ci):
AUCweighted =
∑
∀ci∈C
AUC(ci)× p(ci) (7.1)
Using a weighted average rather than an unweighted one prevents target classes
with smaller instance counts from adversely affecting the results.
7.1.2 Evaluation Method
Five different classification techniques were each tested on UCI benchmark
datasets [3] with nominal classes, providing an experimental comparison of
the classification techniques. For each dataset ten-fold cross-validation was
repeated ten times. The learning techniques used are:
1. Biased multi-class classification using the Na¨ıve Bayes algorithm. No
relabelling was performed, and data from the heldout class was not re-
moved from the training dataset (similar to Figure 7.1, but without re-
labelling the non-target classes to O).
2. Unbiased multi-class classification using Na¨ıve Bayes. No relabelling
was performed, but data from the heldout class was removed from the
training dataset (similar to Figure 7.3, but without relabelling the non-
target classes to O).
3. Biased two-class classification using Na¨ıve Bayes. All non-target classes
were relabelled to ‘outlier’, and the test set contained only the target
and (relabelled) heldout class, as in Figure 7.1.
4. Unbiased two-class classification using Na¨ıve Bayes. All non-target
classes were relabelled to ‘outlier’, and the test set contained only the
target and (relabelled) heldout class and instances of the heldout class
were removed from the training set, as in Figure 7.3.
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5. One-class classification using a Gaussian density estimate for numeric
attributes and a discrete distribution for each nominal one, assuming in-
dependence between attributes (i.e. ‘Na¨ıve Bayes’ with only one class).
All non-target classes were relabelled to ‘outlier’ and the test set con-
tained only the target and (relabelled) heldout class, as in Figure 7.2.
The experiments utilise WEKA’s [77] implementation of Na¨ıve Bayes with
default parameters for all multi-class and two-class tasks. This is the classifier
in WEKA that is directly comparable to the one-class classifier used. The one-
class classifier fits a single Gaussian to each numeric attribute and a discrete
distribution to each nominal one. A prediction for an instance, X, is made by
assuming the attributes are independent. The same happens in Na¨ıve Bayes,
but on a per-class basis. In both Na¨ıve Bayes and the one-class classifier,
missing attribute values are ignored.
7.1.3 Results
Using the methodology discussed previously, experimental results obtained on
UCI datasets are presented in this section. First, results from comparing the
five different classification techniques discussed above are shown. Then some
of the results are examined in greater detail, focusing on unbiased two-class
classification versus one-class classification.
Comparison on UCI Datasets
Table 7.1 provides empirical results for the five different classifiers on UCI
datasets, compared using the weighted average AUC described in Section 7.1.1.
Bold font indicates wins for two-class unbiased classification versus one-class
classification and vice versa. Only UCI datasets with three or more class labels
were used, because the evaluation technique requires at least three classes.
Table 7.1 has some noteworthy results, aside from the expected outcome
that the biased classification techniques (columns 1 and 3) outperform the
unbiased and one-class methods. Of the two biased techniques, one might
na¨ıvely expect the two-class approach to perform better: there are less labels
and the outlier class contains many of them. However, on all but four of the
26 datasets (glass, lymphography, mfeat-factors and vehicle), the multi-class
classifier either performs the same or better than the two-class classifier—and
the difference for these four datasets is not significant. This can be explained
by the fact the multi-class Na¨ıve Bayes classifier is able to form a more complex
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Classification Techniques
Multi-class Multi-class Two-class Two-class One-class
Datasets Classes Biased (1) Unbiased (2) Biased (3) Unbiased (4) (5)
anneal 6 0.957 0.575 0.948 0.605 0.788
arrhythmia 16 0.801 0.724 0.775 0.723 0.576
audiology 24 0.960 0.883 0.946 0.897 0.881
autos 7 0.831 0.722 0.807 0.736 0.567
balance-scale 3 0.970 0.851 0.941 0.851 0.806
ecoli 8 0.958 0.855 0.947 0.889 0.927
glass 7 0.760 0.680 0.763 0.605 0.702
hypothyroid 4 0.931 0.576 0.915 0.587 0.648
iris 3 0.994 0.671 0.990 0.671 0.977
letter 26 0.957 0.932 0.941 0.935 0.887
lymphography 4 0.911 0.432 0.914 0.425 0.739
mfeat-factors 10 0.992 0.946 0.975 0.964 0.948
mfeat-fourier 10 0.966 0.917 0.949 0.930 0.909
mfeat-karhunen 10 0.996 0.969 0.983 0.976 0.955
mfeat-morph 10 0.952 0.890 0.948 0.928 0.941
mfeat-zernike 10 0.960 0.906 0.946 0.912 0.897
optdigits 10 0.986 0.948 0.978 0.969 0.959
pendigits 10 0.980 0.915 0.962 0.942 0.953
primary-tumor 22 0.839 0.778 0.834 0.784 0.732
segment 7 0.971 0.863 0.952 0.863 0.937
soybean 19 0.994 0.966 0.988 0.973 0.961
splice 3 0.993 0.831 0.983 0.831 0.720
vehicle 4 0.767 0.671 0.768 0.696 0.658
vowel 11 0.956 0.907 0.926 0.909 0.865
waveform 3 0.956 0.692 0.927 0.692 0.864
zoo 7 0.999 0.963 0.984 0.963 0.984
Table 7.1: Weighted AUC results for multi-class, two-class and one-class clas-
sifiers
model, with as many mixture components as there are classes. These results
suggest that if one does not expect any novel class labels at testing time, one
should not merge classes to form a two-class verification problem if Na¨ıve Bayes
is used as the classification method.
In situations where the attacker class is not present in the training set (i.e.
considering the unbiased classifiers), the picture is not so clear. The multi-class
classifier (column 2) scores three wins, five draws and 16 losses against its two-
class counterpart (column 4). This result is consistent with intuition: when
expecting novel classes during testing, it is safer to compare to a combined
outlier class because the multi-class model may overfit the training data. By
combining the non-target classes into one class we can provide a more general
single boundary against the target class, and increase the chance that a novel
class will be classified correctly.
As described earlier, one-class classification is intended to deal with novel
classes, and learns only the target class during training. One would expect
that the multi-class classifiers could potentially have an advantage because it
has seen negative data during training. However, as highlighted in Table 7.1,
when considering the unbiased two-class classifier (the most accurate classifier
when novel classes are expected during testing), the one-class classifier loses
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on fifteen datasets and wins on the other nine. On closer inspection, most of
the datasets where the unbiased two-class classifier wins have a large number
of class labels; at least half of the winning datasets have 10 or more original
class labels. In contrast, the one-class classifier wins on only two datasets with
many class labels—pendigits and mfeat-morph.
Exploring a Domain for One-Class Classification
In order to clarify in which situations one-class classification should be ap-
plied, it is instructive to investigate the relationship between the number of
class labels available at training time and the accuracy of the two prospective
classifiers: the one-class classifier and the unbiased two-class classifier. The
number of instances for each class is also relevant; classes with a large num-
ber of instances will generally result in a more accurate classifier. However,
here the primary concern is whether a classifier is capable of identifying novel
classes. Hence, it is more appropriate to investigate the effect on accuracy ob-
tained by reducing the dataset size by removing all instances for a particular
class label, rather than by performing a random selection of instances.
For each of the datasets where the unbiased two-class classifier outper-
formed the one-class method, the experimental procedure from Section 7.1.2
was repeated, but on each run an additional single class label (and all associ-
ated instances) was removed from the training dataset. This was repeated until
only two classes remained: the target class, and one original—but relabelled—
class. Since the heldout attacker class is also being removed before training,
reducing the datasets any further results in no attacker instances present in
the training set. The process for producing the test set remains the same—
ensuring that the dataset used to obtain the AUC is identical for each method.
The results are presented in Table 7.2. For brevity the final column shows the
number of classes that were removed before the one-class classifier became
better than the two-class one.
For all but two of the datasets shown in Table 7.2, there exists a point
where it is better to use the one-class classifier over the two-class one. This is
not unexpected: as the number of non-target classes is reduced, their coverage
diminishes until it is no longer worthwhile to use them to define a boundary
around the target class. For the two datasets where this is not the case,
arrhythmia and primary-tumor, the density estimate does not appear to form
a good model of the data for either classifier and the AUC is relatively low in
both cases.
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Original Total Two-class One-class Wins
Dataset One-class Two-class Removals Final AUC After x Removals
arrhythmia 0.576 0.723 13 0.606 -
audiology 0.881 0.897 21 0.736 7
letter 0.887 0.935 23 0.876 23
mfeat-factors 0.948 0.975 8 0.736 5
mfeat-fourier 0.909 0.949 8 0.726 5
mfeat-karhunen 0.955 0.983 8 0.836 7
mfeat-zernike 0.897 0.946 8 0.728 4
optdigits 0.959 0.969 7 0.855 4
primary-tumor 0.732 0.784 19 0.740 -
soybean 0.961 0.973 16 0.954 10
vowel 0.865 0.909 8 0.827 8
Table 7.2: Weighted AUC results for reduced numbers of non-target classes
When plotting individual results, the weighted AUC continually decays as
classes are removed from the training data. As a typical example, Figure 7.4
shows the results for the audiology dataset. Of course, the one-class classifier
maintains a constant AUC because it does not use non-target data during
training. The shape of decay shown in Figure 7.4 is typical of the datasets in
Table 7.2.
From the results in this section we can say that where there are limited
non-target classes available at training time, thus increasing the potential for
a novel class to appear that is dissimilar from any existing non-target class,
one-class classification should be used in preference to two-class classification.
7.1.4 Summary
In this section, comparisons of one-class and multi-class classification for ver-
ification problems have been explored. For verification problems—like typist
verification—multi-class, two-class and one-class classification can be used to
find a predictive model when negative data is present in the dataset. The
effectiveness of the multi-class classifiers is highly dependent on the coverage
of the negative data, which is considered here to be a function of the number
of non-target classes that exist in the data. How many non-target classes are
required for (unbiased) multi-class classification to be a more accurate solution
than a one-class approach depends on the dataset involved. One-class classifi-
cation is generally more effective when novel classes appear at prediction time
that are different to all classes that appear at training time.
When dealing with verification problems based on behaviours, such as typ-
ist verification, these results indicate that it is preferable to use one-class clas-
sification methods because it is always possible for an impostor to differ from
all the samples on which the system was trained. Furthermore, behavioural
samples for impostors can be hard to obtain, so using one-class classification
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Figure 7.4: Classes removed versus weighted AUC for the audiology dataset.
simplifies the process of collecting data. It is still possible to make use of neg-
ative data using one-class classification techniques, as we will see in Section
7.3. The next section describes general methods of one-class classification.
7.2 Methods of One-Class Classification
Existing models for one-class classification either extend current methods for
multi-class classification or are based on density estimation. In the latter ap-
proach, density estimation is performed by fitting a statistical distribution,
such as a Gaussian, to the target data. Any instances with a low probability
of appearing (more precisely, low density value) can be marked as outliers [54].
This is a sensible approach in cases where the target data follows the selected
distribution very closely. The challenge is to identify an appropriate distri-
bution for the data at hand. Alternatively one can use a non-parametric ap-
proach, such as kernel density estimation, but this can be problematic because
of the curse of dimensionality and the resulting computational complexity.
Examples of applications of density estimation for one-class classification
include: detecting masses in mammograms [69] using Parzen windows and
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Gaussian mixture models, identifying outliers in sensor data [68] by utilis-
ing kernel density estimators, and predicting upcoming critical failures in jet
engines [15] using Gaussian mixture models. Only Subramanium et al. [68]
provides empirical results, stating that the “algorithms averaged 99% preci-
sion, and 93% recall for the engine measurements” [68]. In many cases the
goal is to achieve a low IPR to ensure that real outliers are never missed: it
is generally considered better to wrongly reject target data as an outlier than
to let an outlier go undetected. In these examples failing to identify an outlier
can be the difference between life and death. However, achieving a low IPR
often results in a high FAR—Tarassenko et al. [69] notes this, commenting
that all 40 masses were correctly identified as novel, but “a significant number
of false positives were discovered ... just over one per image on average”.
A common statistical approach to one-class classification is to identify out-
liers as instances that are greater than a distance, d, to a percentage, p, of
the training data [4, 54]. This approach is analogous to clustering the data
using a machine learning algorithm and determining a suitable boundary that
encloses all the clusters [22]. The boundary can be generated by adapting the
inner workings of an existing multi-class classifier [63], or by using artificial
data as a second class, in conjunction with a standard multi-class learning
technique [1, 24]. Methods in the former category generally rely heavily on a
parameter that defines how much of the target data is likely to be classified as
outlier [70]. This parameter defines how conservative the boundary around the
target class will be. If it is chosen too liberally, then the model will overfit and
we risk identifying too much legitimate target data as outliers. A drawback of
these techniques is that an appropriate parameter value needs to be manually
chosen at training time.
In contrast, when density estimation is used for one-class classification, a
threshold on the density can be adjusted at prediction time to obtain a suitable
rate of outliers. In some situations, where parametric density estimation fails,
using classification-based methods may be favourable; these techniques are
generally able to define boundaries on data that cannot be tightly modelled by
a standard statistical distribution. In some cases there is a close link between
classification-based techniques and density estimators. For example, it has
been shown that one-class kernel Fisher discriminant classifiers can be used to
perform non-parametric density estimation [61]. However, this only applies to
very specific learning techniques.
Support vector machines (SVM) are a popular example of classification-
based one-class classifiers. Some of their applications include: authorship
108
verification in combination with a technique referred to by the authors as
“unmasking” [42], detecting anomalies in mass spectral data [72], analysis of
patient seizures [29], and document classification (i.e. tagging) [46]. The im-
plementation used by many of these examples—and others—was proposed by
Scho¨lkopf et al. [63] and has been implemented in a package called libSVM [11],
an open-source SVM library. Their approach forms a hypersphere in feature
space, and uses the manually provided parameter ν to decide how much of the
training data to reject as outliers.
Of course, one-class classification has also been used for typist verification—
the subject of this thesis. The methods employed vary and a full background
is given in Chapter 2 and 3. Of the two typist verification methods reviewed in
Chapter 3, Nisenson et al. [50] is the only example of one-class classification,
and uses a LZ78-based classification model that employs a threshold on the
probability. As discussed previously, Gunetti and Picardi’s work [33] is not an
example of one-class classification because it requires negative data in order
to make a prediction.
7.3 Combining Density and Class Probability
Estimation
Although there are many successful techniques for one-class classification,2 a
large number of multi-class classification algorithms have been developed and
it would be useful to be able to utilize them for one-class problems. However,
as we saw in Section 7.1, such methods rely heavily on the presence of negative
data in order to perform an accurate predictive model. In cases where novel
classes are expected at prediction time, or no negative data is available, one-
class classification techniques become preferable. As discussed in the previous
section, it is possible to customize existing multi-class classifiers by using a
manually set threshold at training time, but doing so creates an inflexible
classifier that must be re-trained in order to adjust the prediction threshold.
Fortunately there is a simple way to use multi-class classifiers for one-
class classification: artificial data can be generated to take the role of the
‘outlier’ class. The easiest way to do this is to generate uniformly distributed
data or some other distribution and train a classifier that can discriminate
this artificial data from the real target instances. This approach has been
used by Fan et al. [24] and Abe et al. [1]. In both cases, artificial instances
2For a wider review than that of the previous section, see Tax [70]
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were generated dimension by dimension, using either Gaussian models or a
uniform distribution. However, as the number of attributes grows, it quickly
becomes infeasible to generate enough data to obtain sufficient coverage of the
instance space, and the probability that a particular artificial instance occurs
inside or close to the target class diminishes to a point that makes any kind of
discrimination impossible.
Abe et al. [1] solved the dimensionality problem by employing active learn-
ing to identify artificial instances that could be considered outliers with respect
to the target class. However, an automated system would be preferred because
it creates a stable classifier (compared to the approach in Abe et al. [1], which
is subjective because classifier accuracy varies based on the human input). A
potential solution to this problem is to generate artificial data that is as close
as possible to the target class.
Generating artificial data that is close to the target class can be performed
by fitting a density function to the target data, then using this ‘reference
density’ when randomly generating instances. But because the artificial data
is no longer uniform it it necessary to take the reference density into account
when calculating the probability that a given instance belongs to the target
class. This can be achieved by using Bayes’ Rule to combine the multi-class
classifier with the density estimate into a single one-class classifier, as shown
in the next section and covered in Hempstalk et al. [37]. One advantage of this
approach is that no modifications need to be made to the multi-class classifier.
Another advantage is that this technique essentially straddles the boundary
between the two types of classifiers presented in the previous section, namely
density functions and class probability estimation techniques.
7.3.1 Combining Classifiers Using Bayes’ Rule
Let T denote the target class for which we want to build a one-class model.
We have training data for this class. Let A be the artificial class, for which we
generate artificial data using a known reference distribution. Let X denote an
instance and let P (X|A) denote the density function of the reference density.
What we would like to obtain is P (X|T ), the density function for the target
class. If we had this density function, we could use it for one-class classifica-
tion by imposing a threshold on its values. Let us assume for the moment
that we know the true class probability function P (T |X). In practice, we
need to estimate this function using a class probability estimator learned from
the training data. An example of a suitable inductive approach is bagging
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of unpruned decision trees, which has been shown to yield good class prob-
ability estimators [55]. However, any multi-class classifier that can produce
class probability estimates can be used. This is not an impediment in general
because most multi-class classifiers do output these values, or can be easily
modified to do so.
The following shows how we can compute the density function for T , namely
P (X|T ), given the class probability function P (T |X), the reference density
P (X|A), and P (T ), which is the prior probability of observing an instance of
the target class. We start with Bayes’ theorem:
P (T |X) =
P (X|T )P (T )
P (X)
For a two-class situation, the probability of X is the probability of seeing an
instance of X with either class label, so the equation becomes:
P (T |X) =
P (X|T )P (T )
P (X|T )P (T ) + P (X|A)P (A)
Now we solve for P (X|T ), and make use of the fact that P (A) = 1 − P (T ),
because there are only two classes:
P (X|T ) =
(1− P (T ))P (T |X)
P (T )(1− P (T |X))
P (X|A) (7.2)
This equation relates the density of the artificial class P (X|A) to the density
of the target class P (X|T ) via the class probability function P (T |X) and the
prior probability of the target class P (T ).
To use this equation in practice, we choose P (X|A) and generate a user-
specified amount of artificial data from it. Each instance in this data receives
the class label A. Each instance in the training set for the target class receives
class label T . Those two sets of labeled instances are then combined. The
proportion of instances belonging to T in this combined dataset is an estimate
of P (T ), and we can apply a learning algorithm to this two-class dataset to
obtain a class probability estimator that takes the role of P (T |X). Assuming
we know how to compute the value for P (X|A) given any particular instance
X—and we can make sure that this is the case by choosing an appropriate
function—we then have all the components to compute an estimate of the
target density function Pˆ (X|T ) for any instance X.
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7.3.2 Combined Classifier Performance
Now we test the performance of Equation 7.2 for one-class classification, using
the same datasets as in Section 7.1.3. In earlier sections comparing one-class
and multi-class classification, a single Gaussian played the role of the one-class
classifier; in this section a single Gaussian is used for the reference density,
P (X|A), and its parameters are estimated by fitting it to the target class to
ensure that the artificial data is close to the target class. The role of the class
probability estimator, P (T |X), is filled by bagged unpruned C4.5 decision
trees with Laplace smoothing, which as previously mentioned has been shown
to provide good class probability estimates [55]. Finally the proportion of
target instances, P (T ), is set to 0.5. Therefore, the data used to build the
decision trees is exactly balanced. This setup allows us to simplify Equation
7.2 to:
P (X|T ) =
P (T |X)
1− P (T |X)
P (X|A) (7.3)
This simplified equation has been used in the context of association rule learn-
ing by Hastie et al. [34].
Equation 7.3 is turned into a usable one-class classifier by choosing an
appropriate threshold on Pˆ (X|T ) and adjusting the threshold to tune the
probability of an instance being identified as the target class. However, the
results presented here use the weighted AUC, which is independent of any
thresholds.
Table 7.3 presents the weighted AUC (Equation 7.1) for the one-class clas-
sifier from the previous section, its components, and two multi-class classifiers
(in unbiased two-class configuration) equivalent to the components of the one-
class classifier. The two-class classifiers Na¨ıve Bayes and bagged unpruned
C4.5 decision trees represent the components P (X|A) and P (T |X) respec-
tively, but in two-class configuration (i.e. learning with negative data). These
multi-class classifiers were evaluated using the same methodology as Section
7.1.2. The one-class classifier, One-Class Combined in Table 7.3, and its com-
ponents P (X|A) and P (T |X), were also evaluated using the methodology de-
veloped in Section 7.1.2. In the case of each component, their values were used
directly for ranking test cases (instead of the result of Equation 7.3). The
component P (T |X) uses the instances artificially generated from the reference
distribution for the outlier class; no real negative data is provided.
Not surprisingly, the two-class classifiers outperform the one-class ones on
twenty of the twenty-seven datasets. In these datasets there is sufficient nega-
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Two-Class Two-Class One-Class One-Class One-Class
Dataset Na¨ıve Bayes Bagged Trees Combined P (X|A) P (T |X)
anneal 0.605 0.624 0.779 0.788 0.531
arrhythmia 0.723 0.775 0.576 0.576 0.515
audiology 0.897 0.885 0.879 0.881 0.537
autos 0.736 0.803 0.565 0.567 0.569
balance-scale 0.851 0.879 0.865 0.806 0.708
ecoli 0.889 0.872 0.927 0.927 0.538
glass 0.605 0.746 0.696 0.702 0.615
hypothyroid 0.587 0.860 0.648 0.648 0.544
iris 0.671 0.708 0.977 0.977 0.510
letter 0.935 0.983 0.902 0.887 0.773
lymph 0.425 0.490 0.721 0.739 0.530
mfeat-factor 0.964 0.959 0.948 0.948 0.656
mfeat-fourier 0.930 0.914 0.910 0.909 0.534
mfeat-karhunen 0.976 0.944 0.956 0.955 0.516
mfeat-morph 0.928 0.906 0.941 0.941 0.829
mfeat-pixel 0.965 0.921 0.954 0.954 0.455
mfeat-zernike 0.912 0.912 0.898 0.897 0.526
optdigits 0.969 0.975 0.958 0.959 0.728
pendigits 0.942 0.970 0.958 0.953 0.860
primary-tumor 0.784 0.734 0.739 0.732 0.524
segment 0.863 0.951 0.937 0.937 0.513
soybean 0.973 0.961 0.962 0.961 0.556
splice 0.831 0.772 0.721 0.720 0.543
vehicle 0.696 0.782 0.684 0.658 0.660
vowel 0.909 0.922 0.873 0.865 0.645
waveform 0.692 0.727 0.863 0.864 0.342
zoo 0.963 0.913 0.985 0.984 0.601
Table 7.3: Weighted AUC for two-class and one-class classifiers
tive data to provide a good coverage for the outlier class. Of the seven datasets
where the one-class methods win, only one (zoo) is a win for the combined
model versus P (X|A). The density function, P (X|A), is often sufficiently
accurate to describe the target data.
When considering only the one-class classifiers in Table 7.3, the results are
more interesting. For every single dataset, the combined model outperforms
the class probability estimator, P (T |X). In contrast, the combined classifier
only wins against the density function on twelve of the twenty-seven datasets
and only two of the wins (balance-scale, letter) are statistically significant3 at
the 5% level. The vehicle dataset is significant at the 10% significance level.
The density function alone appears to be the best approach to one-class
classification; however, none of its wins over the combined classifier are sig-
nificant, whereas the combined classifier has at least two significant wins over
the density function. Combining the classifiers using Equation 7.3 only results
in an improvement over the individual components when both are able to add
value; in many cases the probability estimator has a low AUC so the combined
model can do no better than use the density function alone. Where the com-
3Based on using the formula 1√
4∗N ∗ 1.96 for determining the bounds for 5% significance
on the AUC. The value 1.96 represents the inverse standard normal distribution for 95%
confidence, N represents the number of instances in the dataset. Values are considered
significant if they differ by an amount larger than the calculated bounds.
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P (A)
Dataset 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
anneal 0.777 0.779 0.777 0.777 0.781 0.782 0.781 0.781 0.781
arrhythmia 0.576 0.578 0.575 0.575 0.575 0.578 0.575 0.575 0.576
audiology 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.879 0.879 0.880 0.879 0.878 0.881
autos 0.566 0.566 0.567 0.564 0.564 0.567 0.563 0.565 0.566
balance-scale 0.836 0.850 0.841 0.857 0.861 0.864 0.870 0.872 0.863
ecoli 0.927 0.928 0.929 0.930 0.928 0.926 0.926 0.929 0.927
glass 0.694 0.708 0.691 0.695 0.704 0.700 0.699 0.700 0.697
hypothyroid 0.648 0.649 0.648 0.649 0.649 0.650 0.647 0.651 0.647
iris 0.977 0.978 0.976 0.975 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.975 0.975
letter 0.899 0.900 0.900 0.902 0.902 0.903 0.905 0.905 0.906
lymph 0.727 0.729 0.727 0.724 0.723 0.716 0.705 0.711 0.725
mfeat-factors 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.949
mfeat-fourier 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.910
mfeat-karhunen 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.956
mfeat-morph 0.941 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940
mfeat-pixel 0.953 0.953 0.954 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953
mfeat-zernike 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.899 0.898 0.898 0.897 0.897
optdigits 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.959
pendigits 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.959 0.958 0.958
primary-tumor 0.737 0.733 0.732 0.729 0.737 0.737 0.731 0.738 0.737
segment 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.938
soybean 0.962 0.961 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.963
splice 0.720 0.722 0.720 0.719 0.721 0.720 0.720 0.721 0.720
vehicle 0.669 0.673 0.680 0.679 0.684 0.687 0.686 0.694 0.702
vowel 0.867 0.868 0.869 0.872 0.873 0.876 0.878 0.881 0.889
waveform-5000 0.862 0.863 0.8621 0.8622 0.863 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.861
zoo 0.985 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.982 0.985 0.984 0.984
Table 7.4: Effect of P (A) on the weighted AUC
bined model scores significant wins, the probability estimator performs better
than it does in many of the other datasets.
7.3.3 Generating Different Proportions of Artificial
Data
Given that the combined model outperforms its components when both com-
ponents contribute to the model and that it is often the probability estimator
that performs poorly, it seems sensible to consider improving this component
in order to increase the accuracy of the one-class classifier. One way to possi-
bly improve the probability estimator is to vary the volume of artificial data
provided to it.
Table 7.4 shows the results of varying the proportion of artificial data from
0.1 through to 0.9 using the combined one-class classification model from Sec-
tion 7.3.1. For these experiments the instances were weighted to 1 − P (x),
where P (x) is the prior probability of the relevant class. For example, if
P (A) = 0.1 then artificial instances are weighted to 0.9, and target instances
are weighted to 0.1. The reason for weighting instances in this way is to balance
the dataset.
In general we would expect the combined model to improve as more arti-
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ficial data is provided because there is more information for the probability
estimator to reason about. However, the model only consistently improves
when provided with more data in cases where it is also able to improve over
its individual components in the previous section (i.e. letter, vehicle, vowel).
In most of the datasets, any improvement made by the probability estimation
component is lost because the density function dominates the combined model.
7.3.4 Using Real Data
Clearly the act of adding more data does not improve the probability estima-
tion component enough to make gains over the individual components. An-
other potential source of improvement is the negative data that we have been
forced to ignore for pure one-class classification. The estimate of P (T |X) now
becomes the unbiased bagged decision tree estimator from Table 7.3.
Using negative data for training the probability estimator implies that we
actually have a proper estimate of the outlier distribution, so instead of esti-
mating P (X|A) from the target data, we should estimate it from the negative
data instead. However, the negative data is far from exhaustive—so whilst it
might be able to add enough information to help the probability estimator,
it may be detrimental to the density estimate and generally produces poor
results.
Table 7.5 shows the original combined classifier results alongside those ob-
tained by using negative data. Wins over the two-class classifiers from Table
7.3 are shown in bold. The components using negative data—P (T |X) and
P (X|A), their combined model and the combined model for P (T |X) and the
original estimate P (X|A) (using only target data) are all shown in the table.
For brevity, results have been omitted for combining P (X|A) built with neg-
ative data and P (T |X) built with artificial data; this particular combination
performs poorly since neither of the components are trained with useful data.
Ideally both components should have an exhaustive amount of training data
for the outlier class.
Including the negative data into just the probability estimator P (T |X) has
a much greater effect on all the results than varying the amount of artificial
data as seen in the previous section. The combined model, using either artificial
or negative data for the probability estimator and target data to build the
density model, now scores ten wins over the two-class classifiers shown in
Table 7.3. Although none of the wins by the one-class classifier are statistically
significant, the wins scored by the two-class classifiers are not significant either.
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Standard Negative Negative Negative Negative
P (T |X) P (X|A) & P (T |X) P (T |X) P (X|A)
Dataset Combined Combined Combined Component Component
anneal 0.779 0.786 0.681 0.624 0.664
arrhythmia 0.576 0.576 0.565 0.775 0.565
audiology 0.879 0.893 0.603 0.885 0.536
autos 0.565 0.565 0.483 0.803 0.483
balance-scale 0.865 0.862 0.865 0.879 0.609
ecoli 0.927 0.930 0.836 0.872 0.738
glass 0.696 0.699 0.689 0.746 0.679
hypothyroid 0.648 0.648 0.546 0.860 0.546
iris 0.977 0.974 0.827 0.708 0.584
letter 0.902 0.940 0.658 0.983 0.652
lymphography 0.721 0.733 0.696 0.490 0.687
mfeat-factor 0.948 0.948 0.765 0.959 0.764
mfeat-fourier 0.910 0.919 0.632 0.914 0.628
mfeat-karhunen 0.956 0.959 0.691 0.944 0.684
mfeat-morph 0.941 0.944 0.651 0.906 0.591
mfeat-pixel 0.954 0.955 0.539 0.921 0.511
mfeat-zernike 0.898 0.909 0.643 0.912 0.640
optdigits 0.958 0.961 0.699 0.975 0.690
pendigits 0.958 0.971 0.780 0.970 0.717
primary-tumor 0.739 0.766 0.570 0.734 0.491
segment 0.937 0.941 0.772 0.951 0.734
soybean 0.962 0.968 0.609 0.961 0.515
splice 0.721 0.836 0.514 0.772 0.427
vehicle 0.684 0.695 0.584 0.782 0.550
vowel 0.873 0.896 0.606 0.922 0.589
waveform 0.863 0.861 0.704 0.727 0.565
zoo 0.985 0.985 0.551 0.913 0.472
Table 7.5: Results of using real negative data in one-class classifiers
When negative data is used to build the density model instead of estimat-
ing it from the target data, the combined classifier as well as P (X|A) alone
perform poorly. This can easily be explained: the negative data that is used
to build the model is not complete and simply does not include enough infor-
mation to be able to accurately discriminate between classes. It is possible
that some negative data might be enough to improve the accuracy of P (X|A)
over estimating it from the target class. However, in all datasets tested here,
estimating the density from the target data is more accurate (and usually
significantly so). In fact, the results for at least half of the datasets show
that using fake negative data for training the probability estimator performs
significantly better than using real negative data to build the density model!
7.3.5 Replacing Components
The last section exchanged the one-class components for two-class ones by
making use of negative data. However, it is not necessary to restrict such sub-
stitutions to types of components that only differ because they are trained with
different datasets. For instance, the density function can be more complicated,
such as a mixture of Gaussians, or simpler, such as a uniform distribution.
Both of these functions were tested whilst investigating the combined model
116
one-class classification technique. In general the uniform distribution per-
forms poorly. Using a mixture of Gaussians (EM algorithm from WEKA [77])
achieves more accurate density estimates for some datasets, but worse results
on others. Full results of using other density functions can be found in Hemp-
stalk et al. [37].
It is also possible to use probability estimation techniques other than
bagged unpruned decision trees. Support vector machines (built with logis-
tic models) are an example of a probability estimation model that can be used
for P (T |X). Incidentally, support vector machines are also a machine learning
algorithm that can be modified to perform one-class classification, so it would
be interesting to test the combined model against such a classifier. However,
investigating this is outside the scope of this thesis—which focuses on typist
verification. Hempstalk et al. [37] provides experimental results for using dif-
ferent components and also provides a preliminary comparison of the combined
model to SVM-based one-class classification.
7.4 Summary
The results presented in this chapter support the conclusion that a general pur-
pose one-class classifier can be used in place of a two-class classifier without
compromising accuracy. Where negative data is available during the train-
ing phase, it can be provided to the probability estimation component in a
combined model to potentially improve discriminatory power. Although using
negative data means that a two-class model is actually being used, in most
cases satisfactory results can be achieved with a one-class classifier that com-
bines two different sorts of one-class classification—namely a density function
and a probability estimator trained with additional artificial data.
One-class classification is an appropriate approach for typist verification
because it means that no data needs to be collected for any user other than
the target. It also solves the problem of having a non-exhaustive dataset—
one-class classification can be employed to prevent novel users from accessing
the system. Two-class classification can be used to increase accuracy, but is
best reserved for situations where no novel users are expected, because there
is always the potential for an unseen attacker to appear closer to the target
user than any known attackers. The next chapter covers typist verification
as a general one-class classification problem, using the method presented in
Section 7.3 of this chapter as the underlying learning algorithm.
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Chapter 8
Typist Verification as One-Class
Classification
Continuous typist verification is typically performed by classification algo-
rithms that are designed to handle typing data and nothing else. To use
general algorithms instead of customized ones, the stream of key events and
times must be transformed into a set of features: general machine learning
algorithms—including the one-class classifier presented in Chapter 7—cannot
handle an input that is a stream of symbols. It is hard to ensure that the
features obtained from a typing stream are helpful for verification, but it is
also hard to create a classifier customized to typist verification. It is unclear
which of the two approaches—customized classifiers and general classifiers—
is a better approach to typist verification, regardless of the effort involved.
Section 8.1 addresses this by considering continuous typist verification as a
general one-class classification problem, and comparing the results with the
more traditional approaches that have been discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 5.
One advantage of regarding typist verification as a general one-class prob-
lem is that it is easy to include additional features, such as mouse use, to
increase the accuracy of the system. So far, mouse input has been ignored,
even though it was recorded as part of the SquirrelMail data from Chapter 4.
When the sm-150 and sm-all datasets were produced the mouse events were
removed, and the evaluation in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 relied only on keyboard
events. The methods investigated in earlier chapters could not use this data.
Mouse events are more complicated than key events—the action performed
by the mouse depends on the pointer position—and this information is not
easily converted into symbols, digraphs or other structures that are used with
traditional typist verification approaches.
When typist verification is transformed into a general one-class classifi-
cation problem mouse information can easily be included, and Section 8.2
proposes ways to do this. First, an analysis of mouse use is performed. Next,
the results of this analysis are used to show that mouse features can be use-
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ful for verification. Lastly, the features are added into the continuous typist
verification algorithm presented in Section 8.1, and their effect evaluated.
8.1 Typing and One-Class Classification
Most of the techniques presented in the previous chapters use some kind of
one-class classification. With the exception of KAOFT from Chapter 3 and
the Individual Digraph Classifier from Chapter 5, none of the verification sys-
tems we have examined require negative data. In all cases the classifiers are
customized to the task of typist verification, and cannot operate on other sorts
of one-class problems without modification. In contrast, the general combined
one-class classifier presented in the previous chapter can handle many differ-
ent types of one-class problems. To utilise it for typist verification the stream
of events and times must be converted into a set of features. This is not an
impediment in general because most techniques examined in this thesis also
require typing data to be transformed in some way.
The difficulty of using a general one-class classifier is that the set of de-
fined features needs to describe aspects of a user’s behaviour that distinguishes
it from impostors. Chapter 6 provides a good starting point, but also indi-
cates that some features perform well for some users and poorly for others.
Determining in advance whether a particular feature is helpful for a specific
user requires negative data, which ideally is avoided. However, the analysis
in Chapter 6 showed that some features are effective for all users, regardless
of their performance. These features are the most desirable because of their
consistency; using features that are consistently good ensures the system will
achieve similar results for all users.
Once a good set of features has been established, the combined one-class
classifier expressed in Equation 7.2 from Chapter 7 (hereafter referred to as the
Combined OCC) can be trained and used to verify previously unseen typing
samples. The methodology used to train and test the classifier is described
in the next section, followed by the set of features used during training. The
results of evaluating the features and Combined OCC with the sm datasets are
presented in Section 8.1.3.
8.1.1 Methodology
The Combined OCC was originally implemented in the Java language for the
WEKA Machine Learning Workbench. Rather than attempting to modify the
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classifier to work for the same typist workbench that has been used for all
evaluation in this thesis, a wrapper was written that transformed typing input
into a set of features in the WEKA Instances format and passed these onto
the WEKA implementation of the Combined OCC. Any samples requiring
verification were transformed into the same set of features that were used
to train the Combined OCC model. The Combined OCC used bagged C4.5
decision trees for P (T |X) and a Gaussian distribution for P (X|A).
Although the Combined OCC is a one-class classifier, and can adjust its
threshold at prediction time, the WEKA implementation has a manually set
threshold parameter, known as the Target Rejection Rate. During training,
instances are held out and tested against a leave-one-out model. After accruing
a set of scores from the held out instances, the threshold is set to the score that
ensured that the Target Rejection Rate would be met. For example, a Target
Rejection Rate of 0.1 would cause at most 10% of the training instances to fail
verification. Because of this, the FRR of any typist verification system utilising
the Combined OCC is approximately the same as the Target Rejection Rate
parameter.
It is possible to ignore the yes/no predictions produced by the Combined
OCC and instead use the raw probabilities and set a threshold in some other
fashion, but this was not attempted here. The Target Rejection Rate was
left at the default parameter of 0.1. The main value used to evaluate the
system was the AUC, which is independent of arbitrarily set thresholds. The
raw probabilities were used to calculate the AUC, not the yes/no predictions
because these would only produce a single point on the ROC curve. All eval-
uation of the Combined OCC is performed using ten-times ten-fold stratified
cross-validation, with the same settings as in previous chapters. The folds are
identical to those used to evaluate other algorithms in this thesis.
8.1.2 Features
Chapter 6 defines a number of attributes describing typist behaviour and in-
vestigates their discriminatory performance for users in the sm-all dataset.
An initial set of features was produced using the highest performing of these
attributes: those with overall AUC above 0.600, or per-user AUC values that
were always above 0.500. The attributes meeting this criterion were:
• Average Tap Time The average absolute time taken to perform di-
graphs that are “taps”, that is, formed from two identical keys.
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• Slur Rate The proportion of press events that are not immediately
followed by the release event for the same key.
• Slur Length The average number of events that occur between a press
event and its related release event.
• Press Before Release The proportion of occurrences where a single
press event occurs between the press and release event for another key:
that is, (P1P2R1R2/P1P2RxRy), where Rx and Ry are release events that
are not necessarily from the same keys as the first two press events.
• Paired Perfect Order The proportion of occurrences of a “perfect”
ordered pair of key events: that is, (P1R1P2R2/P1RxP2Ry), where Rx
and Ry are release events that are not necessarily from the same keys as
the first two press events.
• WPM The average speed of the entire sample, measured in words per
minute.
• Backspace Rate The proportion of Backspace events in the sample.
The digraph in was excluded from this list of attributes, even though it
met the above criteria. This digraph was not present in every sample, and
would have a missing value for many occurrences. Missing values are not an
issue for the Combined OCC, but this digraph was omitted anyway to ensure
that classification was not dependent on the existence of a particular typed
sequence. Of course, it is possible that a component from one of the selected
features does not occur in a particular sample, but this was not the case for
the sm datasets. None of the above features were missing from any sample.
A number of other features were also considered, including:
• Average Backspace Block Length The average length of sets of con-
secutive Backspace key presses.
• Average Press Block Length The average length of sets of consecutive
press events.
• Disorder The disorder between this sample and a reference sample (see
Chapter 3. The reference sample was obtained using the average digraph
times from the KAOFT dataset.
• Pause After Space The average time of a digraph where the first char-
acter is the Space key, and the second character may be any key.
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• Pause Before Space The average time of a digraph where the second
character is the Space key, and the first character may be any key.
• Peak WPM Rate The top speed achieved over a window of 20 consec-
utive events. Twenty events correspond to approximately two words of
typed text, using an average word length of 5 characters.
• Use of x Navigation Key The proportion of events in the sample that
are from the x navigational key, where x is one of the following keys:
Left-Arrow, Right-Arrow, Up-Arrow, Down-Arrow, Home, End, Page-Up
and Page-Down. Each key x is a different feature.
• Average Tap/Trill/Reach/Hurdle/Rock/Opposite Time The av-
erage time for a given classification of finger movement. Each movement
type is a different feature.
• Average Left Hand/Right Hand Time The average key duration
for keys typed with the right hand or left hand. Each hand is a different
feature.
• Average Index/Middle/Ring/Little Finger Time The average key
duration for keys typed with a given finger. Each finger is a different
feature.
• Average H-F Hand-Finger Time The average key duration for keys
typed with a particular hand H and finger F combination. Each H-F
combination is a different feature.
The features above had some discriminatory power, but did not significantly
increase the performance of the Combined OCC over the first seven features in
this section (Average Tap Time, Slur Rate, Slur Length, Press Before Release,
Paired Perfect Order, WPM, Backspace Rate). Many other features were also
investigated but discarded immediately because of poor results.
8.1.3 Results
Using the wrapper class in the typing workbench, the Combined OCC and
feature set described in Section 8.1.2 were evaluated using ten-times ten-fold
stratified cross-validation, in an identical manner to all other algorithms in this
thesis. The results are presented in Table 8.1, along with the results on the
same datasets for the state of the art—LTIAT and KAOFT—from Chapter 4.
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Algorithm / Dataset FRR IPR Weighted AUC
sm-150
Combined OCC 36.06 2.70 0.945
LTIAT - m = 0, s = 0, Q = 100 3.53 29.33 0.950
KAOFT - R2A2 6.06 0.00 0.970
sm-all
Combined OCC 12.39 4.13 0.975
LTIAT - m = 0, s = 0, Q = 100 0.75 16.65 0.976
KAOFT - R2A2 3.60 0.00 0.982
Table 8.1: Final results for the Combined OCC typist classifier
On the smaller sm-150 dataset, the Combined OCC performs slightly worse
than both KAOFT and LTIAT, but better than all but the PPM Classifier from
Chapter 5. This is not surprising because these other algorithms always use
a large representation containing often hundreds of features. In contrast, the
Combined OCC uses just seven values to represent a sample. On the sm-all
dataset the Combined OCC has a performance equalling the other methods,
which is somewhat remarkable considering the small sample representation. A
likely explanation for this performance increase is that the Combined OCC
needs more than 15 training samples per user to make confident predictions
because the users are not consistent enough that fewer samples can be used
form a representative profile of their behaviour.
One advantage that the Combined OCC has over the other methods is
speed. Both KAOFT and LTIAT take more than 24 hours of processing to
complete a full evaluation1 on the sm-all dataset, whereas the Combined
OCC takes less than 10 minutes to perform the same evaluation, including
feature extraction.2 Despite this, the Combined OCC does not suffer from any
loss of accuracy—it can build a model and accurately perform predictions in
a fraction of the time of other algorithms. This ability can be attributed to
the compact but efficient data representation; the chosen features describe a
typist’s behaviour sufficiently well that no more than seven features are needed
to rival the LTIAT and KAOFT methods in terms of accuracy (measured with
the weighted AUC) and surpass them in terms of speed.
Another advantage lies in the use of one-class classification. The Combined
OCC does not need any negative data in order to verify a user, meaning that
performance is not dependent on the set of users that the system is trained
with. Although the use of negative data is not necessarily a drawback since in
many cases it is available anyway, it is an unnecessary aspect of this algorithm,
at least in this application.
1A full evaluation is one ten-times ten-fold cross-validation run for each user in the
dataset.
2No parameter optimization was performed for any algorithm.
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Sample Length FRR IPR Weighted AUC
Full 12.39 4.13 0.975
500 Events 10.21 9.90 0.962
400 Events 9.46 13.82 0.954
300 Events 9.78 18.10 0.935
200 Events 10.01 24.43 0.905
100 Events 9.89 39.27 0.842
50 Events 9.79 51.24 0.770
Table 8.2: Results using different sample lengths
One drawback of other techniques is that many require a sample to contain
a large number of events before they are able to make a confident prediction
about identity. It is unclear whether the Combined OCC also suffers from this
problem, so further evaluation was performed on the sm-all dataset. To test
different sample lengths, each was divided up into a set number of events, in
the same manner as for the LTIAT algorithm in Chapter 3. No sample was
included that had fewer than the required number of events. Starting at a
limit of exactly 500 events, the sample length was reduced in increments of
100 events. All samples in the sm-all dataset contain at least 500 events, and
in most cases they are much larger than this.
Table 8.2 contains the results of evaluating the Combined OCC with six
different sample lengths, from 500 to 50 events. As the length is reduced, the
number of samples increases, but the calculated features become less meaning-
ful and as a result the weighted AUC decreases. Nonetheless, until the sample
length is reduced to 200 events the system still outperforms all algorithms from
Chapter 5, except the PPM technique.
8.2 Adding Mouse Patterns
Most personal computers have at least two input devices, a keyboard and a
mouse. For typist verification, only the former is considered. However, normal
computer operation often involves input from the mouse as well, especially for
highlighting and editing text. The SquirrelMail data described in Chapter 4
recorded mouse events as well as keyboard ones, but so far this data has been
ignored. One reason is that most of the techniques were designed to work
only with keyboard data, and could not make sense of the mouse events. A
mouse event is any action occurring with the mouse—it can be press and
release events on the buttons, scroll events on the centre button, or pointer
movements. In the sm datasets, only mouse button press as well as mouse
button release events were recorded, along with the on-screen position of the
pointer when the event occurred.
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Only some of the recorded mouse events may have an effect on the email
samples from SquirrelMail. If a press event occurs outside the bounds of any
of the text boxes, all of them are deselected and subsequent events have no
effect on the email until at least one text box is selected again. When a left
mouse click occurs inside a text box, the caret is repositioned to where the
button is released. If the pointer is dragged across the screen whilst the left
button is down, all text between the press and release positions is highlighted.
Left mouse button presses followed by key press events can therefore have a
varied effect on the email, depending on whether or not it has occurred within
the bounds of a text box.
Unfortunately, the mouse data recorded in the sm datasets is flawed in a
way that makes it difficult to use for mouse-user verification: the position
of the pointer was recorded relative to the email web page, but how much
the page was scrolled and the user’s screen resolution were never recorded.
Furthermore, each Internet browser used to access SquirrelMail displayed the
page slightly differently. A browser identifier was recorded, but was of little
help because the screen resolution also affects how the browser displays the
page. Because of this, it is impossible to determine what the user was clicking
on. This is a problem for verification because the mouse events are ambiguous:
it is possible to tell that the mouse was used, but not what it was used for. In
contrast, key events are explicit—they always produce the same character.
Another issue with the sm mouse data is that only button presses and
releases were recorded, but mouse activity consists of many other actions. It
is unclear how far the mouse moved between each event because the complete
movement was never tracked. This information could have been recorded,
but the data was originally intended for only keystroke-based verification, and
recording all possible mouse events was considered unnecessary. In retrospect,
the sm datasets would be more valuable had this information been included.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to make use of the mouse events to some extent.
8.2.1 Features
Since the mouse pointer position is not accurately recorded, it seems pointless
to attempt to use it for verification. Presses and releases were the only reliable
mouse events in the sm data, along with a button identifier and the time of
the event. A simple way of using this data for verification is to calculate the
proportion of mouse events in the total number of events—including both key
and mouse events. This “Mouse Use” feature can then be provided to the
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Participant Mouse Use
A 0.742
B 0.680
C 0.612
D 0.743
E 0.694
F 0.682
G 0.747
H 0.656
I 0.699
J 0.901
Average 0.716
Table 8.3: AUC values for the Mouse Use feature
same classifier used in the previous section. It gives an indication of how often
a typist uses their mouse, although not an entirely accurate one because only
clicks were recorded.
In Chapter 6 the usefulness of an attribute was analysed using the AUC.
The same idea is applied here in Table 8.3 for the Mouse Use feature defined
above. On average, this feature performs similarly to the best digraph feature
(in) from Chapter 6. It is not more effective for verification than the typist’s
speed, but is nevertheless a helpful feature, and scores a higher AUC for all
users than many individual digraphs do.
Since general use of the mouse is helpful, it might be worth considering
when the mouse is used. However, the mouse is often used infrequently—
sometimes not at all—so pairing occurrences of mouse events with specific
key events in a mouse-keyboard digraph will result in missing values for most
combinations. This does not mean that all combinations are useless: pairing
mouse events with certain key events may be helpful for verification. An obvi-
ous choice is the mouse-keyboard digraph Mouse Backspace because in many
cases it indicates that the user has repositioned the pointer before deleting some
text. This digraph gives information about a user’s editing behaviour, under
the assumption that the pointer is indeed being repositioned. The Backspace
key is also the most common key in the sm datasets, so occurrences of this
feature will likely exist for most users.
One problem with the Mouse Backspace digraph is that the associated
times are inconsistent. There are often large pauses between using the mouse
and the Backspace key, perhaps caused by the two events being actioned by
the same hand. This would be expected if the user is right-handed and oper-
ates the mouse with their right hand. As it happens, all of the users in the sm
datasets were right handed and had their mouse positioned to the right of their
keyboard—although it is impossible to know whether they used the same hand
for these two events because the users were not actively monitored. Nonethe-
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Participant Mouse Backspace
A 0.650
B 0.536
C 0.508
D 0.531
E 0.649
F 0.640
G 0.588
H 0.568
I 0.583
J 0.538
Average 0.579
Table 8.4: AUC values for the Mouse Backspace feature
Algorithm / Dataset FRR IPR Weighted AUC
sm-all
Combined OCC—Mouse Use 13.28 4.28 0.975
Combined OCC—Original 12.39 4.13 0.975
LTIAT—m = 0, s = 0, Q = 100 0.75 16.65 0.976
KAOFT—R2A2 3.60 0.00 0.982
Table 8.5: Results for Mouse Use and the Combined OCC Typist Classifier
less, the varied pausing is unhelpful for verification, and instead the proportion
of Mouse Backspace digraphs against the total number of Backspace events
was used.
Table 8.4 shows the results for evaluating the Mouse Backspace feature.
Although Backspace was the most common key, Mouse Backspace was absent
from most samples—even for users who were prolific mouse users. As a result,
the Mouse Backspace feature often had a value of zero, and was unhelpful in
most cases. It is not completely without merit: in Chapter 6 it was found
that the usefulness of any measure was often dependent on the user, and this
is echoed in the results here. But as in Chapter 6, without negative data it is
impossible to tell in advance if this feature is helpful for a particular user.
8.2.2 Results
Using the same seven features from Section 8.1.2, and the Mouse Use feature
defined in the previous section, the Combined OCC was re-evaluated using the
sm-all dataset. The sm-150 could not be utilised for this evaluation; when
this dataset was anonymised it was also reduced to contain only keyboard
events. Unfortunately, the identities of the emails that were selected for the
sm-150 dataset were never kept, and it is difficult to determine which emails
they are sourced from. However all the sm-all emails were kept, so the sm-all
dataset was reproduced for this evaluation complete with mouse events.
Table 8.5 presents the results of evaluating the Combined OCC with the
additional Mouse Use feature. The FRR and IPR of the system increased
128
slightly when the feature was added, but the AUC remained the same. This
was a disappointing result considering that the average AUC rivalled that of
the other seven features used to train the system. If the system were trained
with more users, or a different range of users, this feature might be more
helpful in increasing the accuracy of the system. Note that adding it did not
noticeably impact running time; the Combined OCC is still many orders of
magnitude faster than other algorithms.
8.3 Summary
This chapter has presented a new approach to continuous typist verification:
representing a sample of text as a set of features and providing this to a
general one-class classifier (rather than a customized one). This achieves a
level of accuracy that compares to the state of the art, performing on par
with LTIAT and KAOFT.3 The Combined OCC has one clear advantage: it
takes only 50ms to train the system and less than 5ms to make predictions on
average—thoroughly eclipsing the other techniques in terms of speed without
compromising accuracy.
Another advantage of the Combined OCC is that it is easy to add new
features, as shown in Section 8.2. With little effort, mouse events are analysed,
turned into a feature and used for classification. Although in this case the
accuracy of the system is not increased, there is still opportunity for other
features to be added that might boost the prediction power—even if only for
particular users. Many features were used to test the Combined OCC, but in
the end a mere seven were found to be sufficient to achieve an accuracy similar
to LTIAT and KAOFT.
Finally, because the Combined OCC uses one-class classification, it is not
dependent on negative data. This is yet another advantage over methods such
as KAOFT, which can be more accurate, but requires a representative set of
users in order to achieve this. In contrast, the Combined OCC is dependent
only on data from the target user, yet obtains a similar accuracy to KAOFT
on the data used for testing.
3Using a conservative estimate of AUC significance [18], the difference between these
three algorithms is not significant at the 5% level for the sm-all dataset.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
This thesis has presented an investigation into continuous typist verification—
the problem of continually checking that a computer user is who they claim
to be by analyzing the way they type. This task is not easy: many factors
influence the performance of a continuous typist verification system. Existing
systems such as LTIAT and KAOFT determine identity by utilising timing
patterns. These systems are able to achieve a commendable level of accuracy,
but also suffer performance issues. In the case of KAOFT, the current state-
of-the-art technique in terms of accuracy, negative data is required to build the
verifier. Although in many cases this negative data is available, the accuracy
of the system is dependent on it; the system performs well with this data—
especially when it contains a representative set of possible impostors—but fails
completely when trained only with data from the target user.
The published accuracy of LTIAT and KAOFT suggests that the hypothesis
stated in Chapter 1 might be true, that there is enough information in a user’s
typing input for continuous typist verification to be a useful form of biometric
authentication. However, when these techniques were re-implemented and re-
evaluated in Chapter 3 it became clear that although they perform well on
their own datasets, they are only able to achieve good results in restricted
circumstances. For LTIAT, both key press and release events are essential,
and KAOFT requires large samples and a representative set of attackers during
training.
This thesis explores whether it is possible to perform typist verification
in less restricted situations, such as those where no negative data is used
during training. The aim of this exploration is to determine to what extent
the information in typing input is useful for verification. There are several
aspects that need to be considered as part of this, but the primary concern is
the ability to identify channels of information that are available in typing input.
Since the existing systems were evaluated with datasets that are deficient in
some way, either in size or the type of events they contain, the first step towards
achieving this was the collection of suitable data.
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9.1 Collecting Data
Data collection is important for this thesis because it enables algorithms to
be tested experimentally in a fair and uniform way. The datasets that were
originally used to evaluate LTIAT and KAOFT cannot be used to fairly test
algorithms because for the former the dataset is small, and for the latter key
release events are missing. Such events are utilised for verification by LTIAT,
and without them this method is unable achieve state-of-the-art accuracy.
Other new methods may also be able to exploit key release events to perform
verification.
Chapter 4 discusses the collection of typing input from real-world emails.
Almost 3000 emails were collected over a period of 3 months, and processed
into two final datasets with 150 email samples (sm-150) and 607 email samples
(sm-all) respectively. The original emails are affected by some technical and
ethical issues that meant that not all could be utilised in the final datasets.
The most common problem was the result of a bug in the Internet browser used
to access the email system, but other issues included confidential information
being revealed, emails typed in a foreign language, sample length less than a
stipulated minimum and inconsistencies in recording modifier keys uniformly
across all Internet browsers utilised. It is likely that any typist verification
system that operates on free text will endure similar issues, so explaining
them is helpful to others.
The two datasets, sm-150 and sm-all, are comparable in size to KAOFT’s
dataset and in content to LTIAT’s dataset: they consist of at least 15 emails
per user and contain key press events, key release events, and their associated
timings. Both were used to re-evaluate LTIAT and KAOFT in Chapter 4, and
similar results were achieved to the original algorithms matched with their
original datasets from Chapter 3. The results indicate that the new datasets
enable a fair comparison between new and existing methods of typist verifica-
tion because they provide all the data necessary for evaluation.
Mouse events were also recorded for all the 3000 emails that were collected.
These are not used for evaluation except for the combined one-class classifier
(Combined OCC) technique in Chapter 8. The collected emails make several
contributions to typist verification. They provide a fair way to evaluate differ-
ent typist verification methods; they give insights into issues associated with
collecting keyboard (and mouse) input; and they contain additional informa-
tion that can be used to assist existing verification techniques.
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9.2 Identifying Channels of Information
Now that two new datasets are available that address the shortcomings of
the existing ones, it is possible to investigate what channels of information
are available in typing input and quantify how useful each is for verification.
Chapter 5 contains an exploratory investigation using probability-based algo-
rithms. This gives insight into what channels of information exist. Algorithms
that use small structures such as digraphs perform well but take a long time to
produce predictions because they need to make a large number of comparisons.
Chapter 6 uses the sm-all dataset to investigate individual aspects of typ-
ing and quantify their usefulness for verification. Features that are considered
include individual digraphs, finger movements, usage of editing and naviga-
tional keys, pausing behaviour, ordering of events and basic measures such as
typing speed and error rate. These features provide different amounts of in-
formation that can be used to verify identity. Simple metrics like the typist’s
speed and backspace rate perform best, whereas individual digraphs are often
poor at distinguishing between users. This might seem surprising given that
individual digraphs are often used in typist verification systems. However, the
samples in the sm datasets contain free text, so it is possible that the user is
unfamiliar—and hence inconsistent—with many of the sequences they type.
Using aggregates such as typing speed smoothes over noise, and renders the
outcome less susceptible to small inconsistencies within and between samples.
The process of typing on a computer often involves other input devices,
such as a mouse, which inevitably affects the patterns of entry. For example,
the mouse can be used to reposition the caret in a block of text, causing a
delay when the user moves their hand from the keyboard to the mouse and
back again. Traditionally, mouse events are not considered in typist verification
systems, but because they are something that affects typing behaviour, they
can potentially be a viable channel of information. In Chapter 8 mouse events
were investigated for verification by adding a single feature called Mouse Use
to an existing system. Using the same analysis as in Chapter 6 it was found
that this feature considered independently was useful for verification, but gave
no noticeable change in accuracy when added to the Combined OCC.
One important insight gained from investigating the channels of informa-
tion is that performance varies on a per-user basis. Although some features
performed better than others for all users, those that performed poorly overall
often achieved a reasonable level of discrimination for particular users. The
difficulty with using these attributes for verification is that it is impossible to
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determine in advance whether or not a particular feature will be useful without
utilising negative data.
9.3 Requirements for System Training
In principle, negative data should be unnecessary for any verification system
because there should be no need to compare to other people in order to confirm
someone’s identity. Chapter 7 addressed this directly by testing whether one-
class classifiers can outperform multi-class ones. It was found that when nega-
tive data provided to a multi-class classifier was insufficiently representative of
possible attackers, a one-class classifier yielded better predictive performance.
This suggests that in cases where novel attackers are expected—and especially
when they have the potential to differ from existing attackers—one-class clas-
sification should be used in preference to multi-class classification. In short,
negative data is unnecessary for successful verification.
However, some systems are designed in a way that requires negative data,
such as KAOFT in Chapter 3 and the Individual Digraph Classifier in Chap-
ter 5. This is not necessarily a disadvantage because in many cases negative
data is available, but performance suffers when only a limited amount is on
hand. LTIAT and the Combined OCC show that it is possible to design algo-
rithms that require no negative data and achieve comparable results to those
that do. Additionally, when used for typist verification, the Combined OCC
produces predictions many orders of magnitude faster than any other classifier
discussed in this thesis.
Typist verification systems often require a large number of training samples
in order to be able to confidently perform verification. In most cases this is the
result of users typing inconsistently: typing data needs to be representative for
each user, otherwise it may be falsely rejected for failing to match the training
profile. The actual number of training samples depends on the length of each
sample and the consistency of each user. For systems evaluated in this thesis
the sm-150 dataset provides reasonable results. This dataset has 15 samples
for each of ten users, each sample having a minimum length of 500 key events.
In each cross-validation run, between 13 and 14 samples were used to train the
user’s profile, the remaining samples being used for evaluation.
When the features provided to the Combined OCC were calculated on
samples of reduced length it was found that the accuracy degraded. Overall,
approximately the same volume of data was available for training; however,
samples were divided up into smaller non-overlapping sequences. Many of
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the features calculated become more meaningful as the length of a sample
is increased, and the results reflect this. For continuous systems, where no
restrictions are placed on the text being entered, sample sizes of at least 500
events produce the best results in this thesis.
9.4 Revisiting the Hypothesis
This thesis argues that
there is enough information in a user’s typing input for continuous
typist verification to be a useful form of biometric authentication.
As discussed in Chapter 1, whether the level of authentication that is achieved
is useful depends on a number of aspects. This thesis addresses them by
collecting data, identifying channels of information and investigating the re-
strictions that must be imposed on verification systems. It also introduces a
new method of performing one-class classification, which is then used to per-
form typist verification to a comparable level of accuracy to—but much faster
than—the current state of the art.
The findings of this thesis are encouraging. With good data and well-
designed algorithms continuous typist verification can be performed quickly
and at a high level of accuracy. We can conclude that there is enough infor-
mation for continuous typist verification to be used effectively for biometric
authentication. However, it is impossible to tell whether these algorithms will
be practically useful because no evaluation was performed with users who were
interacting with an actual system. Whether or not the trade-off between false
rejection rate and impostor pass rate is acceptable depends on what the system
is protecting, and no assumptions have been made about what this might be.
9.5 Future Work
In Chapter 6 it was found that features had differing strengths of verification
on a per-user basis. Since many techniques utilise only one type of feature, such
as digraph time, existing techniques could be combined to form a system that
covers several aspects of typing. One possible way of combining techniques is
to train several different classifiers with the same data, and order them into a
list. During prediction time, a sample must pass through all classifiers in the
list to be successfully verified. If any classifier rejects the sample, verification
fails and the remaining classifiers do not need to consider the sample. The
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reason that this approach might be more appropriate than others such as
voting is that impostors can be quickly identified by ordering the classifiers
by their speed. Contrast the case of voting, where all classifiers must make a
judgement before the system can verify a sample. Depending on the classifiers
involved, this might take a long time.
Another avenue of future work would be to test the features from Chapters 6
and 8 with a different one-class classifier. For example, they could be used to
train a one-class support vector machine (like that provided by libSVM [11])
instead of the Combined OCC. However, in Hempstalk and Frank [37] it was
found that the Combined OCC achieves an accuracy comparable to libSVM’s
one-class SVM, so it is unlikely that there will be a substantial improvement
in accuracy.
An aspect of typist verification that is more likely to improve on the current
state of the art is the choice of attributes provided to the Combined OCC. For
example, features could be selected on a per-user basis. Some of the features
seen in Chapter 6 were not utilised due to poor performance overall, but these
might be helpful for particular users. Also, the Combined OCC makes it
possible to add new features with ease, so there is potential for accuracy to be
increased if another channel of information is identified.
For the last one hundred years the humble keyboard has been used solely
to produce printed text. This thesis has shown that it can also be successfully
employed for authentication, verifying who people are by the way they type.
Computers will begin to recognise us as individuals, just as we do with each
other.
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Appendix A
Experiment Details
A.1 Purpose of Experiment
The purpose of these experiments is to record keystroke entry patterns whilst
performing regular tasks on a computer. The recorded data can then be mined
for biometric information using machine learning techniques.
A.1.1 Questionnaire
Participants will be asked to fill in a short questionnaire about their experi-
ence with computers and requesting some of their bio-data (such as height,
weight, age, handedness, etc). The information will be used as attributes for
machine learning algorithms, but will not identify the participant in any way.
This information is used to help ascertain how much biometric information is
contained in typing patterns.
A.1.2 Email Recording
In this experiment the participant uses an augmented version of SquirrelMail1,
rather than the standard Computer Science Department version. SquirrelMail
is a web-based email system similar to that of Gmail, Hotmail and Yahoo!
mail. SquirrelMail at:
https://webmail.scms.waikato.ac.nz/cs/src/login.php
gives standard access to the Computer Science Department email system. Fig-
ures A.1, A.2 and A.3 show the standard webmail client interface.
The recorded typing (RT) version is almost identical to the standard one,
with the exception that it has the ability to record typing patterns for email.
The user interacts with the RT version in the same way as they would nor-
mally (it provides access to the participant’s standard CS email account). The
differences are as follows:
1See www.squirrelmail.org for more information
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Figure A.1: Login screen—standard CS webmail
Figure A.2: Inbox screen—standard CS webmail
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Figure A.3: Compose screen—standard CS webmail
1. The main login page carries a warning stating that this version of Squir-
relMail is set to record typing patterns, and provides a link back to the
standard version. It also provides a link giving the researcher’s email
address. The login area on the screen also has a colored background to
indicate the difference between the standard and augmented versions.
See Figure A.4 for a screenshot of the login screen.
2. The left hand panel (displaying folders) has a non-standard background
color, and a notice saying “This version of SquirrelMail will record your
typing.” Figures A.5 and A.6 demonstrate the left hand panel messages.
3. The main window for composing an email (shown when a new email is
created, or an email is forwarded/replied to) contains a check box under
the subject entry box, that states: “If checked, all of your typing will be
recorded for this email.” If the check box is de-selected (it is selected by
default) then the typing recorded for that email will not be saved for use
in the experiment. If checked, when the user presses Save Draft or Send
the recorded typing patterns will be saved to disk on the SquirrelMail
server. An example screenshot is shown in Figure A.6.
The system records the typing for each of the text entry boxes on the com-
pose screen: To, CC, BCC, Subject and Body. Mouse press events within the
compose frame (only within that page of the browser) are also recorded. Press
events can also be called clicks. Double clicks appear as two clicks very close
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Figure A.4: Login screen—RT CS webmail
Figure A.5: Inbox screen—RT CS webmail
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Figure A.6: Compose screen—RT CS webmail
together. When the user saves or sends the email, the recorded patterns are
saved to disk on the server—but only if the check box on the compose window
is checked. Each email recording is saved as a separate file on the server, in the
format showing in Appendix A. The text already on the screen (such as from
a saved draft, reply-to or forward) and login details (username/password) are
not recorded. Only the typed keys and mouse events for the current email ses-
sion are kept. Appendix A includes an example printout of an email recording,
Appendix B describes what information is recorded.
It is safe to store the emails on the server in this plain format since only
the computer administrator (Technical Support Group) will have read access
on the server throughout the duration of the experiment. At the end of the
experiment the files will be anonymised by a script, before being given to the
researcher. Each SquirrelMail username will be changed to become a gener-
ated user ID. The master file associating assigned user ID with SquirrelMail
username will be kept encrypted by a 128 bit Blowfish encoder, with the key
known only by the researcher. The data stored on the server will be deleted in
a “strong” way, that is, the recorded typing files (and mailAnalysis database
files) will not only be removed, but the free space left behind will also be
overwritten 7 times to prevent any data being retrieved.
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Figure A.7: Registration screen—Mail Analysis
A.2 Mail Analysis
To allow the participants to further control whether an email is included in the
experiments, the mailAnalysis system is used. On the left hand pane of the
main RT CS Webmail screen (see Figures A.5 and A.6) a link is provided titled
“Analyse Mail”. When pressed for the first time, the participant is taken to a
registration screen (see Figure A.7), where they are asked to give a password
to their mailAnalysis account. Upon registration, they are taken to the main
analysis screen (see Figure A.8). This screen provides a list of all their emails
that were recorded, sorted by date and time. As shown in Figure A.9, clicking
the date of an email brings up a reconstruction of the email’s typed input.
The reconstruction may not match the exact layout intended due to the use
of the mouse whilst the email was typed. It is possible to also see the raw
recording of the email by clicking the button marked “Show Raw Recording”,
the original recording will appear in the same window as shown in Figure A.10
and described in the Appendix. The other columns provided in the main screen
provide general statistics (like how many keys were pressed) for each email.
Clicking the “Summary Activity” link provides summaries of some statis-
tics, including how many emails were typed and how much time was spent
typing them (see Figure A.11). Clicking the “Options” link at the top right-
hand corner of the page gives the user the ability to change their registered
password (Figure A.12). Clicking “Logout”, also at the top right-hand corner
of the screen, returns the user to a login page where they must re-enter their
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Figure A.8: Main screen—Mail Analysis
Figure A.9: Reconstructed email screen—Mail Analysis
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Figure A.10: Reconstructed email screen showing raw recording—Mail Anal-
ysis
SquirrelMail username and mailAnalysis password before being granted access
back to the mailAnalysis system (Figure A.13). Pressing the link in the main
RT CS Webmail screen for a second time (after registering) will take the user
directly into the mailAnalysis system. The system can also be accessed by
entering login details directly into the mailAnalysis login screen.
The SquirrelMail username is encrypted as a session variable by PHP and
passed to the mailAnalysis system, other users cannot access this variable.
The session ID is used to gain access to the store of session variables, and is
kept as a MD5 hash string in a cookie on the user’s computer until either the
cookie expires or is removed by some other process. The cookie is set to expire
after 30 minutes (the default for SquirrelMail), but can be removed before it
expires by clearing out the browser cache or by the user logging out of either
SquirrelMail or mailAnalysis.
The mailAnalysis system is driven by a database stored on the same ma-
chine that runs the RT CS webmail install. A script runs over the pattern files
stored on disk for each email and adds them to the database every 30 minutes.
When a user deletes an email from mailAnalysis it is removed from all tables in
the database and the file is flagged for deletion in another database table. On
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Figure A.11: Summary screen—Mail Analysis
Figure A.12: Options screen—Mail Analysis
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Figure A.13: Login screen—Mail Analysis
the next script pass, the pattern files flagged for deletion on the previous day
are removed from disk and any new pattern files are added to the database.
There is a small grace period between deleting emails in the database and
deleting them off disk to ensure that accidental deletions do not result in the
loss of useful data.
A.3 Network Access
Running the data collection on the University network poses no risk, there
is no software to be installed and the participant is only instructed to use a
different web-based version of SquirrelMail.
A.4 Data Collection
As detailed above, a questionnaire will be used to collect bio-data and com-
puting experience for all research participants. The two experiments are them-
selves the process of data collection. No video, audio or notes will be taken
throughout the observation period. Only keystroke and mouse click informa-
tion will be recorded.
The data that is being collected may be sensitive information. Whilst
the participant always has the opportunity to turn the recording system off,
the content of what they type can be personal. It is possible to partially
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reconstruct a document from typed input. It is difficult to do so, however,
because the use of a mouse and lack of cursor location knowledge means that
it is possible for input to be typed in non-consecutive order. Because a key
recording system records everything, it is possible to see text that was removed
from the document. Care will be taken to ensure the data will only ever be
stored in such a way that only the researcher and the participant will have
access to it in a way where this information can be accessed.
A.5 Data Archiving/Destruction
Data for the experiment may be temporarily kept on the participant’s com-
puter. The data will be moved to a secure store on the researcher’s computer
at the end of the observation period. This data will be destroyed at the end of
the researcher’s PhD, which will approximately be March 2009. All deletion
methods will be “strong”—rather than just allowing the system to mark the
deleted files as free space, each file will be overwritten by random data at least
7 times to ensure that the recorded information will not be recoverable after
deletion. Some processed data may be kept for an indefinite period after this
research is complete to allow others to replicate the results. However, the re-
tained information will contain no content that would allow the identification
of any research participant.
A.6 Confidentiality
Confidentiality and participant anonymity will be strictly maintained. All
information gathered will be used for statistical analysis only and no names or
other identifying characteristics will be stated in the final or any other reports.
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A.7 Example Email Recording
Username: kah18
Date: 19-09-06-1602
Browser: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.9)
Gecko/20061206 Firefox/1.5.0.9
Mouse: [ 2 8513937 0 (201,128) 3 8514033 0 (201,128) 2 8516617 0 (209,148)
3 8516681 0 (209,148) 2 8518361 0 (175,173) 3 8518425 0 (175,173) 2
8523089 0 (126,322) 3 8523161 0 (126,322) 2 8530689 0 (356,241) 3 8530753 0
(356,241) ]
To typing: [ 168 8512062 0 169 8512226 0 138 8512253 0 139 8512454 0 167
8512492 0 169 8512534 0 ]
CC typing: [ 168 8514157 0 169 8514343 0 166 8514393 0 139 8514448 0
168 8514508 0 167 8514549 0 169 8514602 0 102 8515440 0 103 8515532 0 104
8515693 0 105 8515766 0 106 8515937 0 107 8516024 0 ]
BCC typing: [ 98 8517413 0 99 8517590 0 101 8517672 0 102 8517805 0 103
8517908 0 ]
Subject typing: [ 168 8519906 4 169 8519980 0 144 8520012 0 145 8520114
0 147 8520185 0 64 8520303 0 65 8520433 0 16 8520645 0 17 8520747 0 166
8520797 0 167 8520890 0 64 8521010 0 65 8521165 0 147 8521241 0 166 8521248
0 167 8521322 0 65 8521401 0 130 8521430 0 131 8521554 0 65 8521612 0
168 8521699 0 169 8521821 0 138 8521833 0 139 8522030 0 167 8522091 0 169
8522138 0 380 8522208 0 381 8522292 0 ]
Body typing: [ 168 8524311 4 138 8524448 0 169 8524454 0 166 8524487 0
139 8524540 0 168 8524577 0 167 8524609 0 146 8524659 0 169 8524683 0
147 8524741 0 156 8524801 0 157 8524884 0 143 8524950 0 376 8524987 0
377 8525098 0 64 8525140 0 65 8525262 0 138 8525347 0 169 8525422 0 139
8525446 0 168 8525523 0 167 8525547 0 169 8525618 0 146 8525671 0 147
8525742 0 156 8525809 0 157 8525896 0 143 8525961 0 376 8525996 0 377
8526102 0 64 8526177 0 65 8526282 0 158 8526314 0 159 8526396 0 156 8526451
0 157 8526552 0 64 8526630 0 139 8526641 0 168 8526722 0 65 8526730 0 169
8526822 0 174 8527039 0 175 8527131 0 159 8527242 0 64 8527661 0 65 8527764
0 168 8527791 0 169 8527888 0 145 8527914 0 138 8527961 0 139 8528100 0
138 8528166 0 165 8528201 0 139 8528293 0 380 8528343 0 381 8528420 0 16
8528669 0 17 8528737 0 16 8528790 0 17 8528855 0 16 8528910 0 17 8528952
0 16 8529001 0 17 8529078 0 164 8529085 0 165 8529225 0 139 8529279 0 138
8529370 0 139 8529477 0 381 8529548 0 ]
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A.8 How to read an email recording
An email recording always begins with:
Username: userName
Date: dd-mm-yy-24hrTime
Browser: browserIdentificationString
The userName is the name of the user who typed the email, the date is the date
and time that the email was finished (sent). The browserIdentificationString is
the name and version of the web browser that was used to type this email (in
the format in which the browser identifies itself). Following this, the section
Mouse appears, which is recorded in the format:
clickButtonNumber, timeInMilliseconds, modifiers, (xPos, yPos), ...
(A.1)
The clickButtonNumber is (button ∗ 2)+ (ifPress?0 : 1). The timeInMillisec-
onds is the absolute time this event was recorded. The modifiers is a four bit
integer with each bit representing the state of the Ctrl, Alt, Shift and Windows
keys at the time the button was pressed (these keys cannot be independently
recorded in a web-based system). Finally the coordinates of the mouse pointer
(relative to the document) are given.
For the remaining sections (To, CC, BCC, Subject, Body), the keystrokes
are recorded in the following form:
keyStroke, timeInMilliseconds, modifiers, ... (A.2)
The keyStroke is recorded as an ASCII character number and modified to be
(ASCIIcode ∗ 2)+ (ifPress?0 : 1). The timeInMilliseconds and modifiers are
in the same form as the mouse events. Pointer coordinates are irrelevant and
are not recorded.
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Appendix B
Instructions For Participants
These instructions are for typists who have agreed for their emails to be
recorded and used for evaluation in this thesis.
B.1 Requirements
This study requires you to have a Waikato Computer Science Department
email account and access to a web browser. If you are using Linux as an
operating system, you are requested to use Opera as a web browser because
Mozilla based web browsers for Linux contain a bug that prevents your typing
from being accurately recorded.
B.2 Links
The following URLs provide access to SquirrelMail and mailAnalysis for this
study:
SquirrelMail: http://chronicle.cs.waikato.ac.nz/mail
mailAnalysis: http://chronicle.cs.waikato.ac.nz/analysis
B.3 CS Webmail
For the duration of the study we request you use a different copy of SquirrelMail
for accessing your Computer Science emails. This copy, called RT SquirrelMail
(RT for Recorded Typing), will record the typing you perform in the email
compose screen. It does not record your password, or any text typed in a
reply/forward. Only the text typed in the To, CC, BCC, Subject and Body
text boxes, along with any mouse events that occur on that page are recorded.
If you do not wish your typing to be recorded for a particular email, simply
uncheck the box marked “If checked, all of your typing will be recorded for
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Figure B.1: Login screen—RT CS webmail
this email” before saving or sending the email (see Figure B.3). If you forget
to uncheck the box, you are still able to remove the recording from inclusion in
the experiment using the mailAnalysis system. Use of the mailAnalysis system
is described further in the next section.
Standard SquirrelMail and RT SquirrelMail have no functional differences
other than the obvious addition in RT SquirrelMail—the typing patterns for
emails are recorded. Visual markers have been added to RT SquirrelMail to
ensure you are always aware of which version of SquirrelMail you are using.
The login screen, shown in Figure B.1, has a red box around the username
and password entry, and a comment underneath providing a link back to the
standard SquirrelMail install. The main webmail screens, shown in Figures
B.2 and B.3, have been altered to have a yellow sidebar (instead of the default
blue) and carry the warning “This version of SquirrelMail will record your
typing”. The sidebar also provides a link to mailAnalysis.
B.4 Mail Analysis
The mailAnalysis system provides you with the ability to review your own
emails and delete them from the data store if you decide the content of the
email is not appropriate for inclusion in machine learning experiments. As a
participant you will only be given access to your own emails. You must register
with mailAnalysis in order to access your recordings. You will be taken to
160
Figure B.2: Inbox screen—RT CS webmail
Figure B.3: Compose screen—RT CS webmail
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Figure B.4: Registration screen—Mail Analysis
the register page when you click “Analyse Mail” in the left hand pane of RT
SquirrelMail if you have not previously registered (see Figure B.4). To register,
simply enter a password in the boxes provided, and click “Go” to begin using
mailAnalysis. After registering for the first time, clicking the “Analyse Mail”
link in RT SquirrelMail will take you straight into the mailAnalysis system.
The main screen from mailAnalysis is shown in Figure B.5. It displays a
list of all the emails recorded that will be used for machine learning, initially
ordered by the date they were recorded. You can alter the ordering of the
mailAnalysis system by clicking the grey boxes (or arrows) next to each col-
umn heading. Clicking the date of a particular email will pop up a window
displaying a reconstruction of the typing pattern recorded for that email (see
Figure B.6). In the reconstructed email window, it is possible to view the raw
email recording by clicking the button marked “Show Raw Recording” (see
Figure B.7). The reconstruction is not perfect—it shows only what could be
retrieved from the recorded sequence of typing events. The purpose of the re-
construction in mailAnalysis is to allow viewing of an emails content, without
subjecting you to the raw format of the recording.
You are encouraged to delete the email if the general content of the email
is confidential. Please do not delete emails just because you have typed your
name, email address or contact details inside it, because this sort of information
will be removed before machine learning is performed. To delete an email,
check the box next to that emails date and click the link marked “Delete
Selected Emails.” The emails are not instantly removed from disk, so if you
162
Figure B.5: Main screen—Mail Analysis
Figure B.6: Reconstructed email screen—Mail Analysis
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Figure B.7: Reconstructed email screen showing recording—Mail Analysis
delete an email by accident please get in touch with the researcher as quickly
as possible.
The mailAnalysis system also provides general summary statistics. These
statistics can be accessed by clicking the link marked “Summarise Activity”
on the main screen (Figure B.5). The summary statistics are provided for set
periods of time (all time, last 7 days, yesterday and today) and each period
can be accessed by clicking the appropriate link (see Figure B.8).
It is possible to change your registered password for mailAnalysis by se-
lecting “Options” at the top right hand corner of the screen and entering your
old password and a new one in the boxes provided. The password is used if
you wish to use mailAnalysis without first entering SquirrelMail. At the login
page (see Figure B.10), enter your SquirrelMail username and your current
mailAnalysis password to be taken into mailAnalysis. Logging out of mail-
Analysis by clicking “Logout” in the top right hand corner will take you back
to the login page.
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Figure B.8: Summary screen—Mail Analysis
Figure B.9: Options screen—Mail Analysis
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Figure B.10: Login screen—Mail Analysis
B.5 Recording Content
The data used during machine learning may be provided to a third party for
reproduction of the results. Any email content which may identify a participant
will be removed before this data is made available, and all stored usernames
will be generalised to userXX, where XX refers to a random number assigned
to each participant. The mailAnalysis system gives users access to their own
reconstructions of the recorded typing patterns and the original raw formats
of each email as well.
B.6 Final Review
At the end of the data collection, there will be a week-long grace period when
no further emails will be recorded but the mailAnalysis system will still be
available. This enables you to have a final review of the emails recorded in
order to decide whether they contain material inappropriate for inclusion in
this project, and delete them if necessary. You will be notified when the RT
SquirrelMail system becomes unavailable and the final review period begins.
The emails will not be accessed by the researcher until after this review period
is up, at which time they will be anonymized and moved to a secure store on
the researcher’s computer.
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Appendix C
Questionnaire
Introduction
The following questions are designed to provide bio-data for machine learning
on the typing samples. This is not a test, this information is only used to
evaluate the effectiveness of typist recognition. If at any stage you do not feel
comfortable answering a question, leave the answer as blank.
Questions
Participant Number:
Question One: Age
Please circle the option that applies to you:
• 11–20
• 21–30
• 31–40
• 41–50
• 51–60
• 60 or older
Question Two: Height
What is your height in centimetres?
Question Three: Weight
What is your weight in kilograms?
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Question Four: Handedness
In the table below indicate your preference for each hand in the following
activities by placing a check mark in the appropriate column. Where the
preference is so strong you would never try to use the other hand, put two
check marks. In the case you are indifferent to the use of either hand, place a
single check mark in both columns.
Some of the actions listed require the use of both hands. In these cases, the
part of the task, or object, for which hand preference is wanted is indicated in
brackets.
Please try and answer all questions, only leave a blank if you have no
experience with the task.
Task Left Hand Right Hand
Writing
Drawing
Throwing
Scissors
Toothbrush
Knife (without fork)
Spoon
Broom (upper hand)
Striking Match (match)
Opening Box (lid)
Total Check Marks
Question Five: Hand spans
On each of the following pages please place the hand indicated palm down on
the page, with fingers stretched out as far as possible, and trace around it with
a pen. The purpose of doing this is to enable hand span and finger lengths
to be measured in a uniform way. [Space omitted in this appendix, actual
questionnaires contained a single A4 page for each hand.]
168
Question Six: Keyboard
Are you a touch typist? That is, do you use all four fingers of both hands to
type on letter keys on a keyboard?
If not, how many fingers of each hand do you use to type?
Do you have to look at the keyboard to type on letter keys?
Do you have to look at the keyboard to type on number keys?
Do you suffer from RSI (Repetitive Strain Injury), a wrist injury, or any other
disability/injury that may impair your ability to type on a keyboard?
What type of keyboard do you type the majority of your emails with?
• Standard Keyboard
• Ergonomic (or Natural) Keyboard
• Laptop Keyboard
• Other (Please Specify)
Is there anything unusual about the keyboard that you use to type your work?
For example, does it have some letters swapped (such as Z and Y for German
users), do you use a layout other than QWERTY (e.g. Dvorak) or are there
keys that do not work correctly?
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Question Seven: Mouse
Please circle the option that best describes the mouse you use for the majority
of your computer work.
• Ball Mouse
• Ball Mouse (Wireless)
• Optical/Laser Mouse
• Optical/Laser Mouse (Wireless)
• Trackball
• Graphics Tablet (Pen)
• Graphics Tablet (Mouse)
• Touchpad (On a laptop or as a pad integrated with a keyboard)
• Other (Please Specify)
Question Eight: Computer Use
How many hours do you spend on a computer in an average weekday?
How many of those hours would be spent on a computer at home?
How many hours do you spend on a computer in an average weekend day?
How many of those hours would be spent on a computer at home?
From the following options, which one best describes your main use for a
computer?
• Email and Surfing the Internet
• Graphics (e.g. Drawing)
• Gaming
• Word Processing (e.g. Typing Reports) or Typing-Based Tasks (e.g.
Programming)
• Work Related (e.g. Data Entry, Spreadsheets)
• Other (Please Specify)
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Appendix D
List of Top 54 Predictive
Digraphs
The table below lists the top 54 predictive digraphs. Each digraph was typed at
least ten times by each of the first ten users in the sm-all dataset (Participants
A to J). The AUC values for each user were weighted on the number of times
each digraph was typed before being averaged and included in the table.
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Digraph Average Weighted AUC
in 0.744
as 0.726
yo 0.714
er 0.707
on 0.701
re 0.689
se 0.682
at 0.682
ou 0.681
ar 0.673
st 0.663
o Space 0.660
l Space 0.636
y Space 0.633
es 0.623
g Space 0.621
i Space 0.615
n Space 0.615
to 0.613
ha 0.609
he 0.604
th 0.600
t Space 0.599
a Space 0.599
Space y 0.599
r Space 0.595
d Space 0.595
s Space 0.594
ve 0.592
Space h 0.592
me 0.580
is 0.577
Delete Delete 0.576
e Space 0.575
le 0.575
an 0.571
ti 0.568
Space o 0.567
nt 0.566
Space s 0.562
or 0.559
en 0.559
Space f 0.555
ma 0.554
Space m 0.552
Enter Enter 0.548
Space w 0.548
Space i 0.547
e Backspace 0.540
Space c 0.536
Space a 0.536
Space t 0.523
Backspace Backspace 0.512
Space Backspace 0.507
